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INTRODUCTION 
When one thinks of how the law protects public rights in open spaces, 
the public trust doctrine comes to mind.  This is especially true in Chicago.  
The modern public trust doctrine was born in the landmark decision in 
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,1 growing out of struggles over the 
use of land along the margin of Lake Michigan in that city.2  Yet Chicago’s 
premier park—Grant Park, sitting on that land in the center of downtown 
Chicago—owes its existence to a different legal doctrine.  This other 
doctrine, developed by American courts in the nineteenth century, holds 
that owners of private property abutting land dedicated to a public use have 
a right to enjoin deviations from the dedication.  This “public dedication” 
doctrine was invoked by Aaron Montgomery Ward, the famous Chicago 
catalog merchant, in a series of actions from 1890 to 1910 to block 
construction of a variety of structures in Grant Park.3  The body of 
precedent that Ward created served for more than a century to keep Grant 
Park free of significant encroachments, saving it as open space for the use 
and enjoyment of future generations. 
The Ward cases are an important chapter in the history of the Chicago 
lakefront.  In 1887, Ward and his partner, George A. Thorne, purchased 
property on the west side of Michigan Avenue facing Lake Michigan from 
which to operate their burgeoning mail-order business.  The pair paid a 
premium for the land because it allowed them to construct a building 
favored with sunlight, fresh breezes, and lake views over the public land to 
the east.  Ward became upset, or so the story goes, when he observed 
workers building scaffolding in the park to load garbage into railroad cars 
for transport out of the City.4  Ward sued, claiming that this activity violated 
language on a map of the original subdivision where his property was 
 
1  146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
2  See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: 
What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004). 
3  City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 48 N.E. 927 (1897); Bliss v. Ward, 198 Ill. 104, 64 N.E. 
705 (1902); Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 89 N.E. 731 (1909); S. Park 
Comm’rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 248 Ill. 299, 93 N.E. 910 (1910).  
4  See generally Transcript of Record at 8–9, 41, Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 48 N.E. 927 (No. 129568); LOIS 
WILLE, FOREVER OPEN, CLEAR AND FREE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CHICAGO’S LAKEFRONT 71–74 (Univ. of 
Chi. Press 1991) (1972) (describing Ward’s reaction to goings-on in the park).  The transcripts of the 
record in the Ward cases are available at the Illinois State Archives in Springfield in the Supreme Court 
of Illinois Case Files 1820–1970. 
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located which stipulated that the space east of Michigan Avenue would be 
“[p]ublic ground forever to remain vacant of buildings.”5  Ward was able to 
show that this language created a public dedication of the land and that he, 
as an abutting property owner, had standing to secure an injunction against 
violations of the dedication.  The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in Ward’s 
favor in four major decisions, enjoining the construction not just of loading 
platforms but also of a National Guard armory and a natural history 
museum.6 
In the wake of Ward’s victories, the public dedication doctrine was 
wielded by generations of Michigan Avenue landowners to fend off 
construction of public buildings in what became a 319-acre park.  Only at 
the dawn of the twenty-first century were the Ward precedents overcome.  
Led by a mayor determined to bring more activity to downtown Chicago 
and promote tourism, the City, in conjunction with a consortium of wealthy 
private donors, constructed a $370 million project known as Millennium 
Park in the northwest corner of Grant Park, directly opposite the site of 
Montgomery Ward’s original catalog warehouse.7  Millennium Park 
features, among other things, a 130-foot-tall stainless-steel music pavilion 
designed by Frank Gehry, a multipurpose theater, a restaurant, and a pair of 
fifty-foot towers emitting water from faces on giant LED screens.8  The 
City obtained consents to the construction of Millennium Park from owners 
of property abutting the northwest corner of Grant Park, and these consents 
were held by a state court judge, in an unpublished order, to be an effective 
waiver of the public dedication.9  It remains to be seen whether this bypass 
of the dedication will undermine the Ward precedents or even cause them to 
collapse altogether. 
The public dedication doctrine is significant for reasons that go beyond 
understanding the historical development of the Chicago lakefront.  It also 
provides a significant point of juxtaposition to the public trust doctrine, 
which by a remarkable coincidence emerged at roughly the same time and 
place as the Ward precedents.10  Both the public trust doctrine and the 
public dedication doctrine are designed to preserve spaces dedicated to 
public uses.11  The public trust doctrine seeks to preserve public spaces by 
 
5  Ward, 169 Ill. at 402, 48 N.E. at 930 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
6  Id. at 422, 48 N.E. at 937; Bliss, 198 Ill. at 121, 64 N.E. at 709; Field Museum, 241 Ill. at 510, 89 
N.E. at 737; S. Park Comm’rs, 248 Ill. at 313, 93 N.E. at 915. 
7  TIMOTHY J. GILFOYLE, MILLENNIUM PARK: CREATING A CHICAGO LANDMARK 159 (2006).  
8  Id. at 181, 223, 251, 277, 324. 
9  Boaz v. City of Chicago, No. 99L-3804 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2000). 
10  The public trust doctrine emerged in modern form with the Illinois Central decision in 1892.  See 
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 800.  The first Ward case was filed in 1890 and decided in 1897.  
Ward, 169 Ill. at 393, 48 N.E. at 927. 
11  See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 724–25, 727–30 (1986) (discussing the foundation of the public 
dedication and public trust doctrines). 
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positing that certain resources are held in a restricted title that disables any 
transfer of these resources into the hands of private owners.12  The public 
dedication doctrine pursues the same end by recognizing the right of a 
select group of landowners uniquely affected by public spaces to sue in 
equity to prevent departures from the dedicated use. 
Yet even if they serve similar functions, the two doctrines differ in 
several important respects.  The public trust doctrine is effectively confined 
to land having some nexus with navigable waters; the public dedication 
doctrine covers a much wider range of streets, parks, and public squares.  
The public trust doctrine rests on the imputation of an imprecisely defined 
trust obligation; the public dedication doctrine, which often relies on 
publicly recorded maps and plats, applies to a more easily ascertained set of 
resources and incorporates a clearer conception of what is prohibited.13 
Perhaps most significantly, the public dedication doctrine and the 
public trust doctrine are governed by very different standing rules.  Under 
the public trust doctrine, there are two logical standing rules: either the state 
alone, through its legal officers, can sue to enforce the public trust, or any 
citizen of the state can sue to enforce the trust.14  The former rule precludes 
all private enforcement and leaves enforcement up to the vagaries of the 
political process; the latter rule allows any person, no matter how remote 
his or her connection to the resource, to invoke the doctrine, and effectively 
confers enforcement authority on nonprofit advocacy groups.  Under the 
public dedication doctrine, by contrast, an intermediate standing rule 
applies: in addition to the public authority that holds title to the burdened 
land, the doctrine also confers standing on abutting landowners, typically a 
moderate-sized group of individuals who have a strong interest in 
maintaining the public nature of the resource.15  This group of potential 
plaintiffs is large enough to ensure a variety of perspectives on whether the 
dedication should be enforced, but small enough that public authorities can 
attempt to secure their consent in advance of undertaking a project that 
arguably violates the dedication.  This intermediate standing rule arguably 
strikes a better balance than either of the rules associated with the public 
trust doctrine. 
The public dedication doctrine, particularly as it was applied in the 
Ward cases, is also significant because it allows us to evaluate the recent 
 
12  Thomas W. Merrill, Private Property and Public Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 75, 76–86 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011). 
13  See infra Part VI.B. 
14  Illinois traditionally followed the rule that only officers of the State could enforce the trust.  See, 
e.g., People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 152–53, 45 N.E. 830, 835 (1896).  More recently, the 
Illinois Supreme Court overruled this understanding and held that any taxpayer can sue to enforce the 
trust.  Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 46 Ill. 2d 330, 341–42, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (1970); see, e.g., 
Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 203 Ill. 2d 312, 786 N.E.2d 161 (2003). 
15  See infra Part VI.B. 
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proposal to create “antiproperty” rights as a way of protecting resources 
such as public parks.  Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have 
argued that parks and other open spaces are vulnerable to capture of local 
governments by interest groups seeking development opportunities.16  They 
have proposed as a solution that private-property owners who benefit 
disproportionately from parks and similar resources should be given veto 
power over any proposal to develop these resources.17  If the holders of such 
antiproperty rights are sufficiently numerous, they argue, the high 
transaction costs of achieving unanimous consent to development will 
effectively freeze public spaces in their current, open-space state.18  Their 
proposal, in effect, exactly replicates the traditional public dedication 
doctrine. 
Although it is always difficult to generalize from a small number of 
events, one real-world example that has played out over a significant period 
of time is much more illuminating than a purely hypothetical argument.  
The history of the public dedication doctrine on the Chicago lakefront 
suggests that antiproperty rights can serve as a powerful form of protection 
for public property.  The public dedication doctrine secured most of Grant 
Park’s 319 acres as open space while allowing, through the consent 
mechanism, for the construction of selective improvements such as the 
Chicago Art Institute and the miscellaneous structures of Millennium Park, 
both of which enjoy broad public support. 
There is also evidence, however, that the public dedication doctrine has 
resulted in overprotection of the park as open space.  It is far from clear that 
Montgomery Ward’s adamant refusal to allow the Field Museum of Natural 
History to be constructed in Grant Park was consistent with what most 
persons in Chicago wanted.  Ward’s stubbornness yielded an open space 
that now features one cluster of public buildings along Grant Park’s west 
and north edges (the Art Institute and Millennium Park) and another cluster 
(now called the “Museum Campus”) outside the south and southeast edges; 
the distance between the two clusters makes it difficult to walk between 
them in a single outing.  Perhaps even more strikingly, for three decades the 
Ward precedents frustrated every plan for the erection of a new pavilion for 
summer concerts in Grant Park.19  Presumably, abutting landowners 
preferred that the park remain quiet and empty on summer evenings, but 
this preference is almost certainly contrary to how the general public would 
want the space to be used.  Thus, the history suggests that the incentives of 
abutting property owners will not always align with those of the larger 
public. 
 
16  Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1 
(2003). 
17  Id. at 5–6. 
18  Id. at 38–48. 
19  See GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 43–77. 
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This Article is organized as follows: Part I describes the evolution of 
the space that is now known as Grant Park.  Part II traces the origins of the 
public dedication doctrine in the nineteenth century.  Part III describes how 
that doctrine was invoked in controversies over the use of the Chicago 
lakefront before Montgomery Ward came on the scene.  Part IV details 
Ward’s remarkable crusade to save Grant Park as an unencumbered open 
space, which created a powerful body of precedent having a lasting impact 
on the use of the park.  Part V describes the limits of the public dedication 
doctrine that was recognized in the Ward precedents.  Part VI offers some 
brief observations about why the public trust doctrine eclipsed the public 
dedication doctrine, compares the efficacy of the two doctrines in the 
context of the Chicago lakefront, and offers some general reflections about 
what this history tells us about the promises and pitfalls of recognizing 
antiproperty rights to contest development of public spaces. 
I. CONSTRUCTING A LAKEFRONT PARK 
In order to understand the controversies that gave rise to the Ward 
cases and their significance for the physical configuration of the Chicago 
lakefront, it is necessary to know something about the history of the space 
that is now called Grant Park.  In contrast to other famous urban parks, such 
as Central Park in New York City, Grant Park is almost entirely manmade 
and was constructed in fits and starts over more than a century and a half.  
In this Part, we highlight the major events in the evolution of the park, with 
particular attention to issues arising under the public dedication doctrine. 
A. The Early Chicago Lakefront 
The space that is now Grant Park, like the rest of Illinois, was part of 
the Northwest Territories ceded by Virginia and other states to the general 
government around the time of the Revolutionary War.20  When Illinois 
became a state in 1818, the only significant human presence in the place 
that would become Chicago was a military outpost called Fort Dearborn, 
located on the south bank of the Chicago River where the river emptied into 
Lake Michigan.21  By 1833, when it was incorporated as a town, Chicago 
had grown to a population of some 200–300.22  It soon began to expand at a 
geometric rate, spurred by a plan to build a canal that would join the 
Chicago River, which was connected via the Great Lakes and the Erie 
Canal to the East Coast, with the Des Plaines River, which flows into the 
Illinois River and thence to the Mississippi River and was thus connected to 
 
20  See PAUL W. GATES, PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW 
DEVELOPMENT 49–55 (photo. reprint 1979) (1968). 
21  ROBERT P. HOWARD, ILLINOIS: A HISTORY OF THE PRAIRIE STATE 94–95 (1972). 
22  Estimates vary as to how many individuals lived in Chicago at that time.  The total population 
certainly exceeded the 150 individuals required for incorporation as a town.  PAUL GILBERT & CHARLES 
LEE BRYSON, CHICAGO AND ITS MAKERS 57 (1929). 
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the port of New Orleans.23  Congress granted significant federal land to 
Illinois to subsidize the construction of such a canal, and in 1829 a Board of 
Canal Commissioners was established under state law to sell this land, with 
the proceeds to underwrite construction of the canal.24 
All land in Illinois was surveyed in accordance with the rectilinear grid 
established by the Land Ordinance of 1785, whereby land was divided into 
square townships of thirty-six numbered sections each of which contained 
640 acres.25  Congress granted to Illinois the odd-numbered sections for 
two-and-a-half miles on each side of the proposed route of the canal, and 
the State in turn granted these sections to the Canal Commissioners.26  One 
of these sections was fractional section 15 of township 39, located in what 
now includes the southeast portion of Chicago’s loop.  It was bounded on 
the west by State Street, on the north by Madison Street, on the south by 
12th Street, and on the east by Lake Michigan.  It was called “fractional” 
because most of section 15 was under Lake Michigan, and everyone 
assumed that the Canal Commissioners would not sell submerged land 
under the lake.  A map of fractional section 15 is reproduced as Figure 1.27 
 
 
 
23  Id. at 82–84; see also Perry R. Duis, The Shaping of Chicago, in AIA GUIDE TO CHICAGO 2 
(Alice Sinkevitch ed., 2d ed. 2004) (“By 1836, when work on the canal began in earnest, optimism about 
Chicago’s future had boosted land prices to astronomical levels and attracted over 3,000 more 
residents.”). 
24  Act of Mar. 30, 1822, ch. 14, 3 Stat. 659; Act of Mar. 2, 1827, ch. 51, 4 Stat. 234; 1829 Ill. Laws 
14.  That board was abolished in 1833 and reestablished in 1836.  1833 Ill. Laws 113; 1836 Ill. Laws 
145; HOMER HOYT, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LAND VALUES IN CHICAGO 11–12 (Beard Books 2000) 
(1933). 
25  GATES, supra note 20, at 68. 
26  Id. at 350; Dennis H. Cremin, Building Chicago’s Front Yard: Grant Park 1836 to 1936, at 28 
(Jan. 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola University Chicago) (UMI No. 9917766).  
27  Figure 1 is taken from the Illinois Central litigation in the United States Reports.  See Ill. Cent. 
R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 397 (1892) (“Map B” in the statement of the case).  See generally 
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2 (recounting this litigation).  Its origins are worth detailing.  The original 
map on which Figure 1 is based can be found in the Illinois State Archives, record number 491.105 
Plats.  Justice John Marshall Harlan’s circuit court opinion in the Illinois Central litigation contains a 
stylized version of this original map (which was then housed in the Canal Commissioners’ office in 
Lockport, Illinois).  Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 33 F. 730, 739 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888), aff’d, Ill. Cent. R.R. v. 
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).  That version (denominated “Map B” in the circuit court opinion) contains 
most of the information from the original map, whereas “Map B” as it appears in the U.S. Reports (i.e., 
Figure 1 here) is simplified.  Compare id. at 739, with 146 U.S. at 397.  The Supreme Court Reporter, 
published by West Publishing Co., contains a map closer to the version in Justice Harlan’s opinion in the 
Federal Reporter than to the one in the official U.S. Reports.  See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 36 S. Ct. 
1018, 1022–23 (1892) (foldout map).   
A version of the original map can also be found in the Cook County recorder’s office.  The map was 
filed for recording in Cook County on June 18, 1836, with a copy made and deemed recorded on July 
20, 1836, but this copy was destroyed in the Chicago Fire of 1871.  After the fire, the map was 
rerecorded on September 24, 1877, and the resulting copy is now found in Plats book 12, page 82, in the 
Office of the Cook County Recorder of Deeds. 
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FIGURE 1: FRACTIONAL SECTION 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Notice that the easternmost portion of the solid land—from Madison 
south to 12th Street, save only a small block between 11th and 12th—was 
not platted.  The Canal Commissioners’ map designates the entire area 
between the platted blocks and Lake Michigan as “Michigan Avenue.”  A 
commercial map from the same period labeled this area “PUBLIC 
GROUND[—]A Common to remain forever Open, Clear & free of any 
buildings, or other Obstructions Whatever” (see Figure 2).28  According to 
 
28  The map in Figure 2 was published by the lithography firm of Peter A. Meisner in New York.  
ROBERT A. HOLLAND, CHICAGO IN MAPS: 1612 TO 2002, at 61, 64 (2005).  Its primary purpose was 
probably to promote land sales to buyers on the East Coast.  See Elaine Lewinnek, Mapping Chicago, 
Imagining Metropolises: Reconsidering the Zonal Model of Urban Growth, 36 J. URB. HIST. 197, 199 
(2010).  Note that areas not yet officially platted, such as section 10 (the area immediately north of 
section 15), are filled in with imagined future subdivided land (indeed, all the way east to the lake). 
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testimony submitted in the Ward cases, the Canal Commissioners 
represented to prospective purchasers that the land east of Michigan Avenue 
would remain an open public space, and it is likely that this commercial 
map (or a similar visual aid) was used by the Canal Commissioners in 
marketing the land.29   
FIGURE 2: COMMERCIAL MAP OF FRACTIONAL SECTION 15.  “CHICAGO WITH SEVERAL 
ADDITIONS COMPILED FROM RECORDED PLATS IN THE CLERK’S OFFICE (1836)”30   
  
 
29  Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 277–78 (testimony of Fernando Jones). 
30  On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-37310. 
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Based on representations that the land east of Michigan Avenue would 
remain open space, the platted lots fronting on the west side of Michigan 
Avenue sold for higher prices than other land in fractional section 15.31 
Soon afterward, the U.S. Army decided to abandon Fort Dearborn, 
which was located in fractional section 10, immediately north of fractional 
section 15.32  This area was accordingly opened for sale by the federal 
government as the “Fort Dearborn Addition to Chicago.”33  A version of an 
1839 map of the Fort Dearborn subdivision, which was publicly recorded, is 
reproduced as Figure 3.34  Notice that the map includes a notation in the 
area south of Randolph Street and north of Washington Street, 
encompassing what would be Michigan Avenue and half of block 12 and 
saying “public ground for ever to remain vacant of buildings.”  Moreover, a 
note in the margin of the original map signed by Matthew Birchard, the 
federal agent who negotiated the sales and recorded the map with Cook 
County officials in 1839, states as follows: “The public ground between 
Randolph and Madison streets, and fronting upon Lake Michigan, is not to 
be occupied with buildings of any description.”35  Again, testimony was 
 
31  Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 244 (“Lots fronting east on Michigan avenue did sell for 
more than on Wabash, and efforts were made by the canal commissioners . . . to obtain a higher price on 
account of the eastern exposure on the lake.”) (testimony of Fernando Jones).  Section 15 was publicized 
by city promoters as having large lots and a “promenade . . . between [the lots] and the Lake, [making it] 
a very desirable place for private residences.”  CHI. AM., Apr. 23, 1836, at 1.  Chicago experienced 
much land speculation between 1830 and 1842, which affected land prices significantly.  HOYT, supra 
note 24, at 3–44. 
32  Ill. Cent. R.R., 33 F. at 733, 753. 
33  Id. at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
34  Figure 3 is a reproduction of Map A in the Illinois Central litigation, as it appears in the United 
States Reports.  Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 392 (1892) (statement of the case).  The 
Supreme Court Reporter and circuit court opinion contain more detailed versions of the same map.  See 
Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 36 S. Ct. 1018, 1020–21 (1892) (foldout map); Ill. Cent. R.R., 33 F. at 735. 
35  Ill. Cent. R.R., 33 F. at 734 n.1.  The original recorded copy of this map burned in the Chicago 
Fire of 1871, and the map was not rerecorded after the fire.  The only record on file with the Office of 
the Cook County Recorder of Deeds today is an unofficial copy of a map found on page 2B of both tract 
books 460A and 460B.  It is unknown whether the original document containing Birchard’s comment 
still exists. 
Several contemporaneous maps of the area contain language of dedication similar to that of Figure 3, 
including maps found in the records of the U.S. Senate.  See, e.g., U.S. Senate, Maps Accompanying the 
Report of Thomas Jefferson Cram in Senate Document 140, in 4 PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PRINTED BY 
ORDER OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH 
CONGRESS (1839); Fort Dearborn Addition to Chicago, 1839, ENCYCLOPEDIA CHI., http://www.
encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/10710.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2011).  
There is evidence that the restriction of land as “public ground” was demanded by local residents.  
Anticipating the sale of the abandoned Fort Dearborn, local residents of Chicago adopted a resolution 
supporting an application for a grant of the land, “upon the express condition” that twenty acres fronting 
Lake Michigan be reserved for a public square free from buildings, with that area to revert to the federal 
government in the event it were built upon.  See CHI. DEMOCRAT, Nov. 4, 1835.  The map restriction as 
written contains no language of reversion.  The Supreme Court later held, in United States v. Illinois 
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offered much later in the Ward litigation that lots abutting this area were 
sold at a premium based on the understanding that they would enjoy direct 
exposure to Lake Michigan.36 
FIGURE 3: FRACTIONAL SECTION 10 
  
 
Central Railroad, 154 U.S. 225, 241–42 (1894), that the federal government retained no property rights 
in section 10.  
36  See Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 244. 
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These map and plat notations would provide the legal foundation for 
the later invocation of the public dedication doctrine by owners of land on 
the west side of Michigan Avenue.  Otherwise, there were no legal 
restrictions on how land along the lakefront might be used.  There was no 
zoning ordinance in Chicago in the nineteenth century; public regulation of 
land use would come only much later.37 
The preferred use of Michigan Avenue property, at least initially, was 
for residential structures.  The western side of Michigan Avenue quickly 
filled with large residential structures populated by the Chicago elite.38  The 
land to the east of Michigan Avenue, in keeping with the restrictions 
appearing on various maps as recounted above, remained vacant of 
permanent structures.39  This area, stretching from Randolph Street on the 
north to Park Row on the south, came to be known as “Lake Park,” and was 
officially given this designation by city ordinances enacted in the 1840s.40  
There was at this time, however, no formal governmental structure for 
preserving and maintaining the park. 
The most pressing problem Michigan Avenue residents faced in the 
1840s and 1850s was not to prevent construction in Lake Park, but to 
ensure that the park did not disappear altogether.41  Severe erosion became a 
significant problem along this portion of the lakefront, especially after 
winter storms.42  At one point, Michigan Avenue residents had to work 
through the night for fear that the water would wash away not only the 
street but also the residences on its west side.43  Everyone recognized that 
 
37  Chicago first adopted a zoning ordinance in 1923.  JOSEPH P. SCHWIETERMAN & DANA M. 
CASPALL, THE POLITICS OF PLACE: A HISTORY OF ZONING IN CHICAGO 17–25 (2006). 
38  See HERMAN KOGAN & ROBERT CROMIE, THE GREAT FIRE: CHICAGO 1871, at 19–20, 23 (1971). 
39  See Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 203–04 (testimony of Jonathan Young Scammon).  
Scammon, who had lived in Chicago since 1835 and was regarded as an expert on the history of the 
lakefront, had died by the time the first Ward case went to trial.  He had previously testified about 
lakefront history in an injunction proceeding in 1869, see infra notes 199–209 and accompanying text, 
and the parties in the Ward cases stipulated to the introduction of this testimony into evidence.  
Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 187–88. 
40  The land was officially designated “Lake Park” in 1847.  Chi., Ill., An Ordinance More Definitely 
Designating Certain Localities in the City of Chicago, and Providing for the Naming and Numbering of 
Certain Avenues, Streets, Parks, Squares, and Places § 4 (Aug. 10, 1847), in CHARTER OF THE CITY OF 
CHICAGO AND AMENDMENTS WITH RULES OF COUNCIL AND ORDINANCES 76 (Chicago, Democrat 
Office 1849).  The City had also passed a resolution in 1844 to enclose much of the area east of 
Michigan Avenue as a park.  However, resolutions from that era were not officially published and the 
original copy has been lost.  The resolution was read into the record in the first Ward case.  Transcript of 
Record, supra note 4, at 103–04. 
41  See Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 203–04 (testimony of Jonathan Young Scammon). 
42  See id. 
43  Id. 
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some kind of breakwater was needed to protect the shore, but no agreement 
could be reached on a mechanism for financing such a project.44 
B. Entry of the Illinois Central Railroad 
At this point, the newly chartered Illinois Central Railroad came onto 
the scene.  The railroad wanted access to the Chicago River, where grain 
and other commodities were transferred to vessels for reshipment to the 
East Coast.45  The railroad proposed that it be allowed to enter the City 
along the lakefront and construct a terminal between Randolph Street and 
the Chicago River.  The City agreed, provided that the railroad would locate 
its tracks outside Lake Park, on trestles in the lake, and would construct a 
substantial breakwater to protect the shore.46  In deference to the interests of 
the Michigan Avenue residents, the authorizing ordinance prohibited the 
railroad from allowing trains to remain standing in this area and from 
constructing any building or other improvements in Lake Park that might 
obstruct the views from the shore.47  All the railroad’s terminal and 
switching facilities were to be located either north of Randolph Street or 
south of 12th Street.48 
One can see further evidence of the influence of the Michigan Avenue 
landowners in the revised charter of the City adopted by the state legislature 
in 1861 and 1863.  The charter included a section providing in part that 
“[n]o encroachment shall be made upon the land or water west of [the 
Illinois Central Railroad right-of-way] by any railroad company,” and 
permitted any owner of a lot fronting Michigan Avenue to sue to enjoin 
“any such encroachments.”49  For good measure, the charter provided that 
“[n]either the common council of the city of Chicago, nor any other 
authority, shall ever have the power to permit encroachments thereon, 
without the assent of all the persons owning lots or land on said street or 
avenue.”50  Thus, critical elements of the public dedication doctrine were 
effectively codified in positive law in 1861 and 1863. 
Once the Illinois Central facilities were complete, Lake Park took on 
the somewhat awkward form of a series of narrow strips running north and 
south (as can be seen in Figure 4).  Immediately east of Michigan Avenue 
 
44  See ROBIN L. EINHORN, PROPERTY RULES: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CHICAGO, 1833–1872, at 91–
99 (1991). 
45  See Edmund W. Kitch & Clara Ann Bowler, The Facts of Munn v. Illinois, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 
313, 320–21. 
46  Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 811–25. 
47  Chi., Ill., An Ordinance Concerning the Illinois Central Railroad §§ 8–9 (June 14, 1852), in 
CHARTER AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 352 (George W. & John A. Thompson eds., 
Chicago, D.B. Cooke & Co. 1856). 
48  Id. §§ 1, 11. 
49  1861 Ill. Laws 118, 136; accord 1863 Ill. Laws 40, 96.  
50  1861 Ill. Laws 118, 136; accord 1863 Ill. Laws 40, 96. 
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was a narrow strip of solid land.  Farther to the east was a strip of shallow 
water—in effect a lagoon—which served as a harbor for small boats.  Even 
farther to the east was the right-of-way of the Illinois Central, with tracks 
perched above the water on trestles.  Just beyond the tracks (and another 
thin strip of water) was the protective breakwater.  Lake Park retained this 
basic form from the late 1850s through the 1860s. 
FIGURE 4: LAKE PARK “ROWHOUSES ALONG MICHIGAN AVENUE OVERLOOKING RIVER AND 
FACTORIES, LOOKING NORTH FROM HARRISON STREET CIRCA 1865”51 
In 1869, the Illinois General Assembly enacted a law that sparked 
intense controversy about the future of the lakefront.  The statute was 
designed to resolve uncertainty about the legal title to Lake Park and 
transform the Chicago lakefront with a massive new outer harbor.52  The 
area north of Monroe Street and west of the railroad tracks was to be sold 
by the City to the Illinois Central for $800,000.  The Illinois Central would 
fill the shallow water in this area and construct an enlarged passenger depot.  
The area south of Monroe Street and west of the tracks would be conveyed 
to the City, which would use the $800,000 to beautify the space as a proper 
public park.  The area east of the tracks, for a distance of one mile from 
Michigan Avenue, would be conveyed to the Illinois Central for purposes 
 
51  On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-62330. 
52  See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 860–94. 
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of constructing a new outer harbor to relieve congestion in the existing 
harbor, the Chicago River.53 
The statute was unpopular in Chicago, primarily because $800,000 was 
thought to be an inadequate price for north Lake Park, and newspapers 
quickly dubbed it “the Lake Front Steal.”54  The City of Chicago refused 
officially to accept the first installment of the $800,000 when it was 
tendered by the railroad.55  The nation had by then entered into an economic 
depression, and the railroad was in no financial condition to pursue new 
improvements along the lakefront.  The Act, together with the various 
projects that it envisioned, was effectively dead.  In an act that would give 
rise to litigation resolved only decades later, the Illinois legislature formally 
repealed it in 1873.56 
An even more dramatic event occurred on October 8, 1871, when a fire 
broke out in Mrs. O’Leary’s barn, as the story goes, on the near southwest 
side of Chicago.57  Whipped by high winds, the flames spread rapidly to the 
north and east, eventually incinerating a large part of the City.58  The fine 
houses on Michigan Avenue were destroyed, as were many of the Illinois 
Central’s facilities north of Randolph Street.59  The railroad’s tracks and 
most of its rolling stock were spared, an unforeseen benefit of building a 
railroad in a lake.60 
The fire had several consequences for Lake Park.  Massive amounts of 
rubble from the City had to be buried.  At the suggestion of Mayor Roswell 
Mason, a former chief engineer of the Illinois Central, much of the debris 
was dumped in Lake Park, in the area between solid land and the railroad 
tracks.  In fairly short order, all of Lake Park up to the Illinois Central 
breakwater was filled in, significantly increasing the size of the park.61  
When reconstruction of the City began, the character of Michigan Avenue 
changed.  Rather than residences, miscellaneous commercial structures—
eventually made of brick and stone to comply with the new fire code—went 
up along the west side of Michigan Avenue.62  Among the most imposing of 
the new structures would be the headquarters of Montgomery Ward & Co. 
 
53  Id. at 860–77; see also id. at 863–64 (describing a requirement in the law that the Illinois Central 
pay the State seven percent of gross receipts from all leases or improvements of Lake Park). 
54  Id. at 854. 
55  Id. at 895. 
56  1873 Ill. Laws 115; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 905–12. 
57  3 BESSIE LOUISE PIERCE, A HISTORY OF CHICAGO: THE RISE OF A MODERN CITY 1871–1893, at 
3–8 (1957). 
58  Id. 
59  See KOGAN & CROMIE, supra note 38, at 92–93. 
60  See JOHN F. STOVER, HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD 182 (1975). 
61  Id. at 184. 
62  See HOYT, supra note 24, at 102. 
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The crisis created by the fire also resulted in new uses of Lake Park.  In 
the immediate aftermath of the fire, the City, in a desperate effort to keep 
the local economy functioning, leased out a portion of Lake Park for 
temporary commercial buildings.63  Once the rebuilding effort in the 
downtown was underway, these structures were torn down.64  In their place, 
the City in 1873 authorized the erection of a huge Inter-state Industrial 
Exposition Building in Lake Park, between Monroe Street and Jackson 
Street (see Figure 5).  The purpose of this structure was to hold an 
exhibition of Chicago goods and wares in an effort to announce to the world 
that Chicago had recovered from the devastation.65  The exhibition was 
sufficiently successful that it was extended for a second year, and then other 
uses were found for the massive building.  Eventually, the Inter-state 
Exposition Building evolved into a kind of all-purpose convention center, 
hosting agricultural fairs, horticultural displays, art exhibitions, musical 
concerts, and even the 1884 Republican and Democratic national 
presidential conventions.66  It remained a looming presence on the lakefront 
until 1892, when it was demolished and replaced by the building that 
became the Art Institute.67 
FIGURE 5: INTER-STATE INDUSTRIAL EXPOSITION BUILDING (WITH THREE CUPOLAS); 
LOOKING NORTH ON MICHIGAN AVENUE CIRCA 189068 
 
63  Id.  (discussing temporary buildings on the lakefront). 
64  See Cremin, supra note 26, at 92–97 (discussing the construction of the Inter-state Exposition 
Building). 
65  Id. 
66  Id. at 100–15; see also R. CRAIG SAUTTER & EDWARD M. BURKE, INSIDE THE WIGWAM: 
CHICAGO PRESIDENTIAL CONVENTIONS 1860–1996, at 46–65 (1996). 
67  See infra notes 76–81, 312–33 and accompanying text. 
68  Photograph by J.W. Taylor (on file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-62407). 
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Michigan Avenue landowners did not object to any of these 
developments—the landfilling of the shallow water, the temporary 
commercial structures, or the Inter-state Exposition Building—in the years 
immediately after the fire.  No doubt the shock of the fire and the sense of 
collective crisis had much to do with this.  Moreover, the Michigan Avenue 
owners could hardly say that these developments were blocking their view, 
when their houses lay in ruins.  The Inter-state Exposition Building was 
understood to be a temporary structure when it was first erected, and some 
of the Michigan Avenue elite were either sponsors of this undertaking or 
were actively involved in the cultural activities that took place in the giant 
building in later years.69  In any event, in part because of the passivity of the 
Michigan Avenue owners during this period, the City in the ensuing years 
permitted a variety of structures to be erected in Lake Park.  Among these 
were a stadium for Albert Spalding’s Chicago White Stockings Base Ball 
Club (the forerunner of the Chicago Cubs), initially erected in 1877 and 
then demolished and replaced by a larger stadium in 1882;70 structures to 
accommodate armory buildings for two companies of state militia, erected 
in 1881 and demolished in 1897;71 a passenger depot for the Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad, which had obtained trackage rights from the Illinois Central, 
erected in 1882 and demolished in 1891;72 and a massive temporary post 
office building, erected in 1896, enlarged in 1900, and demolished in 
1905.73  Eventually, as we shall see, these structures evoked multiple 
objections from Michigan Avenue landowners and produced significant 
litigation.74 
The 1890s witnessed another event in Chicago history that would have 
a major impact on the park.  Chicago was selected by Congress to be the 
site of the World’s Columbian Exposition, celebrating the 400th 
anniversary of Christopher Columbus’s voyage to the New World.  At first, 
it was expected that this World’s Fair would be located in Lake Park.  But 
this would have required extensive landfilling to enlarge the park, and was 
opposed both by the Illinois Central and by the War Department, which by 
 
69  See Our Exposition, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 1873, at 3; The Council, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 29, 1873, at 3; 
Cremin, supra note 26, at 99–101. 
70  See Bill of Complaint at 7–8, United States v. Chi. Base Ball Club, No. 19026 (C.C.N.D. Ill. May 
27, 1884).  
71  See City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 421, 48 N.E. 927, 936 (1897). 
72  See Bill of Complaint at 15, Illinois v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. (C.C.N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1882); Cremin, 
supra note 26, at 101. 
73  3 J. SEYMOUR CURREY, CHICAGO: ITS HISTORY AND ITS BUILDERS 359 (1912); see also Ward v. 
Cong. Constr. Co., 99 F. 598 (7th Cir. 1900) (dissolving injunction against expansion of the temporary 
post office). 
74  A proposal to build a power house for the Exposition Building also generated a legal challenge.  
Cremin, supra note 26, at 161–62.  The challenge came from Warren Leland in 1889, joined later by 
Sarah Daggett.  Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892); see 
infra Parts III and IV.B. 
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then had assumed active oversight of the harbor facilities.  As a result, the 
fair was held in Jackson Park, on Chicago’s South Side.75 
The Columbian Exposition nevertheless had a significant impact on the 
future of Lake Park.  One activity affiliated with the fair was the World’s 
Congress Auxiliary, an ambitious program of several thousand lectures 
open to the public and delivered by scholarly, literary, and religious 
figures.76  The organizers decided that the venue for the lectures should be 
Lake Park.77  After much jockeying, it was also decided that the Inter-state 
Exposition Building would be torn down, and a new building in the 
neoclassical style associated with the fair would be built in its place to host 
the program.78  After the Columbian Exposition ended, the building would 
become the new home of the Art Institute of Chicago.79 
There was great pressure to have the new building ready for the 
opening of the Columbian Exposition, and several Michigan Avenue 
landowners consented to the project.  Nevertheless, litigation brought by 
Sarah Daggett delayed its completion.80  The issue was eventually resolved 
in favor of the City and the Art Institute, and the new structure was 
sufficiently complete to be used as a venue for lectures in the summer of 
1893.81 
The Columbian Exposition also had indirect impacts on the park.  In 
order to accommodate the huge number of visitors to the fair, the Illinois 
Central built a new terminal south of the park, between Park Row and 12th 
Street, called the Illinois Central Station.82  After the Exposition closed, this 
became the Illinois Central’s principal intercity passenger depot in Chicago, 
effectively ending the railroad’s quest to use north Lake Park as a site for an 
enlarged depot.83  The Columbian Exposition also gave rise to new 
enthusiasm for the creation of large cultural institutions in the City, 
including the Field Museum of Natural History.84 
One institution that emerged at this time and deserves note was the 
Chicago Public Library, which was authorized to occupy space previously 
known as Dearborn Park, just west of Michigan Avenue between Randolph 
Street and Washington Street.  This space had been included as part of the 
“public ground” on the Fort Dearborn Addition map that was “for ever to 
 
75  Cremin, supra note 26, at 129–46. 
76  Id. at 156–64, 182–93. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  See infra Part IV.B. 
81  Cremin, supra note 26, at 163–65, 185. 
82  STOVER, supra note 60, at 217–20. 
83  After 1919, when the Illinois Central agreed to electrify the tracks north of Park Row, see infra 
note 117, the north end of the park was served only by commuter trains. 
84  See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
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remain vacant of buildings.”85  It had served for years as one of the few 
green spots west of Michigan Avenue.  Nevertheless, consents were readily 
obtained from abutting landowners to use Dearborn Park as a site for the 
library, which was constructed in the same austere neoclassical style as the 
Art Institute.86 
C. Lake Park Becomes Grant Park 
The mid-1890s marked a critical turning point for Lake Park.  In 1892, 
the U.S. Supreme Court issued the first of four decisions that resolved the 
legal uncertainty about the title to Lake Park.87  The Court’s most important 
determination was that the State of Illinois owned the bed of Lake 
Michigan.88  Thus, the state legislature had the ultimate say over how this 
submerged land would be used.  The Court also held that land beneath the 
lake was held by the State in trust for the public, and that the State could not 
dispose of the land in a way that would impair the public’s access to the 
lake or free navigation on the lake.89  Collectively, the Court’s decisions 
extinguished any hope on the part of the Illinois Central—or any other 
private enterprise—that it could control the future development of the 
lakefront. 
This period was also critical because of the powerful impression that 
the Columbian Exposition created on the public imagination.  Under the 
guiding hand of Daniel Burnham, Chicago had built a magical “White City” 
in Jackson Park, about six miles south of Lake Park, featuring large 
neoclassical buildings, public plazas, and monumental statuary (see Figure 
6).90  Not surprisingly, after the question of title to Lake Park was resolved, 
the White City served as a model for how the park might be reconstructed.  
 
85  See supra Figure 3. 
86  The library directors obtained consents from the owners of property that abutted Dearborn Park in 
the horseshoe fronting Washington Street, Garland Court, and Randolph Street.  At that time, Ward’s 
property did not directly front Washington Street (it was one lot to the south), and thus Ward was not 
approached to sign the consent.  The Chicago Public Library has retained the consent form, along with a 
list of abutting property owners detailing the lots that each owned.  See Owners of Lots Abutting on 
Dearborn Park (July 14, 1890), in Chicago Public Library Archives: Property Records Dearborn Park 
Property 1935–1898 Box 1, available at Harold Washington Library (on file with authors).  No property 
owners south of Washington Street objected to this procedure, even though under the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s subsequent decisions in Ward III and IV the library arguably should have obtained the consent 
of all property owners along Michigan Avenue.  See infra Part V.C (discussing the proper set of owners 
who must consent). 
87  Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 154 U.S. 225 
(1894); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 176 U.S. 646 (1900); Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 184 U.S. 77 
(1902). 
88  Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452. 
89  Id. 
90  See 1 A HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION HELD IN CHICAGO IN 1893, at 134–
80, 352–53, 364 (Rossiter Johnson ed., 1897).  For a popular account of the fair and its impact on the 
City, emphasizing Burnham’s role, see ERIK LARSON, THE DEVIL IN THE WHITE CITY (2003). 
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Chicago’s business and cultural elite proceeded to draw up numerous plans 
for redevelopment of the lakefront, most of which took the White City as 
their inspiration.91  The most influential of these plans, not coincidentally, 
were authored by Burnham himself.  
FIGURE 6: “BIRD’S EYE VIEW OF THE LAGOON AREA AT THE WORLD’S 
COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION 1893”92 
The culmination of this planning process was the Plan of Chicago, 
published by Burnham and his designated successor, Edward H. Bennett, in 
1909.93  Burnham and Bennett’s Plan was a dazzling utopian vision, 
featuring a greatly enlarged lakefront park as its focal point.  The park 
would be flanked by huge piers reaching out into the lake, with a large oval 
harbor for yachts in the middle (see Figure 7).  Marshall Field had promised 
to fund a splendid natural history museum, which Burnham and others 
envisioned would be the centerpiece of the park.  A new Crerar Library, 
also funded by a major bequest, would also be added to the park.94 
 
91  Cremin, supra note 26, at 206–07. 
92  On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-62403. 
93  DANIEL H. BURNHAM & EDWARD H. BENNETT, PLAN OF CHICAGO PREPARED UNDER THE 
DIRECTION OF THE COMMERCIAL CLUB DURING THE YEARS MCMVI, MCMVII, AND MCMVIII 
(Charles Moore ed., 1909).  See generally CARL SMITH, THE PLAN OF CHICAGO: DANIEL BURNHAM 
AND THE REMAKING OF THE AMERICAN CITY (2006) (detailing the roles of Burnham and Bennett in the 
development of the Plan). 
94  For the various proposals for the Field Museum and Crerar Library, see GILFOYLE, supra note 7, 
at 21–30. 
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FIGURE 7: BURNHAM’S “PLAN OF CHICAGO” RENDERING LOOKING EAST TOWARDS PROPOSED 
HARBOR AND PIERS (1909)95 
With the Chicago elite solidly behind the Burnham Plan,96 the Chicago 
City Council enacted ordinances in 1895 and 1896 designed to make the 
plan a reality, and the Illinois legislature adopted legislation confirming 
these measures.97  The ordinances called for a massive landfilling project, 
covering the area from the Illinois Central tracks east to the harbor line 
established by the U.S. Army.  Reflecting anxiety about social unrest 
associated with the Pullman Strike, which had been suppressed by federal 
troops bivouacked in Lake Park,98 the ordinances provided that the newly 
filled area north of Monroe Street would be transferred to the State for 
purposes of constructing an armory and parade ground for the Illinois 
 
95  On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-39070. 
96  See Letter from Daniel Burnham to John B. Sherman (Apr. 7, 1897), available at http://www.
encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/410027.html (“Your friend Mr. Armour, and Mr. Pullman, and 
everyone else, so far as I know, is enthusiastic for its immediate accomplishment, except Joe[] 
Donnersberger, who is sour, and jealous and ridiculous.”). 
97  See Chi., Ill., Ordinance Providing for a Settlement of the Lake Front Park Question (Oct. 21, 
1895), in JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO FOR COUNCIL 
YEAR 1895, at 1138–45 (1895); Chi., Ill., Ordinance Turning over the Control of a Part of the Lake 
Front to the South Park Commissioners (July 27, 1896), in JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITY 
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO FOR THE COUNCIL YEAR 1896, at 783–85 (1896).  The ordinances 
were accepted by the Illinois General Assembly.  See 1897 Ill. Laws 32; see also Filling for the Lake-
Front Park, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1897, at 6; Ready for Rapid Work, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 1895, at 8. 
98  See DAVID RAY PAPKE, THE PULLMAN CASE: THE CLASH OF LABOR AND CAPITAL IN 
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 20–37 (1999); see also ALMONT LINDSEY, THE PULLMAN STRIKE: THE STORY OF 
A UNIQUE EXPERIMENT AND OF A GREAT LABOR UPHEAVAL 203–38 (Phoenix Books 1964) (1942). 
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National Guard.99  The southern portion of the park would be transferred to 
the South Park Commissioners (SPC) for development into a formal park 
and sites for museums, libraries, and other civic and cultural buildings.100  
Finally, in 1899, the entire area was renamed “Grant Park” in honor of 
President (and one-time Illinois resident) Ulysses S. Grant.101 
Armed with this authority, the SPC quickly set about filling in the lake 
east of the Illinois Central tracks.  Between 1896 and 1906, the 
commissioners engaged in steady landfill activity, starting with about six 
acres per year in the first half of the decade and accelerating to double and 
triple that rate in the second half.102  By 1906, more than 128 acres of new 
land had been created.103  One can get a sense of this development from 
Figure 8. 
FIGURE 8: “MICHIGAN AVENUE. BIRD’S EYE VIEW NORTH FROM HARRISON STREET 1913,” 
SHOWING LANDFILL AND THE ART INSTITUTE AS THE ONLY BUILDING IN GRANT PARK104   
As to the contemplated division between military facilities to the north 
and cultural activities in the south, the plans of the South Park 
Commissioners and their lead architects, Burnham and Bennett, were 
almost entirely frustrated by Montgomery Ward.  The first Ward case, 
decided in 1897, spared the Art Institute on the understanding that all 
 
99  See infra Parts IV.C and IV.D.  For a description of proposed armory construction, see Park in 
the Lake, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1894, at 1.  
100  See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
101  1899 Ill. Laws 328. 
102  Cremin, supra note 26, at 249. 
103  Id. 
104  On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-18353.  
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landowners had consented to its construction.105  But Ward I sounded the 
death knell for all other permanent structures in the original Lake Park, 
including armories, railroad depots, and post offices.  Ward II, handed 
down in 1902, killed the plan to use the newly filled land east of the Illinois 
Central tracks for a training facility for the National Guard.106  Ward III107 
and IV,108 decided in 1909 and 1910 respectively, eliminated the possibility 
of using the park as a site for either the Field Museum or the Crerar Library. 
The cumulative effect of the four Ward decisions was to leave a huge 
vacant space in the center of the much enlarged Grant Park.  Under some 
circumstances, this would have caused a complete rethinking of the 
lakefront’s future.  But the tremendous momentum built up behind the 
Burnham Plan, with its animating vision grounded in what would come to 
be called the “City Beautiful Movement,” could not be deflected.109  
Implementation of the Burnham Plan moved ahead under the guiding hand 
of Edward Bennett, but the multiple cultural institutions contemplated for 
the center of the park were relegated to the periphery.  A site for the Field 
Museum was secured on 12th Street, just south of the area protected by the 
Ward cases.110  A site for the Crerar Library was found on the west side of 
Michigan Avenue, again just outside the protected area.111  Other museums 
and cultural buildings—the Public Library, the Auditorium Building, 
Orchestra Hall, the Shedd Aquarium, the Adler Planetarium—would all be 
erected just outside the perimeter of the park, either on the west side of 
Michigan Avenue or south of 12th Street.  One of the piers contemplated by 
the Burnham Plan was eventually constructed—the enormous 3000-foot 
Navy Pier, north of the park area.  One of the offshore islands contemplated 
by the plan—the so-called Northerly Island—was created and eventually 
became an airport and then a nature preserve.112  In a direct echo of the 
 
105  City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 421, 48 N.E. 927, 937 (1897) (“The only permanent 
building, perhaps, that is excepted from the injunction is the Art Institute, and all the property owners 
gave their consent to its erection.”). 
106  Bliss v. Ward, 198 Ill. 104, 64 N.E. 705 (1902). 
107  Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 89 N.E. 731 (1909). 
108  S. Park Comm’rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 248 Ill. 299, 93 N.E. 910 (1910). 
109  The City Beautiful Movement took its inspiration from the Columbian Exposition; it stressed an 
integrated plan of buildings, parks, and walks, typically in a neoclassical style, as a corrective for 
haphazard urbanization.  See WILLIAM H. WILSON, THE CITY BEAUTIFUL MOVEMENT 53–74 (1989); 
SMITH, supra note 93, at 14–15, 67, 154.  The movement was actively promoted by the Chicago 
Commercial Club.  J. THEODORE FINK, GRANT PARK TOMORROW: FUTURE OF CHICAGO’S FRONT YARD 
74–79 (1979); GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 43. 
110  People To Own the Shore; Field Museum at 12th Street, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 1911, at 1. 
111  Crerar Library Is Dedicated in Boulevard Home, CHI. TRIB., May 29, 1921, at 14. 
112  Northerly Island, CHI. PARK DISTRICT, http://www.chicagoparkdistrict.com/index.cfm/
fuseaction/parks.detail/object_id/5235d96e-2f1c-4c63-80b7-c9e7c589e0ba.cfm (last visited Aug. 14, 
2011). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1440 
original plan, two yacht clubs were allowed to locate at the foot of the park, 
with their boathouses perched on pilings in the lake.113 
The otherwise vacant park was landscaped in accordance with the 
neoclassical dictates favored by Bennett, a graduate of the École des Beaux 
Arts.  Like the gardens at Versailles, the park was divided into large 
rectangles joined by long walkways.  Eventually the rectangles were filled 
in with trees, shrubs, neoclassical concrete balustrades, fountains, and 
statuary.  Other than the Art Institute, which exploited the original consents 
given by the Michigan Avenue landowners by continually expanding to the 
east, no buildings graced the park other than a few comfort stations and a 
solitary band shell.  In the summer, the park served as a gathering place for 
collective celebrations, such as Fourth of July pageantry, an art fair, and 
free concerts.  But for most of the year, it stood relatively empty.114 
Nature is said to abhor a vacuum.  If the huge space that was Grant 
Park could not be occupied with buildings, it could be filled with 
automobiles.  Over the course of the twentieth century, Grant Park was 
crisscrossed by multilane roadways.  Lake Shore Drive and Columbus 
Drive ran through the park north and south; Monroe Street, Jackson Street, 
Congress Parkway, and Balbo Avenue ran east and west through all or part 
of the park.  The landfill area east of the railroad tracks and north of 
Monroe Street, which was slated in the 1896 ordinance to become a 
National Guard armory and training ground, became a vast outdoor parking 
lot.115  After World War II, the parking gradually moved underground; 
eventually much of Grant Park would be perched on top of four huge 
underground parking structures.116  Like much of the rest of America, Grant 
Park was created by the railroad but came to be dominated by the 
automobile. 
The transformation of Grant Park from a railroad-centered to an 
automobile-centered space received its legal imprimatur in the so-called 
Lake Front Ordinance of 1919.117  This law reflected an agreement worked 
 
113  See McCormick v. Chi. Yacht Club, 331 Ill. 514, 163 N.E. 418 (1928); Stevens Hotel Co. v. Chi. 
Yacht Club, 339 Ill. 463, 171 N.E. 550 (1930). 
114  GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 22–29, 43–49. 
115  Chi., Ill., Ordinance Turning over the Control of a Part of the Lake Front to the South Park 
Commissioners (July 27, 1896), in JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY 
OF CHICAGO FOR THE COUNCIL YEAR 1896, at 783–85 (1896); GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 26–27. 
116  GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 32–42, 166, 369.  The four garages are Grant Park North Garage, 
completed in 1954 with a capacity of 2359 cars (1850 now); Grant Park South Underground Garage 
(now Grant Park South Garage), completed in 1965 with a capacity of 1241 cars (1350 now); Monroe 
Street Underground Garage (now East Monroe Street Garage), completed in 1977 with a capacity of 
3700 cars (3850 now); and Millennium Park Garage completed in 2002, with a capacity of 2181 cars 
(2126 now).  See id.; MILLENNIUM GARAGES, http://www.millenniumgarages.com (last visited Aug. 14, 
2011). 
117  See Chi., Ill., Ordinance for the Establishment of Harbor District Number Three; the 
Construction by the Illinois Central Railroad Company of a New Passenger Station; Electrification of 
Certain of the Lines of the Illinois Central and Michigan Central Railroad Companies Within the City; 
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out among the City of Chicago, the Illinois Central Railroad, the SPC, and 
the Secretary of War, who exercised control over the harbor.  Most 
significantly for present purposes, the railroad agreed to depress its tracks 
nine to fourteen feet underground, to electrify its trains so as to eliminate 
noise and air pollution, and to construct viaducts for auto traffic crossing 
over its right-of-way.118  Two years later, the State and the U.S. Army 
agreed to extend Grant Park 300 feet farther into the lake using new landfill, 
in order to accommodate the construction of Lake Shore Drive.119  This in 
turn required demolishing and rebuilding the yacht clubs beyond the 
extended boundary of the park.120  As a result of these changes, the railroad 
began receding from view in the park—and automobile traffic gradually 
rose from a trickle to a torrent. 
With the addition of Lake Shore Drive along its eastern edge and the 
construction of the museums south of 12th Street, the boundaries of Grant 
Park were finally fixed.  For the balance of the twentieth century, the Ward 
cases deterred any attempt to construct within the area of the park any 
structure that could unambiguously be described as a building.  The century 
would witness many legal actions brought or threatened by Michigan 
Avenue landowners.  But these related primarily to issues defining the outer 
limits of the dedication, such as continued expansion of the Art Institute, 
reconstruction of the yacht clubs, and proposals to build a new band shell.121 
This equilibrium was disrupted by the Millennium Park project at the 
dawn of the twenty-first century.  As originally conceived, the Millennium 
Park project was consistent with the Ward precedents.  The basic idea was 
to cover over the area in the northwest corner of Grant Park where rail 
passenger operations—now part of the Metra commuter rail system—
remained exposed; construct a new underground parking garage; and use 
the revenues from the parking fees to fund surface landscaping and a new 
band shell.122 
As the Millennium Park project progressed, cost estimates for the 
underground garage soared and augmenting donations were sought from 
wealthy Chicago families.123  The families responded positively but wanted 
their largesse associated with permanent monuments added to the park.  
The Pritzker family agreed to fund a new band shell, provided that it was 
designed by architect Frank Gehry.124  Renamed a “music pavilion,” the 
 
and the Development of the Lake Front (July 21, 1919), in JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITY 
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO FOR THE COUNCIL YEAR 1919, at 969–89 (1919). 
118  Id. at 971–79. 
119  Stevens Hotel Co. v. Chi. Yacht Club, 339 Ill. 463, 467–68, 171 N.E. 550, 552 (1930). 
120  Id. 
121  See infra Parts V.A and V.B. 
122  GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 147–74, 319–40. 
123  Id. at 107–29. 
124  Id. at 129. 
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design for this structure became more and more elaborate until it could 
scarcely be described as a mere band shell.125  The Harris family agreed to 
pay for a new theater for music and dance.126  The theater would be 
constructed underground, but required a two-story glass and steel entrance 
above ground (see Figure 9). 
FIGURE 9: HARRIS THEATER ENTRANCE IN MILLENNIUM PARK 
ALONG RANDOLPH STREET (2010) 
With these additions to the plan, the tension with the Ward cases could 
no longer be ignored.127  Attorneys for the Millennium Park project obtained 
consents for construction of these and other structures from property 
owners who owned land on Michigan Avenue and Randolph Street abutting 
the northwest corner of Grant Park.  A Cook County Circuit Court judge 
ruled that these consents, patterned after those secured in 1891 to build the 
Art Institute, eliminated any constraint associated with the Ward 
precedents.128 
Whatever its aesthetic merits or demerits, Millennium Park succeeded, 
for the first time, in drawing large crowds to a portion of the park on a 
 
125  Id. at 194. 
126  Id. at 135–46. 
127  Id. at 141. 
128  See Boaz v. City of Chicago, No. 99L-3804 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2000); 
GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 141–43. 
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consistent basis.129  The Art Institute quickly followed up with another 
addition—its largest yet—linked to Millennium Park by a long pedestrian 
bridge over Monroe Street.130  Recently the City proposed that a new 
children’s museum be added to the park.131  Although this immediately 
elicited objections from Michigan Avenue property owners,132 the 
momentum has clearly shifted toward adding new physical structures to the 
park, leaving the legacy of the Ward precedents in doubt. 
II. THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC DEDICATION 
Everyone relies on public spaces.  We rely on the streets on which we 
live remaining public thoroughfares, the alleys behind our homes remaining 
accessible to service vehicles, and the parks down the block remaining open 
and accessible places for recreation.  Today, the primary protection of these 
expectations is the political process.  State and local statutes typically 
require public notice and other procedural formalities before public spaces 
can be closed or sold, giving affected individuals an opportunity to vocalize 
their objections.133  In some instances, roadways and open spaces may be 
protected by easements or by covenants running with the land.  But these 
sources of protection are exceptional insofar as government-owned spaces 
such as roads and parks are involved.  Moreover, easements and covenants 
typically require formal writings, incorporated into deeds, before they can 
be enforced against successors in interest.134 
 
129  The park was expected to have a baseline attendance of 3 million visitors in 2005, with 3.3–3.65 
million visitors in 2010 and 3.66–4.4 million visitors in 2015.  GOODMAN WILLIAMS GROUP, 
MILLENNIUM PARK ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY 5 (2005), available at http://www.chicagoloopalliance.
com/db_images/includes/227Millennium Park Economic Impact Study 20050503.pdf.  The park 
exceeded expectations, with 4 million visitors in 2009 and 4.5 million visitors in 2011.  Crain’s List 
Chicago’s Largest Tourist Attractions (Sightseeing), CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Mar. 22, 2010, at 21; Crain’s 
List Largest Tourist Attractions, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Mar. 28, 2011, at 24. 
130  Art Institute Addition Set To Open in May, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2008, § 2 (Metro), at 3. 
131  Press Release, Mayor’s Press Office, Chicago Children’s Museum Moving to Grant Park (Sept. 
27, 2006) (on file with authors). 
132  A lawsuit was filed challenging the procedure by which the Chicago Plan Commission and the 
City Council approved the museum in Grant Park.  See Complaint for De Novo Judicial Review of and 
to Void a Chicago Zoning Amendment, Figiel v. Chi. Plan Comm’n, No. 08-CH-32919 (Cook County, 
Ill., Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 2008).  After the court ruled in favor of the museum, Figiel appealed and lost.  
Figiel v. Chi. Plan Comm’n, 408 Ill. App. 3d 223, 945 N.E.2d 71 (2011).  This was an administrative 
law challenge to the approval process.  See id. at 229, 945 N.E.2d at 76.  In the event that construction 
begins, property owners will likely bring suit challenging the construction under the Ward precedents. 
133  See, e.g., 60 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1/30–50 (2008) (requiring for the sale of public land valued at 
more than $2500 a resolution of township trustees, an appraisal, and notice to the public); 765 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 205/6 (2008) (providing that vacating plats, a procedure in which the legal effect of a plat 
is nullified, requires consent of the city, village, or county and of any owners who have bought lots in 
the plat). 
134  JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND § 3:1–2 
(2010); Charles E. Clark, The Doctrine of Privity of Estate in Connection with Real Covenants, 32 YALE 
L.J. 123, 124 (1922). 
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Protecting reliance interests in public spaces is a particularly difficult 
problem where new communities or subdivisions are involved.  In the 
nineteenth century, entire towns and cities regularly sprang into existence 
where no organized settlement had previously existed.  The promoters of 
these new communities would often display maps or plats indicating that 
lots offered for sale would be made accessible by roads and streets, and 
would be favored with nearby public squares or parks.135  Prospective 
purchasers would rely on these representations in deciding whether to 
purchase and how much to pay for particular lots.136 
The actions of the Board of Commissioners of the Illinois and 
Michigan Canal, in referring to maps indicating that land to the east of 
Michigan Avenue would remain “forever Open, Clear & free of any 
buildings,”137 and the actions of the agents of the federal government, in 
recording a map stating that land east of Michigan Avenue would forever 
“remain vacant of buildings,”138 were therefore representative of a much 
larger problem.  There were no Illinois precedents regarding the legal 
consequences of such representations when Michigan Avenue lots were 
first purchased after 1836 and 1839.139  There was, however, a growing 
body of precedent from other jurisdictions—including several prominent 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.140  A legally sophisticated purchaser 
would have been encouraged by these precedents to assume that the 
restrictions appearing on the maps of fractional sections 15 and 10 would be 
legally enforceable by those who had purchased property on the west side 
of Michigan Avenue. 
The restrictions noted on these maps, perhaps because it was assumed 
that they were legally enforceable, set in motion strong expectations about 
what would come to be called Lake Park and later Grant Park.  These 
 
135  See Lewinnek, supra note 28, at 197–98. 
136  See id.; see also HOLLAND, supra note 28, at 61–65. 
137  See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text (including Figure 2). 
138  See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text (including Figure 3). 
139  There was a plat statute that prescribed a procedure by which municipal authorities could take 
title to dedicated roads and public spaces.  See 1833 Ill. Laws 599.  Compliance with this procedure 
gave rise to what were later called “statutory dedications,” although the Illinois courts continued to 
recognize “common law dedications” where the statute was not followed.  See, e.g., Chi., Rock Island, 
& Pac. R.R. v. City of Joliet, 79 Ill. 25 (1875); see generally 2 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 628, at 738–39 (4th ed. 1890).  Substantively, there was no 
difference between statutory and common law dedications in Illinois.  City of Joliet, 79 Ill. at 32–33; 
DILLON, supra, at 739 n.1.  The only difference lay in the difficulty of proving the existence of a 
dedication.  Statutory dedication created a safe harbor in which only one piece of evidence was required: 
compliance with the statute.  Common law dedication often required difficult inquiries into the behavior 
of individuals, officials, and the general public over time. 
140  See City of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431 (1832) (recognizing public 
dedication of commons in Cincinnati); Barclay v. Howell’s Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 498 (1832) 
(recognizing public dedication of street in Pittsburgh); Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 
(10 Pet.) 662 (1836) (recognizing public dedication of quay in New Orleans). 
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expectations, in turn, were reflected in the Chicago real estate market.  
Throughout most of Chicago’s history, lots abutting Michigan Avenue have 
sold for a premium relative to lots on streets farther from the lake.141  Local 
residents have been keenly aware of this, and have identified the direct 
exposure to Lake Michigan enjoyed by owners on Michigan Avenue as the 
reason for the price differential.142 
A. A Unique American Hybrid 
American courts in the nineteenth century developed a potent doctrine 
for protecting expectations about public spaces, generally known as the law 
of public dedication.  The doctrine, at least as it applied to public spaces, is 
“of ambiguous origin.”143  Scattered English precedents had recognized the 
dedication of public roads.144  But there is no evidence that English courts 
extended the idea of public dedication to public spaces such as parks or 
squares.  The first known American court to apply public dedication 
reasoning to protect a public space, the Vermont Supreme Court, 
analogized the issue to the dedication of land to pious uses, a doctrine with 
roots in civil and canon law.145 
Close on the heels of the Vermont decision came the most influential 
precedent in establishing public dedication of public spaces, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1832 decision in Cincinnati v. White.146  John Cleves 
 
141  See HOYT, supra note 24, at 128–95.  Lots in this vicinity sold at prices up to ten times higher 
than those sold a few blocks away.  Id. at 187.  Interestingly, testimony in the Ward cases indicates that 
when Ward purchased his land in 1887, prices for land on Wabash Avenue, one block west of Michigan 
Avenue, were higher.  Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 294–95 (testimony of William C. Thorne).  
This may have been because the dominant land use along Michigan Avenue after the 1871 fire changed 
from residential to commercial uses such as liveries and saloons.  Wabash was closer to the center of 
commercial activity in the City, and hence may have been a more desirable location for such activities.  
In time, land use along Michigan evolved again, toward hotels, private clubs, public buildings such as 
the Auditorium Theater and Orchestra Hall, and high-end retail shops.  With this further transformation, 
the Avenue again enjoyed a price premium over blocks to the west.  See generally HOYT, supra note 24, 
at 178–90. 
142  Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 287–88 (testimony of William C. Thorne). 
143  Abbott v. Cottage City, 10 N.E. 325, 328 (Mass. 1887); accord 11A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE 
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 33:1, at 422 n.1 (3d ed. 2009). 
144  Appleton v. City of New York, 114 N.E. 73, 77 (N.Y. 1916) (citing a 1713 English decision).  
For other cases, see Wood v. Veal, (1822) 106 Eng. Rep. 1257; 5 B. & Ald. 454; Jarvis v. Dean, (1826) 
130 Eng. Rep. 585; 3 Bing. 447. 
145  Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 521, 527 (1831).  Under the doctrine of dedication to pious uses, land 
donated to a church for church purposes would be held in the name of the minister for the use of the 
church.  In the event of a vacancy, the title would be held in abeyance.  The minister could not transfer 
title to the land without the consent of the members of the church.  See, e.g., Weston v. Hunt, 2 Mass. (2 
Tyng) 500 (1807). 
The Louisiana Supreme Court anticipated the public dedication doctrine in an 1822 case in which 
abutting owners were granted an injunction against construction on a public square, but the court did not 
invoke public dedication reasoning.  See Mayor of New Orleans v. Gravier, 11 Mart. (o.s.) 620 (1822). 
146  31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431 (1832). 
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Symmes, who had a habit of selling the same property twice,147 conveyed 
land to three individuals who proceeded to lay out a plan for the town of 
Cincinnati.  Their plan showed a tract along the Ohio River, set apart as a 
common “for the use and benefit of the town forever.”148  Symmes later 
conveyed the same riverfront tract by another deed, which passed after 
several conveyances to one White, who sued to gain possession of the 
tract.149  The Court held that the original restriction was a valid public 
dedication, notwithstanding its failure to satisfy the elements of a 
conventional grant.150  The subsequent conveyance of the same tract in fee 
to another could not defeat the purpose of this dedication, which was “for 
the public use, and the convenience and accommodation of the inhabitants 
of Cincinnati.”151 
The Court in White acknowledged the difficulties presented by the fact 
that no grantee had taken title to the land under the original plan, and there 
was no written conveyance that would satisfy the statute of frauds.152  
Following the lead of the Vermont Supreme Court, however, it relied on 
donation-to-pious-uses cases,153 as well as English highway cases,154 to 
show that other courts had recognized exceptions to overcome these 
difficulties.  The Court concluded that “[i]f this is the doctrine of the law 
applicable to highways, it must apply with equal force, and in all its parts, 
to all dedications of land to public uses.”155 
After White, the use of public dedication theory to protect public 
spaces spread rapidly.156  Initially, some older states on the eastern seaboard 
resisted the new doctrine.157  But even these states came to accept public 
dedication of public spaces.158  The resulting doctrine was a unique 
 
147  See Lessee of Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41 (1837) (a famous adverse possession case 
involving land sold twice by Symmes, also in Cincinnati). 
148  White, 31 U.S. at 431. 
149  Id. at 433. 
150  Id. at 442–44. 
151  Id. at 438. 
152  See id. at 438–39. 
153  Id. at 436–37 (citing Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 566 (1829); Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 
U.S. (9 Cranch) 292 (1815)). 
154  Id. at 439 (citing Jarvis v. Dean, (1826) 130 Eng. Rep. 585; 3 Bing. 447). 
155  Id. at 437–38. 
156  Relying on White, Louisiana adopted the doctrine in 1833, see De Armas v. Mayor of New 
Orleans, 5 La. 132, 148 (1833), and Ohio the year after that, see Brown v. Manning, 6 Ohio 298, 303 
(1834). 
157  Massachusetts and New York initially rejected the idea.  See Hinckley v. Hastings, 19 Mass. (2 
Pick.) 162 (1824); Pearsall v. Post, 20 Wend. 111 (N.Y. 1838). 
158  See Abbott v. Cottage City, 10 N.E. 325, 328 (Mass. 1887); Cady v. Conger, 19 N.Y. 256 
(1859). 
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American hybrid159—one that provided powerful protection for public 
spaces.160 
Viewed from the perspective of property law doctrines familiar today, 
the nineteenth-century public dedication doctrine seems highly peculiar.161  
On the one hand, the doctrine appears to recognize something functionally 
similar to a negative easement: a prohibition against modifying public 
spaces that runs with ownership of the abutting land.  Ordinarily, negative 
easements can be created only by a written grant, typically in the form of a 
deed.162  Restrictions such as those contained in the maps of the Canal 
Commissioners and the United States would not qualify as negative 
easements, because they did not appear in deeds issued to purchasers of 
land. 
On the other hand, the public dedication doctrine seems to embody an 
anomalous conception of public rights.  We tend today to think of parks and 
other public spaces as being owned by governmental bodies.  Public 
property means government property.  The government, as owner, 
presumptively has all the rights and privileges associated with fee simple 
title as to how these properties will be managed, developed, and alienated.163  
 
159  One nineteenth-century treatise remarks that the doctrine is “comparatively modern” and 
suggests that it came to be generally accepted only in the 1830s.  EMORY WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON 
THE AMERICAN LAW OF EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES 184–85 (3d ed. 1873).  Although American 
courts naturally identified certain English highway-dedication precedents as antecedents, see id. at 184, 
the leading English treatise on easements contains no mention of the doctrine.  See CHARLES JAMES 
GALE & W.J. BYRNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS (10th ed. 1925). 
160  A survey of the cases in 1877, many of them from Illinois, observed that “[t]he dedication of 
land is becoming a very important question in the jurisprudence of this country.”  Dedication of Lands—
Estoppel in Pais, 3 MONTHLY W. JURIST 641, 641 (1877). 
161  The public dedication doctrine was recognized as peculiar even at the peak of its power.  See 
DILLON, supra note 139, § 653a, at 774 (noting with approval how under the doctrine of public 
dedication “the ordinary rules of law relating to private rights have been modified and limited by the 
public convenience and necessities”). 
162  English common law recognized only four types of negative easements—that is, rights of one 
landowner to require another landowner to desist or refrain from some use of his property.  See, e.g., 
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1959); United States v. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d 442, 446 (Va. 2005).  The right to keep adjacent land free 
of development was not among these rights.  American courts have recognized a wider variety of 
negative easements, but only if they are created by written grant.  Fontainebleau, 114 So. 2d at 359; 
4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.01[3], 34.02[1] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 
2010).  Because of these and other limits on negative easements, conservation easements—private 
negative servitudes running with the land that preclude development—have required special legislation 
authorizing their creation.  THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 1039 (2007); see also Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy 
Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 470–79 
(1984). 
163  There are, of course, various restrictions on the government’s discretion with respect to the 
disposition of parks and similar public property, including the public trust doctrine.  But for any member 
of the public to bring a legal action challenging the government’s disposition of its property, it is 
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The public dedication doctrine, in contrast, suggests that certain public 
properties come with restrictions running in favor of particular private 
parties.  This notion of private rights in public land seems alien in a world 
in which land is classified as being either public or private, with exclusion 
rights and control over uses being assigned to either public or private 
managers, respectively. 
The most basic explanation for why American courts were able to 
devise such a curious hybrid doctrine is that public dedication cases were 
brought as actions for injunctive relief, and the courts hearing these actions 
regarded themselves as exercising the flexibility traditionally associated 
with courts of equity.164  Equity was understood in the nineteenth century to 
protect only rights of property.165  A public dedication did not create an 
easement or any other conventional property right; consequently, equity 
could not enforce a public dedication directly.166  Nevertheless, equity 
would intervene to protect conventional property rights, such as lots and 
buildings, from indirect harms such as nuisances.  Using similar reasoning, 
courts of equity concluded that they could intervene at the behest of owners 
of lots and buildings abutting a public dedication to protect these owners 
from the effects of a failure to comply with the terms of the dedication.167  A 
public dedication was a commitment made with respect to public property 
that had an effect on abutting private property—an effect strong enough to 
warrant intervention by courts of equity at the behest of the private owner.  
Substantively, the unique hybrid doctrine that emerged can be seen as 
sharing some features of the law of contracts, some of equitable estoppel, 
some of easements by prescription, and some of the law of trusts. 
 
necessary to satisfy standing requirements and then identify some legal constraint that the government 
has allegedly violated. 
164  See generally 1 JAMES L. HIGH & SHIRLEY T. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 
60 (4th ed. 1905) (describing the broad flexibility of judges to grant injunctions under English equity 
law). 
165  See Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 Ill. 237, 247 (1875) (“The [chancery] court is conversant only with 
questions of property and the maintenance of civil rights.  Injury to property, whether actual or 
prospective, is the foundation on which the jurisdiction rests.”); HIGH & HIGH, supra note 164, § 20b, at 
34–35; Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. 
REV. 640 (1916).  See generally Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint 
Doctrine: Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the Separation of Powers, 34 IND. 
L. REV. 295 (2001) (explaining the origins of the rule against prior restraints in terms of the 
understanding that equity would intervene only to protect property rights). 
166  The nineteenth-century cases did not refer to public dedications as “easements.”  Much later, 
courts would sometimes use the word “easement” to describe public dedications, suggesting that they 
were a property right belonging to abutting property owners.  See, e.g., Stevens Hotel Co. v. Art Inst. of 
Chi., 260 Ill. App. 555, 558 (1931).  This suggests that the original rationale for the public dedication 
doctrine was no longer familiar to courts in the twentieth century. 
167  See People ex rel. Bransom v. Walsh, 96 Ill. 232, 249 (1880) (recognizing that dedications affect 
the private parties’ interests in their own property). 
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As in the law of contracts, the creation of a public dedication proceeds 
on an offer-and-acceptance model.  An owner of property “offers” to 
dedicate some portion of his property, through words or deeds, to the 
public.  The offer is then “accepted,” either officially by the duly appointed 
representatives of the public (such as the town council) or by longstanding 
actions of the public in conformance to the dedication.168  Courts repeatedly 
said that neither the offer nor the acceptance had to be in writing, but each 
could be inferred from the course of conduct of either the grantor or the 
public.169  Of course, having the offer or the acceptance in writing made it 
much easier to establish a dedication. 
As in the law of equitable estoppel, courts placed heavy emphasis on 
the reliance interests of those who acted or changed their position in 
response to a public dedication.170  Most prominent here were the reliance 
interests of those who purchased land—typically at higher prices—on the 
understanding that adjacent land would remain subject to public use.  
Evidence of purchase at higher prices was routinely asserted in establishing 
the standing of abutting owners to sue in equity to enforce public 
dedications.171  Such evidence was also offered in actions brought by public 
authorities, perhaps to establish the requisite interference with property 
rights necessary to invoke the intervention of courts of equity.172 
As in the law of easements by prescription, courts enforcing public 
dedications emphasized longstanding use by the public to establish an 
implied offer to dedicate, an implied acceptance by the public, or reliance.173  
Like an easement by prescription, a dedication, once established, was 
regarded as irrevocable by the grantor.174 
 
168  See DILLON, supra note 139, §§ 636, 642, at 751–52, 759–61.  A dedication formally accepted 
following established procedures was called a statutory dedication; a dedication accepted instead by the 
actions of the public and public authorities was called a common law dedication.  Id. 
169  See, e.g., Marcy v. Taylor, 19 Ill. 634 (1858) (public acceptance of dedication may be shown by 
actions of public over a period of time); City of Alton v. Ill. Transp. Co., 12 Ill. 38 (1850) (public 
dedication established by reciprocal deeds); Godfrey v. City of Alton, 12 Ill. 29 (1850) (dedication of 
public landing on Mississippi River established by oral testimony). 
170  The Supreme Court in City of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White noted the close connection between 
public dedication and estoppel.  31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431, 438 (1832).  This in turn was repeated by courts 
and commentators.  See, e.g., LEONARD A. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS 335 (1898).  
Nevertheless, there are important differences between dedication and estoppel.  Dedication rests on an 
express or implied intention on the part of the grantor and runs to the public as well as to particular 
individuals.  Estoppel does not turn on the intention of the grantor and runs only to individuals. 
171  For examples of cases where evidence of purchase at higher prices was adduced, see Village of 
Princeville v. Auten, 77 Ill. 325 (1875); Bill of Complaint, supra note 72, at 10–11.  
172  See City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Ry., 67 Ill. 540, 542 (1873). 
173  See DILLON, supra note 139, §§ 631, 632, 637, at 743, 744–46, 753–54. 
174  See City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. at 544.  In this case, the town had been laid out to include a 
public square that was used as a park.  The court held that the city was entitled to sue in equity on behalf 
of abutting owners and others to enjoin a state statute authorizing the construction of a railroad in the 
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Finally, as in the law of trusts, courts spoke frequently of governmental 
bodies, once they had accepted a dedication, as having assumed a trust 
obligation to preserve public spaces.175  This obligation was owed especially 
to abutting property owners, who received special benefits from the 
dedication.  But it was also routinely said to extend to the public more 
generally.176 
B. Questions Posed by Map Restrictions 
Although there were no Illinois cases on public dedications in 1836 or 
1839 (the dates of the maps preceding the first sales of Michigan Avenue 
land), the Illinois Supreme Court embraced the doctrine in 1850.177  Soon 
Illinois courts were enforcing the doctrine with vigor, applying it to a 
variety of plat and map restrictions involving streets, landings, highways, 
and parks.178  Thus, the central elements of the public dedication theory, 
including the understanding that plat restrictions are rights enforceable in 
equity by abutting landowners, were fully recognized in Illinois law well 
before Ward filed his first lawsuit in 1890.179 
Nevertheless, the particular dedication reflected in the notations on 
various maps of fractional sections 10 and 15 raised a number of 
unanswered questions.  Would the restriction on buildings be subject to 
modification by future legislation?  Or would it be regarded as a vested 
right impervious to legislative revision?  If the restriction were to be 
regarded as a vested right, could it nevertheless be condemned in an action 
in eminent domain, and eliminated by paying just compensation to those 
who had relied upon it? 
Another set of questions: Would traditional equitable doctrines such as 
the need to show irreparable harm stand as potential barriers to the issuance 
of an injunction enforcing the dedication?  Would defenses such as laches, 
waiver, abandonment, or adverse possession be available if enforcement 
were sought after buildings were constructed? 
 
square.  Id. at 545.  In effect, the interest of abutting owners in preserving the square as a park was 
regarded as a vested right, and as such was immune from legislative abrogation.  Id. 
175  See, e.g., id. at 544; Bd. of Trs. of the Ill. & Mich. Canal v. Haven, 11 Ill. 554 (1850). 
176  See JOHN LEYBOURN GODDARD & EDMUND H. BENNETT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
EASEMENTS 181–82 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1880); JONES, supra note 170, at 332–67. 
177  Godfrey v. City of Alton, 12 Ill. 29 (1850); see also Canal Trustees, 11 Ill. at 555–57 (relying on 
doctrine in determining the scope of private riparian rights in order to assess an award of damages for a 
stream diversion). 
178  See, e.g., City of Alton v. Ill. Transp. Co., 12 Ill. 38 (1850); Marcy v. Taylor, 19 Ill. 634 (1858); 
Waugh v. Leech, 28 Ill. 488 (1862). 
179  See, e.g., Maywood Co. v. Vill. of Maywood, 118 Ill. 61, 69, 71, 73, 6 N.E. 866, 869, 870–71 
(1886) (enjoining actions that would result in the transfer of a dedicated public park to private parties); 
Vill. of Princeville v. Auten, 77 Ill. 325 (1875) (barring the village from moving the village hall onto the 
public square); City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. at 545 (barring construction of railroad in dedicated public 
square). 
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A third set of questions: Who, in addition to the public body that 
accepted the dedication (here the City, it was eventually held) and abutting 
owners, could enforce it?  In particular, could the original grantors of the 
dedication—the Canal Commissioners and the United States—also enforce 
the dedication, like the settlor of a trust? 
If abutting landowners could enforce the dedication, then a series of 
further questions would arise about who should be included in this class.  
Would this apply only to owners in fee simple of land abutting Michigan 
Avenue?  What about purchasers on Randolph Street, to the north of the 
restricted area, or on Park Row, to the south?  What about purchasers of 
land one block west, on Wabash Avenue, who could not claim a view of the 
lake but would benefit from lake breezes?  Would tenants living in 
buildings on Michigan Avenue be allowed to enforce the dedication?  
Landlords holding only a reversion?  Once condominiums were created, 
would each condo owner be entitled to enforce the dedication, or only the 
association as a whole, perhaps by majority vote? 
If the restrictions were legally enforceable by individual landowners, 
then could the landowners agree to waive the restrictions, assuming of 
course that any other parties empowered to enforce (such as the City as 
trustee) also agreed to the waiver?  How would such a waiver or consent be 
made?  Would it be binding on successors in interest?  Would one or more 
consents give rise to an estoppel barring a decision not to waive the 
restrictions in the future?180 
Still other questions related to the physical lay of the land.  To begin: 
Did the statements on the maps have a different force with respect to 
property north of Madison Street as opposed to property south of Madison 
Street?  To the north, the promise appeared on a map that was publicly 
recorded, and thus could be said to appear in the chain of title of all 
subsequent Michigan Avenue owners as well as whoever was determined to 
own Lake Park.181  To the south, the promise appeared on at least one 
unrecorded commercial map and was made in oral representations to 
purchasers.182  Arguably these more informal representations could not be 
invoked by successors in interest. 
To continue: Did the restrictions apply only to the narrow strip of land 
shown on the original maps and plats, or would they also attach to 
enlargements of Lake Park (and later Grant Park) created by landfills?  If 
the restrictions extended to artificial enlargements of the park, would this 
include only areas formally regarded as part of the park, or any contiguous 
landfilled area?  What about structures erected on offshore islands?  
 
180  An analogy might be made to the rule in Dumpor’s Case, which holds that once a landlord 
consents to assignment of a lease by a tenant, further assignments are presumed to have the landlord’s 
consent.  (1578) 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (K.B.); 4 Co. Rep. 119 b. 
181  See supra Part I.A. 
182  See supra Part I.A. 
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Structures built north and south of the original boundary of the park?  
Underground structures? 
A final set of questions related to the reference to “buildings” in the 
dedications: Did the dedications only prohibit buildings in a particular 
space?  Or did the reference to “public ground” found on both the United 
States map of fractional section 10 and the commercial map of fractional 
section 15, together with the ordinances of the 1840s in which the City 
accepted the dedication and denominated the area a “park,” give rise to an 
inference that the space was dedicated as a park?  Did this in turn mean that 
the only uses permitted in this space were ones consistent with park 
purposes?  And, ultimately, a seemingly prosaic question: What is a 
building?  Does a building refer only to an enclosed structure, and thus 
exclude things such as fences, bridges, and baseball stadiums?183  Does a 
structure have to reach a certain size to be considered a building, thereby 
excluding small structures such as restrooms or storm shelters?  Does a 
building refer only to a permanent structure, thereby excluding temporary 
enclosures such as tents? 
One overarching issue presented by several of these questions is 
whether the restriction should be interpreted according to its ordinary or 
plain meaning, or instead in such a way as to effectuate its purpose.  If 
purposive interpretation is appropriate, then it is necessary to identify the 
relevant purpose.  Was the purpose of the restriction to preserve an open 
view and direct breezes from Lake Michigan?  Or was it to preserve the 
market value of the Michigan Avenue property purchased in reliance on the 
restrictions?  Was it to preserve the area as a public park?  By way of 
illustration, consider a proposal to erect a baseball stadium in the space, 
consisting of a low fence and an open seating area.  This might not qualify 
as a “building” under the ordinary meaning of the term.  It also might not 
impair the view of the lake or the flow of air and light from the lake toward 
the properties on Michigan Avenue.  But the crowds and noise that the 
stadium would attract might well impair the market value of the property of 
Michigan Avenue owners.  And if it was a commercial enterprise, the 
baseball stadium might be deemed incompatible with the idea of a public 
park. 
It would take many years, and many legal decisions, to answer the 
questions posed by the 1836 and 1839 restrictions.  Some remain 
unresolved to this day. 
III. PUBLIC DEDICATION ON THE LAKEFRONT BEFORE WARD 
Someone familiar only with the Ward cases might assume that they 
were the first invocation of the public dedication theory on the Chicago 
lakefront.  This would be mistaken.  The public dedication theory was in 
 
183  See infra Part V.B. 
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fact advanced with some regularity by Michigan Avenue property owners 
well before Ward came on the scene.  To be sure, none of the pre-Ward 
cases generated an appellate opinion.184  But on the whole, these efforts 
were successful—enough so that one can say the public dedication theory 
was recognized not only in general jurisprudence but also as part of the 
local law of the Chicago lakefront. 
The first known effort to enlist the aid of the courts in prohibiting the 
construction of a building in Lake Park occurred in 1864.  The occasion 
was the Democratic National Convention scheduled to be held in Chicago 
that summer.185  The convention obtained the City’s permission to construct 
a “wigwam”—a circular wooden amphitheater with a canvas roof—at the 
southern end of the park at 11th and Michigan.186  Michigan Avenue 
property owners objected to the plan, arguing in state court that it violated 
the promise to keep Lake Park free of buildings.187  Their petition in equity 
stated that all of the land east of Michigan Avenue between Randolph Street 
on the north and Park Row on the south “is, and of right ought to be, kept 
open and vacant land.”188  Tracking the language of the 1861 and 1863 city 
charters, the petition claimed that no person or corporation was permitted to 
encroach on the land absent the assent of all abutting property owners.189  
Judge Wilson immediately granted the requested injunction.190 
The suit was perceived as being politically motivated, and a public 
outcry ensued.191  On June 2, 1864, the parties filed a detailed stipulation to 
remove the injunction and permit the construction of the wigwam to go 
forward, subject to a number of conditions, including a promise that the 
building would be torn down within six days of the end of the convention.192  
 
184  Before 1887, a party could not appeal an interlocutory order granting or denying an injunction.  
See Gage v. Eich, 56 Ill. 297, 298 (1870) (“It is a well settled rule in equity practice, as well as in 
proceedings at common law, that no appeal lies from any interlocutory order merely, in either court.  
There must be a final decree, order or judgment, to justify an appeal.”); SABIN D. PUTERBAUGH, 
PUTERBAUGH’S CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 811 (6th ed. 1916).  Thus, a party would have to 
incur the time and expense of litigating an action for injunction to a final judgment before taking an 
appeal.  Since abutting property owners were generally successful in seeking temporary injunctions, 
they had no opportunity to appeal.  Why the defendants in these actions did not appeal is not clear, but 
arguably they did not have a sufficiently strong stake in the matter to warrant the expense of an appeal 
until the fundamental question of title to Lake Park was resolved.  In 1887, Illinois passed a law 
providing for appeals from interlocutory orders granting or enlarging the scope of injunctions, but not 
orders denying or dissolving them.  1887 Ill. Laws 250. 
185  See Cremin, supra note 26, at 59–62. 
186  Id. at 59–60. 
187  The Copperhead Amphitheater, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1864, at 4; Cremin, supra note 26, at 60.  
188  The Copperhead Amphitheater, supra note 187. 
189  Id. 
190  Id. 
191  See Democratic Amphitheater, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 1864, at 4. 
192  Copperhead Amphitheater, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1864, at 4. 
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Construction promptly resumed,193 and the convention proceeded to 
nominate General George McClellan as the party’s candidate in the general 
election.  Consistently with the stipulation, the structure was removed in 
September 1864 after the convention.194 
FIGURE 10: WIGWAM IN LAKE PARK (AUG. 29, 1864)195 
The wigwam dispute, as the first legal action seeking to enforce the 
1836 and 1839 map restrictions, was an important local precedent.  
Abutting landowners were granted an injunction enforcing the restriction 
against buildings, evidently on the understanding that this was necessary to 
protect their property rights.  Public skepticism about the motives of the 
abutting owners was also a harbinger of the future.  The settlement of the 
dispute—allowing the temporary erection of what was clearly a building—
even more clearly established a pattern for the future. 
A more consequential judicial precedent arose from the aftermath of 
the 1869 legislation known as the “Lake Front Steal.”196  Recall that one of 
the elements of that act was a provision requiring the City to transfer title of 
north Lake Park to the Illinois Central Railroad for the construction of a 
new passenger depot.197  This provision was widely opposed in Chicago, 
 
193  That Amphitheater, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 1864, at 4. 
194  Cremin, supra note 26, at 62. 
195  On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-62405. 
196  See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
197  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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primarily on the ground that the $800,000 to be paid by the railroad for the 
land was inadequate.198 
Given that the objective of the grant was the erection of a building, it is 
not surprising that the first legal challenge to the Act was an action to 
enjoin construction as violating the restriction on buildings on the map of 
fractional section 10.199  The identity of the complainant and the forum 
were, however, something of a surprise: the action was brought on behalf of 
the United States Government in federal circuit court by the local United 
States Attorney, J.O. Glover.200 
A preliminary injunction was quickly granted, with U.S. Circuit Judge 
Thomas Drummond issuing a published opinion justifying his action.201  
Judge Drummond had no trouble concluding that the restriction against 
buildings was a binding commitment that could not be abrogated by “a 
simple stroke of legislation.”202  Such a “special dedication” of property, he 
wrote, could only be extinguished through a proper exercise of the power of 
eminent domain.203  The Lake Front Act was not a valid exercise in eminent 
domain because the compensation was fixed by the legislature, not by a 
court, and was set at what was alleged to be an inadequate level.204  
Moreover, the matter could not be vindicated by actions at law by affected 
owners because construction of the depot would cause irreparable injury to 
multiple persons. 
The more difficult question, according to Judge Drummond, was 
whether the United States had authority to enforce the restriction on 
buildings.  He concluded that the United States did have such authority, 
largely because the land marked “public ground” on the plat of fractional 
section 10 had never been sold, and hence, he assumed, was still owned by 
the United States.205  The United States was thus in the position of an owner 
who has restricted part of his land in order to encourage the sale of the 
remainder.  In these circumstances, the federal government held the retained 
land as a “trustee” on behalf of those who had purchased, and had the right 
to invoke the power of a court of equity to enforce the restriction.206  In any 
 
198  See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 800–11. 
199  See United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 26 F. Cas. 461, 461 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1869). 
200  Id. 
201  Drummond had been appointed a federal district judge in 1850 and then, after the Judiciary Act 
of 1869 created new circuit courts with appellate jurisdiction to review district court decisions, was 
appointed the first circuit judge in the region.  Kevin Collins, Drummond, Thomas, in 1 GREAT 
AMERICAN JUDGES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 212, 212–20 (John R. Vile ed., 2003).  Drummond later 
rendered a second important decision involving public dedication on the lakefront.  See infra note 219 
and accompanying text.  He retired in 1884.  Collins, supra, at 219. 
202  Ill. Cent. R.R., 26 F. Cas. at 463. 
203  Id. at 462. 
204  Id. at 464. 
205  Id. at 462–63. 
206  Id. at 464. 
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event, Judge Drummond concluded that a private-property owner abutting 
the park would have the right to seek an injunction.  He observed that there 
was such an owner who also had sued and thus the order in which the suits 
were considered was immaterial.207  The injunction was not appealed by the 
Illinois Central,208 and had the effect of freezing plans to construct a new 
depot on the north Lake Park site (for all time, as things turned out).209 
Shortly after the Drummond injunction was issued, much of Chicago, 
including Michigan Avenue properties, was consumed by the great fire.210  
As previously described, this event fundamentally transformed the 
lakefront.211  In the wake of the fire, a number of temporary buildings 
sprang up in Lake Park, most dramatically the enormous Inter-state 
Exposition Building constructed in 1873.  The trauma of the fire also 
suppressed litigation over the construction of structures in the park.  
Gradually, the Exposition Building was joined by armories, baseball 
stadiums, depots operated by other railroad companies, various work sheds 
and loading docks, and a temporary post office.212 
Chicago was back on its feet again by the 1880s; the economy was 
booming, and Michigan Avenue property owners began to rediscover their 
distaste for encumbrances in the park.  Litigation over the restriction against 
buildings erupted again in 1882.  The principal properties that were 
involved in lawsuits during the ensuing years are shown in Figure 11.  The 
catalyst for the first action was a decision by the City to permit the 
Baltimore & Ohio (B&O) Railroad to construct a passenger depot in the 
park.213 
 
207  That suit was filed by Ralph E. Starkweather.  Starkweather v. Ill. Cent. R.R., No. 8976 
(C.C.N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 1869), discussed in Chicago Public Library Archives: Property Records 
Dearborn Park Property 1935–1898 Box 1, supra note 86, at 208; see Transcript of Record, supra 
note 4, at 281.  Two suits were also filed in state court seeking to enjoin construction of the depot.  One 
was filed by Cyrus McCormick, the reaper manufacturer, and was later dismissed.  McCormick v. Ill. 
Cent. R.R., No. 31566 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. June 22, 1869), discussed in Chicago Public Library 
Archives: Property Records Dearborn Park Property 1935–1898 Box 1, supra note 86, at 209.  Three 
years later, a fourth suit was filed by Mathew Laflin, also in state court; it, too, was dismissed.  Laflin v. 
City of Chicago, No. 3066 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. June 29, 1872), discussed in Chicago Public 
Library Archives: Property Records Dearborn Park Property 1935–1898 Box 1, supra note 86, at 210. 
208  According to newspaper accounts written later, the case proceeded to a full trial in July 1871, 
with Drummond granting a permanent injunction.  See The Lake-Front: John F. Stafford Wants It 
Denuded of Buildings, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 11, 1882, at 8; A Bill Filed To Keep the “Nickel-Plate” off the 
Lake-Front, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1882, at 3.  The permanent-injunction opinion and other papers were 
evidently destroyed in the Chicago Fire three months later; in any event, we were unable to find them. 
209  It is not known why the Illinois Central did not appeal.  One possible reason is that the railroad 
sought to get the Illinois legislature to abrogate the dedication.  See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 
898.  Any appeal at that time would have been to the U.S. Supreme Court.  See U.S. REV. STAT. §§ 563, 
629 (1878). 
210  See KOGAN & CROMIE, supra note 38. 
211  See supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text. 
212  See Cremin, supra note 26, at 90–128. 
213  See Bill of Complaint, supra note 72. 
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FIGURE 11: CERTAIN MICHIGAN AVENUE AND LAKE PARK PROPERTIES CIRCA 1882 
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The B&O had a thriving business in Chicago, transporting to the 
Midwest immigrants who had arrived from Germany and other European 
countries on the company’s ships.214  The B&O used the Illinois Central 
tracks but had not been able to arrange with the Illinois Central for depot 
space, presumably because of the Illinois Central’s own challenges in that 
regard.215  Instead, it had been using a space in the Inter-state Exposition 
Building.216  It seemed only logical to allow it to build a freestanding depot 
just north of the Exposition Building. 
Once construction of the new depot was underway, however, it was 
challenged in federal court by two Michigan Avenue property owners, John 
Stafford and Thomas Hoyne, joined by the State of Illinois.217  The essential 
allegations included the standard elements of the public dedication theory.  
Not surprisingly, given the extensive construction activity in the park since 
the fire, the B&O’s answer emphasized themes of waiver or abandonment.  
The railroad averred that the City had permitted various buildings to be 
constructed in the previous decade, that its proposed building could scarcely 
be seen from Michigan Avenue because of the other construction, and that 
the character of the west side of Michigan Avenue had changed 
permanently after (and because of) the fire.218 
The matter, like the 1869 litigation over the transfer of north Lake Park 
to the Illinois Central, was assigned to Judge Drummond.  This time, 
however, the estimable judge refused to issue the requested injunction.219  
He noted that the State and the United States had originally intended the 
area to remain free of buildings, and he agreed that the Exposition Building, 
the armories, and the railroad structures were all built in violation of the 
trust in which the land was held.  Nevertheless, with each new building, the 
State and the adjoining landowners gradually lost their right to enforce the 
dedication.  In essence, because the plaintiffs had not objected to any of 
these buildings, they were estopped from now challenging the B&O 
terminal.220 
The following year, 1883, was a banner year for litigation concerning 
the Chicago lakefront.  In an effort to resolve the vexing question of title to 
Lake Park, the Attorney General of Illinois filed suit in Cook County 
 
214  2 EDWARD HUNGERFORD, THE STORY OF THE BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD 1827–1927, at 
180–98 (1928). 
215  See supra notes 197–209 and accompanying text. 
216  See Cremin, supra note 26, at 101. 
217  Stafford owned half of a lot on Michigan Avenue on the block between Madison and Monroe.  
Thomas Hoyne owned a lot on Michigan Avenue well south of the proposed depot.  See Bill of 
Complaint, supra note 72, at 9; supra Figure 11. 
218  Answer at 8–16, Illinois v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. (C.C.N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 1882).  
219  The Lake-Front: Judge Drummond Decides a Point in Favor of the Railroads, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 
8, 1882, at 12. 
220  See id. 
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Circuit Court against the Illinois Central, the City of Chicago, and the 
United States, asserting ownership in the State.221  After removing the case 
to federal court, the Illinois Central answered and filed cross-claims against 
the other parties, asserting alternatively that either the City or the railroad 
owned the park.222  The United States filed its own complaint against the 
Illinois Central and affiliated railroads, as well as the City, asserting 
ownership in the United States.223  These actions were consolidated together 
before Justice John Marshall Harlan, sitting as circuit justice.224 
That same year, Stafford filed suit in state court, mounting essentially 
the same challenge to buildings in Lake Park that he had unsuccessfully 
pursued in federal court the year before.225  Stafford brought the action on 
behalf of himself and all similarly situated property owners—essentially as 
a class action.226  It named as defendants not only the railroads, but also all 
other entities involved in building in the park, including the City.227 
The forty-one-page complaint recounted at length the origins of Lake 
Park, which were said to establish a dedication to public uses free of 
buildings.228  It complained that the City, in violation of this public 
dedication, had permitted the construction of the Inter-state Exposition 
Building, a building occupied by Battery D of the First Artillery Illinois 
National Guard, the armory of the First Regiment of Cavalry of the Illinois 
National Guard, and the B&O depot.229  It also complained—for what 
would appear to be the event that precipitated the litigation—that the City 
had recently authorized a structure to be erected by the Trades Assembly 
and Knights of Labor, which was projected to be two stories tall and of 
sufficient dimensions to “contain one main hall and gallery and two ticket 
offices and a place for the sale of spirituous liquors, and all the other 
accessories of a play house or public hall and saloon.”230  Anticipating the 
likely defense, Stafford’s complaint averred that the abutting property 
owners had never consented to any encroachments on the lands so 
dedicated.231  The relief sought was an injunction against further 
 
221  Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 33 F. 730, 732 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888). 
222  Id. 
223  Id. 
224  Id. 
225  Bill of Complaint, Stafford v. City of Chicago, No. 83C44290 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Mar. 
23, 1883). 
226  Id. at 1. 
227  Id. 
228  Id. at 1–12. 
229  Id. at 14–26. 
230  Id. at 13–14. 
231  Id. at 26–27, 32. 
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construction in the park and a cessation of essentially all development 
there.232 
On May 9, 1883, Judge Moran granted a temporary injunction against 
further construction.233  According to a report of the decision in Chicago 
Legal News, the judge found the question whether the map restrictions 
could be enforced in equity “had been entirely settled by the [Illinois] 
Supreme Court.”234  Pending a final decree, the buildings already 
constructed could stay.235  “But there must be no further encroachments.”236 
Judge Moran’s injunction had the effect of freezing further 
construction in Lake Park.  The portion of the park on the east side of 
Michigan Avenue, at least from the Exposition Building north to Randolph 
Street, was by then littered with a ragtag collection of structures, nearly all 
of which had been erected on a “temporary” basis.  These could stay for the 
time being.  But no further construction would be permitted. 
The next move was launched by the United States Attorney and 
directed specifically at Albert Spalding’s baseball stadium (Figure 12).237  
On May 27, 1884, the United States sued the City and the Chicago Base 
Ball Club, Inc., complaining of the baseball grounds east of Michigan 
Avenue.238  The United States again alleged that it retained title to the land 
in fractional section 10.239  While Chicago was in possession of this land (as 
“mere custodian”), the federal government had dedicated the property and 
held it in trust for neighboring property owners and Chicago residents.240  
The complaint alleged that the City had violated this trust by permitting 
Spalding to construct “a board fence at least ten feet in height, in such 
manner as to completely shut out said ground from public view or access, 
and . . . buildings for offices and also a building for a Grand stand,” with “a 
roof and . . . seats.”241  The complaint noted that the public was excluded 
from the stadium unless it paid admission.242 
 
232  Id. at 36–39.  At oral argument on the temporary injunction, Judge Moran remarked that the 
“only doubt” that he had about the case was whether Stafford and the others had standing or whether the 
State needed to be involved.  The Lake-Front Case Taken Under Advisement by Judge Moran, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 25, 1883, at 6. 
233  See The Lake Front: A Temporary Injunction Granted Restraining the Erection of Any More 
Buildings on the Lake Park, 15 CHI. L. NEWS 290 (1883). 
234  Id.  In particular, the judge regarded City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Railway Co., 67 Ill. 540 
(1873), as “directly in point.”  Id. 
235  Id. 
236  Id. 
237  Bill of Complaint, supra note 70, at 6. 
238  Id. 
239  Id. 
240  Id. 
241  Id. at 8. 
242  Id. at 9. 
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FIGURE 12: UNION BASE-BALL GROUNDS 1883243 
The government stated that “this bill is filed at the request and partly 
on the behalf of” neighboring owners and other Chicago residents.244  
Indeed, though signed by U.S. Attorney Richard S. Tuthill,245 the complaint 
was verified by none other than John F. Stafford.246 
Despite Spalding’s entreaties that the requested injunction could force 
the team to disband because it had no other suitable venue available, the 
government prevailed.247  On July 17, 1884, federal Circuit Court Judge 
Henry Blodgett ordered that the City “absolutely desist and refrain from 
leasing the whole or any part of the public ground” or from “constructing 
on or occupying the whole or any part of [it].”248  After the season was over, 
the ballclub was to cease playing on the grounds and remove its 
 
243  The Chicago Base-Ball Grounds, HARPER’S WKLY., May 12, 1883, at 292. 
244  Bill of Complaint, supra note 70, at 9. 
245  Later, after his appointment to the Cook County Circuit Court bench, Tuthill heard the initial 
Daggett–Art Institute case and dissented from the full panel decision against Daggett.  See infra notes 
323–29 and accompanying text. 
246  Bill of Complaint, supra note 70, at 13.  For Stafford’s other involvement in lakefront litigation, 
see supra notes 217–20, 225–36 and accompanying text. 
247  The Lake-Front: No More Trespassers Allowed To Occupy the Ground, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 
1884, at 8. 
248  Id. 
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structures.249  For the first time, a court ordered the actual demolition of a 
standing structure.250 
The Base Ball Club litigation is also interesting because it reveals that 
there was considerable confusion, at least on the part of some influential 
actors, about the exact nature of the public dedication.  At one point, 
Marshall Field and others felt compelled to go to Judge Blodgett for a 
modification of the injunction to permit the lakefront to be used as a place 
where snow removed from the front of businesses could be dumped.251  
Field and his compatriots evidently understood the dedication to be not just 
a negative restriction on buildings, but also an affirmative mandate to use 
the lakefront for park purposes.  If the dedication was only a negative 
restriction on buildings, no serious argument could be made that it would 
bar dumping snow.  But if the dedication was to use the space as a park, 
then dumping snow would be arguably improper. 
In any event, the doubts expressed by Judge Drummond in 1869 about 
whether the United States had standing to enforce the public dedication 
were soon powerfully reinforced.  In 1888, Justice Harlan, sitting as circuit 
justice, issued a comprehensive opinion resolving all the title issues raised 
by Illinois’s 1883 lawsuit.252  The State was given title to the submerged 
lands, the City was given title to Lake Park, and the railroad was allowed to 
keep all of its existing tracks, facilities, piers, and wharves, largely as an 
incident to its riparian rights north of Randolph Street and south of 12th 
Street.253 
With respect to the matter most relevant to the public dedication issue, 
however, Justice Harlan held that the United States did not have standing to 
object to the construction of buildings in Lake Park.254  Justice Harlan 
concluded that the public recording of the plat of the Fort Dearborn 
Addition in 1839 constituted an offer to make a statutory dedication of the 
open space marked on the plat, and this had been accepted by the City of 
Chicago when the City adopted its ordinances declaring the space a public 
park.255  The statutory dedication transferred the title of the open space to 
the City.  In effect, the United States had given away any remaining interest 
in the property and thus did not have standing to enforce the plat 
 
249  Id. 
250  So-called “mandatory injunctions”—those requiring positive action on the part of the 
defendant—were rarely granted in federal court.  See 3 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY 
PRACTICE § 2289 (1909) (“A mandatory injunction is never granted unless very serious damage will 
ensue from withholding relief . . . .”). 
251  See Motion to the Honorable Henry W. Blodgett at 1, United States v. Chi. Base Ball Club, No. 
19026 (C.C.N.D. Ill. May 27, 1884) (undated motion signed by Marshall Field and others, requesting 
that George Wells be allowed to dump snow on the lakefront). 
252  Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 33 F. 730 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888). 
253  Id. at 756–59. 
254  Id. at 753–55. 
255  Id. 
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dedication.256  This ruling would be affirmed by the Supreme Court a 
number of years later.257 
The practical effect of Justice Harlan’s decision, in terms of Lake Park, 
was that Michigan Avenue landowners could no longer count on 
accommodating U.S. Attorneys serving as their enforcement agents.  One or 
more property owners themselves would have to step forward to assume 
this role.  But Justice Harlan did not question the right of abutting 
landowners to enforce the dedication.  Judge Moran’s injunction against the 
construction of any new buildings, issued on behalf of John Stafford and 
other landowners, still stood.  And there was evidence that the property 
owners would continue to assert their rights. 
Meanwhile, a new plaintiff appeared on the scene: Warren F. Leland, 
owner of the Leland Hotel, located on the west side of Michigan Avenue 
between Jackson and Van Buren streets.  In late 1886, Leland filed suit in 
Cook County Circuit Court against the City and one John M. Martin, 
seeking an injunction against a toboggan slide that the City had permitted 
Martin to erect in Lake Park south of the Exposition Building.258  Martin 
said that the toboggan slide was intended to raise funds to support an 
impoverished widow, Mrs. Carpenter.259  He further claimed to have 
obtained the consent of property owners on Michigan Avenue.260  But 
Leland refused to consent; he alleged that the toboggan slide would damage 
his hotel business.  Judge Louis Collins issued a temporary injunction in 
late December and a permanent injunction early the next year.261 
In 1889, Leland was back in state court again, this time challenging a 
proposal to modernize the Exposition Building by adding a powerhouse.  
Again, a temporary injunction was promptly issued.262  The City disclaimed 
any interest in building a power plant on the lakefront, but nevertheless 
stated that it wanted to continue the lawsuit so that it could obtain a 
definitive declaration of the rights of the City in the park.263  It appears, 
however, that Leland made no effort to pursue a permanent injunction. 
At this point, it is worth pausing to ask this question: What would a 
well-informed attorney have concluded in 1890, on the eve of the first Ward 
suit, about the status of the public dedication theory as applied to Lake 
 
256  Id. 
257  United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 154 U.S. 225 (1894). 
258  Bill of Complaint at 1, Leland v. City of Chicago, No. 86-G-59228 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 
Dec. 29, 1886); A Toboggan Slide, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30, 1886, at 12. 
259  A Toboggan Slide, supra note 258. 
260  Id. 
261  Items, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 1887, at 6. 
262  A Novel Suit, DAILY INTER OCEAN (Chi.), Aug. 4, 1889, at 9. 
263  The Lake Front Trouble, DAILY INTER OCEAN (Chi.), Nov. 1, 1889, at 3.  Presumably this 
interest was stimulated by Justice Harlan’s circuit court ruling in the first Illinois Central case that the 
City held the title to the land on the lakefront. 
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Park?  There could be no doubt that under Illinois law the restrictions 
against buildings reflected in the 1836 maps of fractional section 15 and the 
1839 map of fractional section 10 were legally enforceable.  There could 
also be no doubt that owners of land abutting Michigan Avenue had 
standing to sue in equity to enforce the restrictions.  On the other hand, 
there was uncertainty as to whether the dedication merely barred the 
construction of buildings, or whether it affirmatively mandated that the 
lakefront be used as a park.  There was also some risk that abutting 
landowners would be denied relief on the ground that the restrictions had 
been abandoned or waived because of the flurry of construction activity in 
the park after the great fire in 1871.  And it was increasingly likely that the 
United States would be denied standing to enforce the restrictions, and 
hence the U.S. Attorneys could no longer act on behalf of the property 
owners in federal court.  On the whole, however, the prospect for success 
through litigation by Michigan Avenue owners was quite good—especially 
if they could find a champion willing to shoulder the cost. 
IV. THE WATCHDOG OF THE LAKEFRONT 
We now turn to an individual who was to have a profound impact on 
the future of the Chicago lakefront.  Aaron Montgomery Ward’s 
contribution did not take the form of a publicly articulated vision for the 
future of the park, as in the case of Daniel Burnham.  Nor did it take the 
form of any legal innovation.  The elements of the public dedication theory 
that Ward’s lawyers would advance were all in place, and had been 
repeatedly asserted in the context of the Chicago lakefront before Ward 
came on the scene.  Ward’s contribution was to fund litigation on behalf of 
Michigan Avenue property owners at a level and with a degree of 
persistence that had not been previously seen and has not been witnessed 
since.  Ward’s deep pockets and his persistence—some would say 
stubbornness—transformed the local understanding of the public dedication 
doctrine into four Illinois Supreme Court decisions, the cumulative impact 
of which would serve for over a century to constrain local officials from 
constructing new buildings in Grant Park. 
A. Aaron Montgomery Ward 
Montgomery Ward has always been something of a mystery, especially 
with respect to his motives for waging a twenty-year campaign to keep 
Grant Park free of buildings.  He has no full-length biography.264  He 
 
264  The only published biography is NINA BROWN BAKER, BIG CATALOGUE: THE LIFE OF AARON 
MONTGOMERY WARD (1956), a children’s book containing imaginary dialogue and no bibliography.  
The major reported events in the book, however, are consistent with company biographical sketches and 
other sources. 
A document titled “Copy of a Memorandum Found among the Private Papers of Mr. A. 
Montgomery—in his own handwriting” briefly recounts the history of Ward’s life.  This document is 
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disliked publicity and rarely spoke to the press.265  He consistently refused 
permission to be written up in sketches of Chicago leaders.266  He reportedly 
gave generously to philanthropic causes during his lifetime, but nearly 
always anonymously.267  Allison Dunham, a longtime property professor at 
the University of Chicago Law School, once wrote: “Those who really want 
to know Mr. Ward’s motives will have to await psychoanalysis of his letters 
and papers.”268  Unfortunately, if Ward left any papers and letters, they long 
ago disappeared.269 
The bare outline of what is known about Ward suggests that he was the 
quintessential self-made man.270  Ward was born on February 17, 1844, in 
Chatham, New Jersey.271  Raised in poverty in Niles, Michigan, he left 
school at the age of fourteen to work as a manual laborer to help support his 
family.272  Later, he became a shop clerk in St. Joseph, Michigan.273 
  
 
available at the Chicago History Museum and the American Heritage Center at the University of 
Wyoming.  It seems to be the foundation for most of the biographical sketches of Ward and is often 
cited as “Ward’s diary.”  See, e.g., Daniel J. Boorstin, A. Montgomery Ward’s Mail-Order Business, 
2 CHI. HIST. 142, 145 (1973). 
265  Robert J. Thorne, Former Executives Tell of the “Old Days,” FORWARD, Nov. 1925, at 4.  Ward 
“had a strong aversion to being interviewed by the press, or having any court papers served upon him.”  
Id.  His second-floor office was difficult to access, being reached only by a winding iron staircase.  Id.  
“When he was in the very public first floor offices, he usually left his hat on, making it seem to a 
stranger that he was a visitor.”  Id. 
266  Allison Dunham, The Chicago Lake Front and A. Montgomery Ward, 1 LAND-USE CONTROLS 
11, 19 (1967). 
267  Ward’s wife, Elizabeth, and daughter, Marjorie, made substantial charitable donations after his 
death, many of which bear the Ward name.  Based on a donation of $8 million, the principal classroom 
building at Northwestern University’s medical school is still named after Mr. and Mrs. Ward.  History: 
1900–1949 Timeline, NW. U., http://www.northwestern.edu/about/history/1900-1949.html (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2011). 
268  Dunham, supra note 266, at 20. 
269  Such is the conclusion of both our own research and that of David Blanke.  See DAVID BLANKE, 
SOWING THE AMERICAN DREAM: HOW CONSUMER CULTURE TOOK ROOT IN THE RURAL MIDWEST 273 
n.10 (2000). 
270  We rely primarily on two company-sponsored histories for biographical details: MONTGOMERY 
WARD & CO., THE HISTORY AND PROGRESS OF MONTGOMERY WARD & COMPANY (1925) [hereinafter 
HISTORY & PROGRESS] and FRANK B. LATHAM, 1872–1972, A CENTURY OF SERVING CONSUMERS: THE 
STORY OF MONTGOMERY WARD (1972). 
271  HISTORY & PROGRESS, supra note 270, at 5. 
272  Id. at 6. 
273  Id. 
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FIGURE 13: PORTRAIT OF AARON MONTGOMERY WARD274 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After the Civil War ended in 1866, Ward moved to Chicago, the new 
center of the Midwest, where he worked as a clerk at Field, Palmer & 
Leiter, which later became Marshall Field & Co.275  Ward then became a 
traveling salesman for a St. Louis wholesale house, which served as a 
supplier to rural general stores.276  During his travels throughout the rural 
Midwest, he observed the often-shoddy goods sold at high prices to farm 
families in small-town stores.277  He later switched jobs again, becoming a 
buyer for C. W. & E. Pardridge Co., a Chicago dry-goods company.278 
 
274  On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-62410. 
275  LATHAM, supra note 270, at 2–3. 
276  Id. at 3. 
277  Id. 
278  Id. at 4. 
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Armed with close familiarity with rural tastes and values and a 
background in both sales and purchasing, Ward conceived a revolutionary 
scheme to buy goods in bulk and sell them directly to farmers through the 
U.S. mails.279  In early 1871, Ward had saved enough money to buy a small 
amount of goods, but before he could advertise to customers, his inventory 
was completely destroyed by the Chicago Fire.280  He was determined to 
start over, and in August 1872 he had again saved enough money to build a 
small inventory.281  His first catalog was a single page.282  The first year was 
a slow one, exacerbated by the Panic of 1873, and Ward kept his day job at 
Pardridge’s while he filled orders at night from items that he bought from 
surplus Pardridge’s stock.283 
The missing ingredient was credibility with rural customers, who 
needed to be convinced that they would not be cheated if they sent cash to a 
firm in Chicago.284  Ward solved the problem by forging an alliance with the 
populist Granger movement, securing the right to use Granger membership 
lists and to call his operation the “Original Grange Supply House.”285  He 
also conceived the radical idea of offering a money-back guarantee on all 
goods sold, no questions asked.286 
The result was phenomenal.  By cutting out the middlemen, 
emphasizing value, and working tirelessly to determine what his customers 
wanted, Ward’s company quickly became the largest retailer in America.287  
Ward’s concept was copied by Sears, Roebuck & Co., which would 
eventually overcome Ward’s after fierce competition.288  But it is no 
exaggeration to say that Montgomery Ward was to the late nineteenth 
century what Sam Walton and Walmart were to the late twentieth.  Starting 
with a focus on rural and small-town America, Ward, like Walton, 
revolutionized merchandizing.289  Also like Walton, Ward encountered 
 
279  Boorstin, supra note 264, at 144–45. 
280  LATHAM, supra note 270, at 5–6. 
281  Id. at 6. 
282  CECIL C. HOGE, SR., THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS ARE THE TOUGHEST: WHAT WE CAN LEARN 
FROM THE CENTURY OF COMPETITION BETWEEN SEARS AND WARDS 12 (1988). 
283  LATHAM, supra note 270, at 8–9. 
284  In November 1873, the Chicago Tribune advised its readers not to trust a company calling itself 
Montgomery Ward & Co., which the paper characterized as a “swindling” operation run by “dead-
beats.”  Grangers, Beware!, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 1873, at 3.  Ward immediately called for a retraction, 
and the newspaper sent a reporter to investigate Ward’s operations.  The reporter was so impressed that 
the newspaper printed a full retraction, including a glowing review of the company.  Montgomery, Ward 
& Co., CHI. TRIB., Dec. 24, 1873, at 5.  Ward reprinted the entire article in his 1874 catalog.  LATHAM, 
supra note 270, at 9–10. 
285  HOGE, supra note 282, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
286  LATHAM, supra note 270, at 12. 
287  HOGE, supra note 282, at 23. 
288  Id. at 36–40. 
289  See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 121–29 (1973); see 
also Boorstin, supra note 264, at 142–52. 
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fierce resistance from local retailers, some of whom organized collective 
burnings of Ward’s catalogs to protest his enterprise.290 
Ward’s first Granger catalog was mailed in 1872.  Within a few years, 
he and his partner, George Thorne,291 were scrambling to acquire ever-
bigger office and warehouse space in Chicago, first on Clark Street, then 
Michigan Avenue, then Kinzie Street, and then Wabash Avenue.292  In 
1887, Ward and Thorne purchased two adjacent lots on the west side of 
Michigan Avenue, between Madison and Washington streets, for 
$235,000.293  Two years later, they acquired the lot to the south for 
$72,000.294  By 1890, they had constructed a seven-story “skyscraper,” 
celebrated for its six steam elevators (see Figure 14). 
Ward and Thorne later stated that they selected the site on Michigan 
Avenue in order to assure that their employees enjoyed sunlight, fresh air, 
and a relatively quiet location in which to work.295  This claim is plausible.  
Ward was by all accounts highly solicitous of his employees’ well-being: he 
offered group health insurance to employees well before it was typical to do 
so, enabled female workers to dry their shoes and stockings on rainy days, 
and offered free malted milks midmorning and midafternoon in the belief 
that this would fortify at-risk employees against tuberculosis.296  The 
lakefront site was not chosen to appeal to customers, since the catalog 
facility was not, at least initially, open to the public.  Later, during the 
Columbian Exposition, Ward added a plush “Customers’ Parlor” on the first 
floor, where visitors could browse through catalogs and place orders, or 
simply rest their feet.297  But when the Michigan Avenue facility was 
 
290  BOOTON HERNDON, SATISFACTION GUARANTEED: AN UNCONVENTIONAL REPORT TO TODAY’S 
CONSUMERS 168 (1972).  Some local groups offered a small reward for customers who threw their 
catalogs in the fire.  Many of these customers would earn the reward and simply send off for another 
catalog.  Id. 
291  George Thorne was not very involved in the lakefront fight.  At the time of the disputes, Ward 
was the owner of the Michigan Avenue properties.  See Letter from George P. Merrick to John G. 
Carlisle, Sec’y of Treasury (June 20, 1895) (on file with the National Archives at College Park, 
Maryland).  In addition, Thorne may not have been as active as Ward in the lakefront fight because he 
may have had a different view of how the Chicago lakefront should look.  It is possible that he shared 
the views of his son, Charles Thorne, who was a member of the Commercial Club of Chicago and was 
involved with the development of the Burnham Plan. 
292  HISTORY & PROGRESS, supra note 270, at 11, 14, 17. 
293  Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 312 (statement of A. Montgomery Ward and George R. 
Thorne); LATHAM, supra note 270, at 29. 
294  Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 312 (statement of A. Montgomery Ward and George R. 
Thorne); LATHAM, supra note 270, at 30. 
295  Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 312–15 (statement of A. Montgomery Ward and George 
R. Thorne).  Ward also cited the lack of soot and dust from nearby chimneys and a lower fire-insurance 
rate as additional advantages of the lakefront location.  Id. at 315. 
296  See HERNDON, supra note 290, at 169. 
297  WILLE, supra note 4, at 73. 
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established, Ward, Thorne, and their employees were the only people who 
would be affected by the light, air, and views that the lake afforded. 
FIGURE 14: CATALOG COVER SHOWING THE ACTIVITY IN WARD’S WAREHOUSE AT THE 
CORNER OF MADISON STREET (LEFT-HAND SIDE) AND MICHIGAN AVENUE CIRCA 1900298 
 
298  On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-HB-29482. 
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B. The Local Litigation Phase—1890–1895 
When Ward and Thorne purchased their property on Michigan Avenue 
in 1887, other landowners, including John Stafford, Warren Leland, and 
Sarah Daggett, were already active in threatening and sometimes actually 
suing for injunctions to stave off construction in the park.299  Once Ward 
and Thorne completed their new building in 1890, they quickly joined 
forces with this group.  Ward was not immediately regarded as the leader.  
He gradually assumed this role, as Stafford leased his property for ninety-
nine years beginning in 1888,300 Warren Leland sold his hotel and withdrew 
from his suit in 1892,301 and Daggett died in 1895.302 
During the first years of Ward and Thorne’s ownership on Michigan 
Avenue, their legal activity remained focused on the local courts, which had 
been issuing injunctions enforcing the dedication off and on since 1864.  
The first recorded salvo from Ward & Co. came on October 16, 1890.303  
The partners filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Cook County to 
enjoin the City of Chicago from erecting any buildings in Lake Park.304  The 
Illinois Central and other railroads were made parties to the suit.305  The 
genesis of the suit—according to later accounts—occurred when Ward 
looked out the window from his new office and saw workers building 
scaffolding to load garbage into railroad cars.306  He summoned his lawyer, 
George P. Merrick, and demanded that something be done to clean up the 
mess.307 
 
299  See supra Part III. 
300  Indenture Between John Francis Stafford and Andrew Jackson Cooper (Dec. 1, 1887) (on file 
with Cook County Recorder of Deeds Office, Doc. No. 1244031, recorded in book 2848 page 322). 
301  Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79, 82 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892); Warren 
F. Leland Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1899, at 7. 
302  See Will of Sarah E. Daggett, CHI. TRIB., July 21, 1895, at 15. 
303  City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 393, 48 N.E. 927, 927 (1897). 
304  Id. 
305  Id., 48 N.E. at 928. 
306  LATHAM, supra note 270, at 51; WILLE, supra note 4, at 71.  We have uncovered no 
contemporary evidence to support this account of the suit’s origins.  The first version of the story that 
we found appears in Gene Morgan, How Grant Park Was Saved for People; Ward’s Great Fight Waged 
21 Years, CHI. DAILY NEWS, June 8, 1935, at 5. 
307  Ward was represented throughout the litigation by two lawyers, Elbridge Hanecy and George 
Merrick.  Hanecy grew up in Wisconsin and moved to Chicago in 1869 after graduating from the 
College of Milwaukee.  His first job in Chicago was at Field, Leiter & Co., where he missed Ward by 
about two years.  After being admitted to the Illinois bar in 1874, Hanecy practiced solo for several 
years until he took on Merrick, who became his partner in 1889.  Hanecy was elected circuit judge for 
Cook County in 1893, where he remained until 1904.  A.N. WATERMAN, 2 HISTORICAL REVIEW OF 
CHICAGO AND COOK COUNTY AND SELECTED BIOGRAPHY 660–62 (1908); George Peck Merrick, in 2 
HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ILLINOIS 547, 547 (Newton Bateman & Paul Selby eds., 1906).  Hanecy 
served as Ward’s lawyer until he took the bench, and he resumed his representation of Ward when he 
returned to the bar.  Despite his previous service to Ward, Hanecy, while serving as a judge, presided 
over a case related to the lakefront.  See infra note 568 and accompanying text. 
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The complaint offered a relatively straightforward rendition of the 
public dedication theory, aside from some hedging about which government 
entity had title to Lake Park—a matter still pending before the U.S. 
Supreme Court.308  Among other derelictions, the complaint emphasized, the 
City had allowed several railroads to build “cheap frame structure[s]” in the 
park, had “constructed or caused to be built certain scaffolding” upon which 
“filth, refuse, garbage, and rubbish from many streets and alleys of the City 
of Chicago has been placed,” and had “caused to be built a large one story 
structure . . . partially rotted or decayed” for storing paving blocks.309 
The next day, the clerk of court issued a writ of injunction prohibiting 
any of the defendants “from erecting or causing to be erected . . . any 
structure [in the park].”310  In essence, this merely replicated the injunction 
issued by Judge Moran, which was still in effect.311  The action thereafter 
lay dormant for several years. 
Meanwhile, planning for the Columbian Exposition was underway.  
The sponsors ultimately decided that one building, the World’s Congress 
Auxiliary, would be located in Lake Park, in a new structure that would 
replace the decrepit Inter-state Exposition Building.312  After the fair, the 
new building would become a permanent memorial to the Exposition and a 
home for the Art Institute.313  The directors of the Art Institute were well 
aware of the risk of litigation from Michigan Avenue owners.  
Consequently, Caryl Young, a Michigan Avenue property owner 
sympathetic to the project, sought to obtain consents to construction of the 
new structure from property owners abutting the park.314  Consents were 
sought from those who owned property immediately across from the 
proposed structure and those owning lots immediately north and south of 
this area.  Ward and Thorne’s property was one block north of this consent 
zone, so their consents were not sought.315  Even within the two-block 
 
Unlike Hanecy, Merrick was educated by private tutors and attended college at Northwestern 
University.  ALBUM OF GENEALOGY AND BIOGRAPHY: COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 598–99 (3d ed. 1895).  
He served as a trustee for Northwestern for several years, and he had many prominent clients, including 
the Santa Fe Railroad.  Despite his many achievements, Merrick’s work on the lakefront litigation was 
cited at his death as his greatest accomplishment.  George Merrick Dies; A Veteran Chicago Lawyer, 
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1938, at 18. 
308  Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 5 (Bill of Complaint). 
309  Id. at 8–11. 
310  Id. at 18. 
311  See City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 392, 400, 48 N.E. 927, 928 (1897); Transcript of 
Record, supra note 4, at 17–19. 
312  See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text. 
313  See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
314  Affidavit of Caryl Young at 1, Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79 (Cook County, 
Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892) (No. 89C74794). 
315  Later authors have claimed, erroneously, that Ward and Thorne gave their consent to the Art 
Institute.  See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 266, at 15.  There is no documentary evidence supporting this 
claim, and it is inconsistent with the list of consenting owners in the Daggett case file. 
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stretch of land in which consents were sought, one owner, Sarah Daggett, 
held out.316  While she was visiting family members in New York, Young 
approached her husband, Isaac Daggett, seeking his consent.  Although 
Isaac had no ownership interest in the property and declined to sign the 
consent form, Young evidently came to believe that the Daggetts did not 
oppose the Art Institute construction, and reported this back to the 
directors.317 
Armed with what it apparently regarded as a complete set of owner 
consents, the Art Institute entered into construction contracts on February 4, 
1892.318  On February 6, Sarah Daggett wrote to one of the directors stating 
that she in fact did not consent to the construction of a new building.319  
Although that director informed his fellow directors of this communication, 
construction went ahead.  Shortly thereafter, on April 3, the City was served 
with an order to show cause why it should not be held in contempt under 
the 1889 injunction obtained by Warren Leland.320  Leland had withdrawn 
as a plaintiff in that suit in 1892,321 but had been replaced by none other than 
Sarah Daggett.322 
 
316  Daggett, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79; see also Gives Its Reasons, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1892, at 13.  
John Stafford also opposed the Art Institute, but he had entered into a ninety-nine-year lease of his 
property, which raised (legitimate) doubts about his standing to object or consent.  Alone in the Fight, 
CHI. TRIB., June 2, 1892, at 16. 
317  The panel of circuit court judges reviewing the case determined that this consent was sufficient.  
Daggett, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. at 86.  The first Ward decision also later posited that this consent was likely 
sufficient.  City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 420, 48 N.E. 927, 936 (1897).  Newspaper accounts of 
the episode offer somewhat conflicting depictions of what happened.  Compare Four Judges Hearing It, 
EVENING NEWS (Chi.), June 20, 1892, at 2, and Courts of Record, DAILY INTER OCEAN (Chi.), May 21, 
1892, at 13, with She Ignored Her Spouse, CHI. DAILY NEWS, June 2, 1892, at 1.  In the circuit court 
litigation, Caryl Young submitted an affidavit stating that he had visited Isaac Daggett, believing him to 
be the owner of the Michigan Avenue property, and that Isaac Daggett told him to return after he had 
received more consents.  Later, while Daggett was in New York, Young sent him several newspaper 
clippings regarding the Art Institute.  At no time, according to Young, did Daggett manifest any 
opposition to the Art Institute.  Affidavit of Caryl Young, supra note 314, at 1–3.  Isaac Daggett 
responded with an opposing affidavit stating that he had told Young that Sarah Daggett was the owner 
of the property, whereupon Young said he would return after receiving more signatures.  Daggett, “not 
wishing to be considered rude or unfriendly . . . replied . . . that [Young] might call.”  Affidavit of Isaac 
M. Daggett (May 2, 1892) at 2, Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79 (Cook County, Ill., 
Cir. Ct. 1892) (No. 89C74794).  Daggett insisted, however, that he never did anything to suggest that 
either he or his wife supported the Art Institute; to the contrary, he had always opposed any building on 
the lakefront.  Id. at 1–4. 
318  Daggett, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. at 86. 
319  Id.  Isaac Daggett sent a letter to Art Institute Director William M.R. French on February 1, 
1892, stating that he and Sarah did not consent to the Institute.  A copy of Director French’s reply of 
February 6, 1892, is found in the case record.  Affidavit of Isaac M. Daggett (June 20, 1892), Daggett v. 
City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892) (No. 89C74794). 
320  Daggett, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. at 87; Gives Its Reasons, supra note 316, at 13. 
321  Leland had sold his hotel on Michigan Avenue and purchased another on the South Side.  
Warren F. Leland Dead, supra note 301. 
322  Gives Its Reasons, supra note 316. 
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Ruling on the motion, Judge Tuthill found that the 1889 Leland 
injunction applied to the Art Institute building, and construction activity 
was brought to a halt.323  In an unusual move designed to resolve the matter 
expeditiously, because the opening of the fair was rapidly approaching, the 
matter was then reheard three weeks later by a full panel of circuit court 
judges, which reversed Tuthill’s ruling.324 
The panel of circuit judges reaffirmed that the plat restrictions created 
an enforceable public dedication, and that Daggett, as an abutting owner, 
had standing to enforce the restrictions in equity.325  It gave three reasons 
why injunctive relief was nevertheless improper.  First, the panel held that 
Daggett was guilty of laches for failing to assert her claim for injunctive 
relief before the Art Institute had expended considerable money ($100,000 
was mentioned) on construction activity.326  Given the dubious 
circumstances surrounding Daggett’s alleged consent, and her prompt 
clarification that she had not given such consent just two days after the 
construction contracts were signed, this was a flimsy argument.  Second, 
the state legislature had adopted legislation in 1890 authorizing the World’s 
Fair to construct buildings in the park, and this legislation provided for 
condemning any rights of abutting property owners for a period of up to 
five years if necessary.327  Although no action to condemn the rights of 
abutting owners had been commenced, the court reasoned that this 
legislation in effect converted their interest into a right to obtain money 
compensation in exchange for their interest, and hence eliminated their right 
to specific relief in equity.328  Finally, the panel expressed skepticism about 
 
323  See Against the Art Institute, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 1892, at 3. 
324  For an Institute, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1892, at 13; Oppose Mrs. Daggett, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 
1892, at 13.  Three of the four judges had previous involvement in lakefront litigation.  Judge Tuley had 
previously worked as corporation counsel for the City of Chicago.  Judge Horton had been an attorney in 
the 1869 lakefront case that Judge Drummond heard, apparently working for Ralph Starkweather.  Judge 
Tuthill, as U.S. Attorney, had filed the suit against the Chicago Base Ball Club.  See Oppose Mrs. 
Daggett, supra, at 13; supra note 245. 
325  Daggett, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. at 87.  Judge Tuthill dissented from the denial of the injunction. 
326  Id. at 87, 92. 
327  1890 Ill. Laws 5–6.  Section 2 of the Act in Relation to the World’s Columbian Exposition 
provided that all exposition buildings would be removed within a year after the fair, but that the City 
could purchase the buildings from the fair.  It further provided: 
If any owners of any lands or lots abutting or fronting on any such public grounds, or park 
grounds, or adjacent thereto, shall have any private right, easement, interest or property in such 
public or park grounds, appurtenant to their lands or lots, or otherwise, or any right to have such 
public or park grounds remain open or vacant and free from encroachments, [the State or the 
county can file an action] praying that the compensation [be determined] for such right, interest, 
easement or property, or for any interference with or damage thereto . . . . 
Id. 
328  In the terminology introduced by Calabresi and Melamed, the panel reasoned that the statute 
transformed protection for the owners’ entitlement from a “property rule” to a “liability rule.”  See 
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972). 
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whether Daggett would suffer any loss in the market value of her property 
by having the Art Institute constructed across the street, and it alluded to the 
traditional equity rule that an injunction will not issue in the absence of 
irreparable injury.329 
The panel did not overturn the existing Leland injunction; it simply 
held that the injunction was modified to the extent necessary to permit 
construction of the Art Institute.  With this ruling, Daggett’s holdout ended.  
In order to appeal, she would have had to post a large bond,330 and this 
undoubtedly dissuaded her from taking further action.  The building was 
still under construction when the World’s Congress Auxiliary took 
possession in late spring 1893.331 
The Art Institute was the only substantial permanent building to be 
constructed in the park, and would remain so until the Millennium Park 
project more than a century in the future.  Although Ward was not asked to 
give his consent to construction of the Art Institute, it is doubtful that he 
harbored any reservations about the project.  His legal activity in 1892 and 
for some years afterwards was focused on nuisance-like conduct—unsightly 
loading platforms, shabby work sheds, and armory buildings used for 
dogfights.332  Moreover, Ward served as a Governing Member of the Art 
Institute from 1888 to 1913, and as the museum commented after his death, 
“[d]uring all his years as the ‘watch-dog of the Lake Front’ he was always 
friendly to the Art Institute and considerate of its interests.”333 
Although Ward was a passive bystander in the Art Institute fight, he 
found himself back in court in several disputes arising under the temporary 
injunction that he had obtained in 1890, which remained in force.  In May 
1891, the City petitioned the court to modify the injunction to allow it to 
issue a license to the Adam Forepaugh Circus to erect a tent in Lake Park.334  
 
329  Daggett, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. at 87–88.  The City and the Art Institute had obtained affidavits from 
several consenting owners stating that the building would increase the value of their property.  
Affidavits of Orrington Lunt, Charles A. Winship & William F. Price, O. M. Powers, W. C. Ritchie, 
Leroy Payne, Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892) (No. 
89C74794). 
330  Bonds were a general prerequisite to the grant of an injunction under Illinois law: “[B]efore an 
injunction shall issue, the complainant shall give bond in such penalty, and upon such condition and 
with such security as may be required by the court, judge or master granting or ordering the injunction.”  
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 69, § 9 (1877).  Courts had authority to dispense with the bonding requirement for 
good cause.  Id.  Having been denied an injunction by the panel of circuit judges, Daggett almost surely 
would have been required to post a large bond to obtain an injunction pending appeal.  Cf. Marks v. 
Columbia Yacht Club, 219 Ill. 417, 420, 76 N.E. 582, 583 (1905) (upholding a significant award of 
damages against a Michigan Avenue property owner pursuant to a bond posted to secure an injunction 
on public dedication grounds). 
331  Cremin, supra note 26, at 184. 
332  To Be a Fine Park, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1893, at 6. 
333  Notes: Montgomery Ward, 7 BULL. ART INST. CHI. 47, 47 (1914).  Montgomery Ward is also 
listed as a Benefactor on the Art Institute’s donor wall. 
334  See Small Boys Are Happy, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1891, at 9. 
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Ward opposed modification, arguing that a circus tent was no less a 
building than a permanent structure.335  Judge Hawes said that the park had 
been neglected by the City for twenty years, and he asked the parties to 
submit authorities on whether abutting property owners had standing to 
prevent temporary use of a “mud hole.”336  He eventually modified the 
injunction to allow the circus to go forward with the tent.337 
In February 1892, the City sought permission to modify the injunction 
to allow another wigwam to be built, this time for the Democratic National 
Convention to be held during the coming summer.338  Ward initially 
objected along with other property owners,339 but he eventually consented, 
having been assured that the wigwam would be torn down immediately 
after the convention.340  Ward later regretted the decision, saying that “it 
took five years of litigation to undo the precedent thus established.”341 
In the winter of 1893, in a sign of Ward’s emerging leadership, the 
Michigan Avenue property owners met at the Montgomery Ward & Co. 
offices.342  The owners collectively agreed to fund a project to beautify the 
park at their own expense, committing $10,000 to the effort.343  The City 
evidently rejected the offer. 
Three months later, in April 1893, the City of Chicago petitioned for a 
modification of the injunction to permit the Adam Forepaugh Circus to hold 
another circus in the park.344  In response, Ward and Thorne amended their 
original (1890) complaint, naming the proprietors of the Forepaugh Circus 
as defendants.  The amended complaint reiterated the derelictions of the 
City in permitting sheds to be erected and garbage to be dumped in the 
park.  But a good portion of the document was spent listing the reasons why 
the circus should not be allowed to operate in the park.345  On May 24, the 
court entered an order enjoining all defendants from “erecting any 
 
335  Id. 
336  Id. 
337  City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 394, 48 N.E. 927, 928 (1897); Transcript of Record, 
supra note 4, at 484–88 (petition of Adam Forepaugh Shows); Small Boys Are Happy, supra note 334. 
338  Ward, 169 Ill. at 420, 48 N.E. at 936. 
339  Against the Democratic Wigwam, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 1892, at 3. 
340  Ward, 169 Ill. at 420, 48 N.E. at 936.  Hanecy demanded for Ward that the Democratic National 
Convention put up a $15,000 guarantee that it would demolish the building when the convention was 
over.  Must Put Up a $15,000 Guarantee, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 1892, at 6.  Whether the Convention 
complied with this demand is unclear. 
341  A. Montgomery Ward, Letter to the Editor, Mr. Ward Explains, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2, 1900, at 4.  
In the winter of 1893, the City successfully petitioned the court to allow it to dump snow in the park.  
Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 32–33 (order granting petition). 
342  To Be a Fine Park, supra note 332. 
343  Id. 
344  Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 33–34 (order granting petition). 
345  See id. at 39–54 (amended complaint). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1476 
buildings, sheds, plateforms [sic], tents, or other structures upon [Lake 
Park].”346 
Ward’s attitude toward use of the lakefront nevertheless remained 
selective.  In 1895, the City adopted a resolution allowing a temporary post 
office to be built in Lake Park until a permanent one could be built 
elsewhere.347  The City’s corporation counsel wrote a legal opinion 
concluding that the City could not erect such a building without first 
obtaining permission from Ward and the other abutting property owners.348  
After some equivocating, Ward gave his oral consent, which the federal 
authorities regarded as sufficient.349  Once the building was completed, 
however, he again drew the line.  Postal carrier Leslie C. Whitaker had 
received permission to build a bicycle track next to the temporary post 
office building.  Ward promptly obtained an injunction to stop this 
enterprise.350  When the post office decided to expand the temporary 
building, Merrick was back in court again.351  He secured an injunction in 
state court, but when the case was removed to federal court, the injunction 
was dissolved.  The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the “original plan” called 
for a larger post office than had been originally constructed, and thus 
Ward’s consent should be construed to include the newly enlarged 
structure.352 
C. The Illinois Supreme Court Phase—Ward I 
For over thirty years, from 1864 to 1896, litigation over the 
construction of buildings in Lake Park was confined to courts in Chicago—
the federal circuit court and the Cook County Circuit Court.  Then, rather 
abruptly, the action shifted to the Illinois Supreme Court.  The explanation 
for this is simple: the stakes were suddenly higher.  In decisions rendered in 
1892 and 1894, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the uncertainty over who 
had title to Lake Park: the State of Illinois had title, and had delegated 
 
346  Id. at 57–59. 
347  Id. at 354–55 (reflecting resolution). 
348  Can’t Allow Its Use, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13, 1895, at 8. 
349  According to correspondence with federal authorities, Thorne signed an affidavit indicating that 
Ward had given his oral consent.  Letter from George P. Merrick to John G. Carlisle, supra note 291.  
Merrick then wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Postmaster of Chicago denying that 
Ward had given his consent.  Id.  Two days later, however, Merrick followed up with another letter, 
withdrawing his repudiation of Thorne’s affidavit and allowing the construction of the temporary post 
office building to move forward.  Letter from George P. Merrick to John G. Carlisle, Sec’y of Treasury 
(June 22, 1895) (on file with the National Archives at College Park, Maryland).  Whether this episode 
reflected an internal disagreement between Ward and Thorne, or Ward and Merrick, or simply 
miscommunication, is unclear. 
350  Court Bars Bike Track, CHI. TRIB., June 19, 1897, at 1. 
351  Ward v. Cong. Constr. Co., 99 F. 598, 598–99 (7th Cir. 1900). 
352  Id. at 600–01. 
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authority over the use of the park to the City of Chicago.353  This resolution 
of the title question, combined with the burst of civic energy associated 
with the Columbian Exposition, unleashed a flurry of plans to fill the park 
with permanent monumental structures.  The City and its allies had to 
obtain a definitive resolution of the public dedication issue in order to 
proceed with these plans.  The Michigan Avenue landowners had much less 
incentive to seek a ruling from a higher court, because they had consistently 
been winning in the local courts.  But given the intense pressure for 
development of the lakefront, they too may have seen the wisdom of 
securing a more authoritative precedent interpreting the public dedication. 
The inexorable movement to the state supreme court began when the 
City of Chicago brought a motion to compel Ward to “dispose of the issues 
now pending on demurrer,” and the court gave Ward ten days to respond.354  
The demurrer was overruled on March 2, 1896.355  Testimony was then 
taken before Judge Brentano over a three-week period in June and July of 
1896, supplemented by a massive documentary presentation detailing much 
of the history of the controversy over the park.356 
After reviewing the voluminous record, Judge Brentano ruled in 
September 1896 that the temporary injunction previously issued in favor of 
Ward should be made permanent.357  His order prohibited the City and the 
Illinois Central from building any new railroad tracks, sheds, or other 
structures in the park.358  An exception was made for structures authorized 
by the ordinance passed on October 21, 1895, which contemplated 
construction of a new armory and parade ground for the Illinois National 
Guard in north Lake Park.359  The injunction also specifically exempted the 
Art Institute and the temporary post office, both of which, the court 
concluded, enjoyed owner consent.360  The next day an article appeared in 
the Chicago Tribune naming Ward the “watch dog of the lake-front,”361 a 
 
353  Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 154 U.S. 
225 (1894). 
354  Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 68.  One of the defendants named in Ward’s original 
complaint filed a demurrer in 1890, but for reasons that are not clear, the court had never ruled on it.  
When the City decided to reactivate the litigation in 1896, the mechanism for doing so was to demand a 
ruling on the demurrer. 
355  Id. at 69. 
356  See id. at 93–542. 
357  City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 395, 48 N.E. 927, 928 (1897). 
358  Id. 
359  Id. at 395–96, 421, 48 N.E. at 928, 936. 
360  Id. at 396, 422, 48 N.E. at 928, 937. 
361  One Year To Take Park, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 15, 1896, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The same newspaper had previously referred to Warren F. Leland by the same title.  See Watchdogs of 
the Lake-Front, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 6, 1892, at 1.  The first known published occurrence of the title is a 
Chicago Tribune article apparently quoting a statement from Sarah Daggett’s attorney.  Alone in the 
Fight, supra note 316. 
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tagline that the paper would continue to use up to its publication of Ward’s 
obituary. 
The City promptly appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.  In a 
unanimous decision authored by Justice Carter, the court, on November 8, 
1897, upheld the decree.362  Most of the opinion was devoted to 
recapitulating the complex history of the park, from the initial marketing 
efforts of the Canal Commissioners and the United States through the 
balance of the nineteenth century.363  The court concluded that the 
restrictions on buildings included on the maps of 1836 and 1839 were 
legally binding public dedications.364  It explained that the City had accepted 
the dedications when it adopted the resolution of 1844 and the ordinance of 
1847 designating the space as a public park, and that the City had thereby 
agreed to hold the land in trust for the public.365  These propositions were, as 
we have seen, relatively uncontroversial, given the Illinois Supreme Court’s 
existing precedents on public dedications and the longstanding acceptance 
of the public dedication doctrine by local judges in Chicago in repeated 
disputes over the use of the park. 
The court also held that the adjoining property owners had standing to 
enforce the dedication.  The court’s holding on the standing question was 
reinforced by language in the U.S. Supreme Court’s second Illinois Central 
decision, where Justice Field had declared that  
[t]he only parties interested in the public use for which the ground was 
dedicated are the owners of lots abutting on the ground dedicated . . . and it 
may be conceded they have a right to invoke, through the proper public 
authorities, the protection of the property in the use for which it was 
dedicated.366  
Again, this proposition was uncontroversial, given numerous previous 
decisions to the same effect. 
The court also had little trouble concluding that it made no difference 
that Lake Park was dedicated by two different owners—the Canal 
Commissioners and the United States—at different times.   
Both had represented to prospective purchasers that the land east of 
Michigan Avenue would be clear of buildings.367  “Besides,” the court 
remarked, “this open space has always been treated by the city and the 
public as one park.”368 
 
362  Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 48 N.E. 927. 
363  See id. 
364  Id. at 402–03, 48 N.E. at 930. 
365  Id. at 403, 48 N.E. at 930. 
366  Id. at 417, 48 N.E. at 935 (quoting United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 154 U.S. 225, 238–39 (1894)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
367  Id. at 418, 48 N.E. at 935. 
368  Id. 
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Turning to the most seriously contested question, the court rejected the 
City’s argument that the adjoining property owners were estopped from 
enforcing the public dedication because they had acquiesced in other 
violations of the restriction in the park.369  This, of course, had been Judge 
Drummond’s rationale in 1882 for denying abutting landowners an 
injunction against the B&O depot.370  Since then, however, the owners had 
roused themselves, and the Illinois Supreme Court recounted the extensive 
record of litigation surrounding the park for over a decade.371  The only 
recent exceptions, the court noted, were the Art Institute and the post office, 
and property owners had consented to their erection.  It would not be 
appropriate, the court said, to find that the owners had “waived all of their 
rights in the premises because they may have chosen to waive some of 
them.”372 
In affirming the decree issued by Judge Brentano, no mention was 
made of the exemption in his decree for the new armory projected for the 
ongoing landfill activity in north Lake Park.  This set the stage for the next 
round of litigation. 
D. Ward Versus Everyone Else—Ward II and Ward III 
Ward’s next battles would be more difficult because the City wanted to 
add buildings that enjoyed widespread support among the civic elite, the 
local newspapers, and presumably a majority of the populace.  Ward I was 
decided shortly after the Chicago City Council, pursuant to ordinances 
adopted in 1895 and 1896, had transferred title to Lake Park to the South 
Park Commissioners.373  The ordinances contemplated that the SPC would 
engage in a massive landfill, extending the park to the harbor line.  The 
north portion of the new landfill was to be used for a National Guard 
armory and training ground, and the south portion developed by the SPC as 
an expanded park including new monumental public buildings.  While 
Burnham continued to work on an overall design for the park, over the next 
several years the SPC concentrated on the landfill project.374  In 1899, the 
state legislature passed an act dedicating the new landfill for park purposes 
and renaming the expanded space “Grant Park.”375  The SPC retransferred 
 
369  Id. 
370  See The Lake-Front, supra note 219; supra notes 219–20 and accompanying text. 
371  See Ward, 169 Ill. at 418–21, 48 N.E. at 935–36. 
372  Id. at 421, 48 N.E. at 937. 
373  Bliss v. Ward, 198 Ill. 104, 117–18, 64 N.E. 705, 708 (1902). 
374  Cremin, supra note 26, at 246.  The fill was composed of street sweepings supplied by the city 
streets department and sludge dredged from the river and the canal.  Id. at 247–48. 
375  1899 Ill. Laws 328. 
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title to the north portion of the landfill area to the State, and entered into 
contracts for construction of the armory.376 
As soon as construction began on the armory, Ward filed a bill for an 
injunction on June 19, 1900.377  He prevailed in the trial court, and the 
defendant in the suit, the Board of Commissioners for the armory and 
parade grounds, appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.  The issue on 
appeal in Ward II was whether the public dedication recognized in Ward I 
applied only to the land west of the Illinois Central tracks, or also extended 
to new land east of the tracks created by landfill, such as the land to be used 
for the new armory.378 
Ward argued that the issue had been resolved as to the entire park by 
Ward I.  But the Illinois Supreme Court held that its previous decision had 
enforced the public dedication only as to lands west of the tracks.379  
Nevertheless, the court decided that the dedication applied equally to the 
newly filled land east of the tracks.  Justice Cartwright’s opinion for the 
court was less than clear about the rationale for this conclusion.  One reason 
appeared to be based on an analogy to natural accretion.  If the original 
parkland had been augmented by natural accretion, no one would argue that 
the original dedication did not also apply to the expanded park.  The court 
was “unable to see how any different rule can prevail” when the 
augmentation occurred by artificial filling.380  “In either case the extension 
grows upon the original park and becomes corporate with it and part of it,—
in the one case by natural process, and in the other by artificial means, with 
the assent of the State.”381 
This argument ignored the distinction between accretion—where 
riparian land is gradually and imperceptibly augmented—and avulsion—
when the change is sudden and perceptible.382  Title to land formed by 
accretion belongs to the riparian owner and is subject to the same 
restrictions as apply to the original land.383  But where riparian land is 
augmented by avulsion, title to the new land does not attach to the riparian 
 
376  Bliss, 198 Ill. at 118–19, 64 N.E. at 708–09.  The City wanted a new armory for several reasons.  
The violence of the recent Pullman Strike was doubtless on the minds of citizens when the project was 
approved.  See supra note 98 and accompanying text.  Additionally, even the City Council of Chicago 
was disappointed in the current condition of the park.  Old Buildings To Go, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1895, 
at 8. 
377  See Wants Armory Work Stopped, CHI. TRIB., June 20, 1900, at 10. 
378  Bliss, 198 Ill. at 112, 64 N.E. at 706. 
379  Id. 
380  Id. at 121, 64 N.E. at 709. 
381  Id. 
382  See 1 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 69 (1904). 
383  The very first Illinois dedication case had held that additions to dedicated land caused by 
accretion are also subject to the dedication.  Godfrey v. City of Alton, 12 Ill. 29, 36 (1850).  However, it 
does not appear that any Illinois courts had previously extended a dedication to land added by avulsion, 
whether natural or artificial. 
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owner and instead remains where it stood before the change occurred.384  
Many courts have held that artificial filling is a form of avulsion, not 
accretion.385  If this is correct, then it seems to follow that restrictions on 
title that inhere in the original riparian lands should not automatically 
extend to the newly formed landfill. 
The court’s decision also hinted at a more functional analysis: 
specifically, that extending the dedication to the newly created parkland 
was necessary in order to fulfill the purposes of the original dedication.  
“[T]he property owners on Michigan avenue bought their lots with the 
distinct understanding that there should never be any building between their 
lots and the lake.”386  That being so, the court said, “when the limits of the 
park were extended into the lake, no right was acquired to erect buildings 
between the lots and the lake although at a greater distance from the lots.”387  
This reasoning is more persuasive, although it failed to take into account 
that structures erected farther from Michigan Avenue would obviously have 
a reduced impact on light, air, and view for owners of land abutting 
Michigan Avenue, at least relative to structures immediately opposite them 
in what had been the original Lake Park.  In all events, another victory for 
Ward. 
At this point, the disputes between Ward and the SPC turned to two 
monumental civic projects supported by private philanthropy.  The 
principal properties and proposed construction sites are shown in Figure 15. 
When John Crerar, a railroad mogul, died in 1889, he left $2.5 million 
to the City of Chicago for a public library, as well as a separate $100,000 
bequest to support construction of a statue of Abraham Lincoln.388  In 1901, 
the City Council settled on the newly renamed Grant Park, between 
Madison and Monroe streets, as the location for these projects.389  The state 
legislature promptly passed an act authorizing both the Crerar Library and 
the statue to be built in Grant Park.390  The Act recognized the interests of 
the abutting property owners, and provided that consent had to be obtained 
from all owners before construction could begin.391 
 
 
384  See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2598–99 
(2010); see also FARNHAM, supra note 382, § 69. 
385  See, e.g., Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2611. 
386  Bliss, 198 Ill. at 115, 64 N.E. at 707. 
387  Id. at 115–16, 64 N.E. at 707. 
388  Thomas W. Goodspeed, John Crerar, in THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 98, 117 (D.A. Henderson 
ed., 1920); see Crerar Lincoln Monument Plans Nearly Completed, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 1907, at 9. 
389  Favors the Crerar Plan, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19, 1901, at 1. 
390  1901 Ill. Laws 232.  The commission for the Lincoln statute had been awarded to the famous 
sculptor, Auguste St. Gaudens, in 1897, and the project was expected to take three years.  Favors the 
Crerar Plan, supra note 389.  St. Gaudens’s “Lincoln” still stands in Grant Park. 
391  1901 Ill. Laws 233. 
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FIGURE 15: CERTAIN MICHIGAN AVENUE AND GRANT PARK PROPERTIES CIRCA 1903 
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George Merrick, Ward’s attorney, initially responded to the Act by 
saying that Ward would not consent to any buildings in the park.392  A few 
weeks later, Merrick issued another statement, saying that Ward would 
consent to the library, but only if it were built south of Jackson 
Boulevard—that is, south of the Art Institute, rather than to the north where 
Ward’s property lay.393  The SPC responded that Ward’s condition was 
unacceptable.394  The commissioners were adamant that the library be 
placed to the north of the Art Institute.395 
The directors of the library quickly obtained consents from most of the 
other property owners on Michigan Avenue, and indicated that they would 
go to court to overturn the Act’s requirement of unanimous consent from 
abutting owners.396  But it appears that they did not do this.  Instead, in 
1903, the legislature enacted a statute permitting the SPC to condemn the 
rights of abutting owners.397  In early 1905 the SPC gave final approval to 
build the Crerar Library on the lakefront,398 and the board of directors for 
the library accepted the SPC’s ordinance.399  The contractors would set up 
their equipment and prepare to break ground.400 
Merrick immediately initiated contempt proceedings on Ward’s 
behalf.401  In a tacit recognition that Ward was moving against the tide of 
public opinion, Merrick simultaneously issued a statement to the press 
attempting to neutralize the reaction.402  The statement declared that Ward 
was “misunderstood” and that he was merely trying to preserve the park for 
the people of Chicago.  The statement also accused the library directors and 
SPC officials of acting lawlessly in blatant disregard of the decision in 
Ward II.403 
A hearing on the matter was held on June 25, 1906, and Elbridge 
Hanecy, who was no longer on the bench, argued the case for Ward.404  He 
called on the court to sanction the SPC and the library board for their 
“outrageous conduct.”405  The library board and the SPC, taking a page from 
the panel decision in the Daggett case, argued that the 1903 Act giving the 
 
392  Favors the Crerar Plan, supra note 389. 
393  Expect Ward To Give In, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 10, 1901, at 7. 
394  Id. 
395  See id. 
396  Court May Pick Crerar Site, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 1901, at 7. 
397  1903 Ill. Laws 262.  
398  See S. Park Comm’rs, Meeting Minutes 160–62 (Dec. 15, 1909); To Start Crerar Library, CHI. 
REC.-HERALD, June 22, 1906. 
399  See S. Park Comm’rs, supra note 398, at 162. 
400  To Start Crerar Library, supra note 398. 
401  Renews Lake Front Fight, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1906, at 1. 
402  Id. 
403  Id. 
404  “Watchdog” Given Contempt Order, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 1906, at 7. 
405  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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SPC the power to condemn easements in the park eliminated Ward’s right 
to injunctive relief.406  In effect, the power to condemn should be treated as 
if an actual condemnation had occurred—minus the payment of 
compensation, which Ward would have to obtain through a later action for 
damages.407 
Judge Brentano, who had issued the 1896 injunction that was upheld in 
Ward I, did not buy the argument that an unexercised power of eminent 
domain was sufficient to deprive a court of equity of the power to enforce a 
public dedication.  He issued an order giving the library board and the SPC 
until July 16, 1906, to show cause why they should not be held in contempt 
of court.408  A few days later, he ordered all building materials removed 
from the lakefront.409 
At this point, the legal fight over the Crerar Library abated.  Although 
the library’s attorney was quoted by one newspaper as saying that the 
matter should go to the Illinois Supreme Court, where “it will be a totally 
new case” as a result of the 1903 legislation,410 no appeal was filed.  
Litigation costs do not seem to have been the decisive factor; it is more 
likely that the library concluded that the theory about an unexercised power 
of eminent domain was a loser and that the proponents of new park 
structures should proceed directly to condemnation.  This seems confirmed 
by the fact that the library trustees later funded condemnation proceedings 
to acquire the rights of Michigan Avenue owners at the same time the SPC 
undertook to condemn the owners’ rights to object to the Field Museum.411  
Eventually, after the condemnation effort also failed,412 the library trustees 
settled on a location just outside the park, on the northwest corner of 
Michigan Avenue and Randolph Street. 
As litigation over the Crerar Library subsided, the battle flared with 
new intensity on another front: the Field Museum.  After the World’s 
Columbian Exposition closed in 1893, Marshall Field began a campaign to 
house the natural history artifacts in a permanent museum.  He donated 
more than $1 million in initial funding and encouraged others to donate 
their World’s Fair stock to such a museum.413  Ward, ironically, was the 
largest contributor, donating 1000 shares.414  The museum was incorporated 
 
406  See supra notes 324–29 and accompanying text. 
407  “Watchdog” Given Contempt Order, supra note 404. 
408  Id. 
409  Must Take Workmen’s Sheds from Crerar Library Site, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 1906, at 12. 
410  Library Board Firm, CHI. REC.-HERALD, June 28, 1906.  The attorney told the Tribune that the 
library board would either appeal the decision or begin condemnation proceedings.  Library Without a 
Home, CHI. TRIB., July 3, 1906, at 5. 
411  Crerar Trustees in Lake Front War, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1909, at 6. 
412  See infra Part IV.E. 
413  Funds To Buy Curios, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 1893, at 8. 
414  Id. 
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as the Columbian Museum of Chicago and was originally housed in one of 
the buildings built for the fair on the South Side.415  As early as 1896, Field 
and others wanted to construct a larger building in Grant Park.  The mayor 
had added a provision to the 1896 ordinance, directing that the Field 
Museum be constructed in the park.416  However, the South Park 
Commissioners were reluctant to commit to a specific location until the 
final plans for the park system were complete.417  The commissioners were 
also concerned about the legality of building in the park, which was in 
obvious tension with the rulings in Ward I and II.418 
The plans for the museum were shelved for several years while the 
SPC cleaned up the park and planned the next move.419  In early 1903, 
Marshall Field announced that he would donate funds for the “handsomest 
museum building in the world” to house the museum collections on the 
lakefront.420  Several bills were proposed to the state legislature in 
connection with the museum building, including the previously mentioned 
1903 Act allowing the SPC to condemn the rights of nonconsenting 
abutting property owners to facilitate construction of the museum.421  
Consents for the museum from abutting owners were slowly obtained.422 
With plans for fixing the location of the museum stalled, garbage 
began to pile up in the park again.  Public discontent over Ward’s decision 
to block the building grew, fueled by remarks from SPC leaders reported in 
the newspapers.423  SPC President Henry G. Foreman threatened to “turn the 
front yard of the city into a rubbish heap” and to abandon all plans to 
maintain or improve Grant Park if the museum could not be built on the 
lakefront.424  In response to growing public criticism, Merrick released a 
statement to the Tribune describing the history of the park and defending 
 
415  History of the Museum, FIELD MUSEUM, http://fieldmuseum.org/about/history-museum (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2011). 
416  Mayor Signs Lake-Front Ordinance, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16, 1896, at 3; see supra notes 93–100 
and accompanying text. 
417  Can Fix a Museum Site, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1896, at 6. 
418  One Year To Take Park, supra note 361. 
419  Lost: One City Park, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 1903, at 1. 
420  Will Watch Dog Be Manger Dog?, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20, 1903, at 1 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
421  Muzzle for Lake Front Watchdog, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 1903, at 5; see supra notes 397, 406, 410 
and accompanying text. 
422  Significantly, though, a number of owners now joined with Ward in objecting to the plan.  Two 
New Parks Planned, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 1903, at 16.  The article states that Ward was joined by at least 
a dozen other objectors.  Id. 
423  Proposed Home of Field Museum To Be Erected on Lake Front, Work Beginning About Feb. 15, 
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1907, at 4; see also Museum Plans Turned In, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23, 1907, at 18. 
424  South Park Man Plans Reprisals, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 28, 1903, at 10 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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the idea of a park free of buildings.425  In early 1904, the SPC submitted a 
proposal to the voters for approval of a tax to support the museum, which 
passed overwhelmingly.426 
Marshall Field died on January 16, 1906, leaving $8 million to the City 
of Chicago for the express purpose of building the Field Museum.427  His 
will provided that the bequest would revert to his estate if a site was not 
chosen for the museum within six years of his death.428  Although Field’s 
will did not expressly require the site to be Grant Park,429 SPC officials and 
the museum’s trustees implied as much.  Harlow Higinbotham, president of 
the museum trustees, declared that there was only one site available in the 
City and that, if Ward successfully kept the museum off the lakefront, it 
would amount to “the ruin of what otherwise ultimately will be the greatest 
museum in the world.”430 
In early 1907, the SPC adopted an ordinance granting the museum a 
tract of land at the foot of Congress Street on the east side of the Illinois 
Central tracks—in the center of Grant Park but half a mile south of Ward’s 
building at Madison Street.431  Ward was not in the City when the news was 
released.432  When the newspapers contacted Merrick for a response, he said 
that Ward would not take immediate action and would wait for some overt 
action before going to court.433  Higinbotham stated that Ward was the only 
remaining objector and dared others in opposition to come forward.434  He 
declared that Ward had no right to contest the museum building because the 
people of the City had already voted on it.435 
 
425  Makes Plea for Park “Watch Dog,” CHI. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1903, at 3.  Merrick indicated that he 
had provided advice to other abutting property owners, but the only name mentioned was Ward.  Id.  
426  S. Park Comm’rs, Meeting Minutes 7 (July 10, 1909). 
427  Museum Loss Feared, CHI. REC.-HERALD, Nov. 21, 1908. 
428  Id. 
429  Will of Marshall Field § 17, at 35–40 (Sept. 5, 1905) (on file with Chicago History Museum).  
430  Fight on Museum Starts in Court, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 1907, at 3 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
431  Field Museum Gets Site, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 1907, at 9. 
432  Id. 
433  Id. 
434  Id. 
435  Id.  Higinbotham was a partner in Field, Palmer & Leiter.  He had personally contributed 
$100,000 to the Field Museum project and served as president of the museum’s board of trustees for 
several years.  GILBERT & BRYSON, supra note 22, at 736; Head of Museum Really Deposed, CHI. TRIB., 
Jan. 22, 1909, at 7.  Higinbotham was a strong-willed character who had previously served as president 
of the Columbian Exposition.  See LARSON, supra note 90, at 309.  It is perhaps not surprising that he 
reacted poorly to Ward’s opposition to the trustees’ preferred plan for the museum.  In one interview 
with the Tribune, he declared that “[w]e must have a new structure or stop developing—and that means 
stop existing.”  Fight on Museum Starts in Court, supra note 430 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Higinbotham’s pugilistic attitude eventually got him fired from the board of trustees.  Head of Museum 
Really Deposed, supra.  Higinbotham was at Field’s department store at the same time as Elbridge 
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As final preparations for construction began, Merrick met with John 
Barton Payne, attorney for the museum trustees, to discuss the situation.436  
Payne was concerned about the cost of entering into construction contracts 
that would be delayed by litigation, and they planned a symbolic act of 
driving a stake into the ground so that litigation could be started.437  Merrick 
filed a twenty-nine-page petition for an injunction on February 23, 1907.438  
The SPC filed a cross-bill to enjoin Ward from interfering with 
construction.439 
The matter was assigned to Judge George Dupuy, who had served as 
counsel to the City in Ward I before joining the bench and was clearly 
hostile to Ward’s position.  Hanecy engaged in some vigorous maneuvering 
to get the case reassigned, but to no avail.440  Judge Dupuy overruled 
Hanecy’s demurrer to the cross-bill, holding that buildings consistent with 
“park purposes” would be allowed in the park.441  In so ruling, Judge Dupuy 
implicitly adopted the understanding that the dedication was an affirmative 
command to use the space for park purposes, ignoring the language on the 
original maps expressed in terms of a negative restriction on “buildings.” 
The case went to trial in October 1908.  In the meantime, Ward offered 
to settle the matter and allow the museum in Grant Park, as long as the SPC 
would agree not to sponsor any more buildings.442  The SPC immediately 
rejected Ward’s offer, saying that they did not want to go “hat in hand” to 
Ward every time they wanted to build in the park.443  The parties’ patience 
had grown thin by this time, and courtroom discussions were often 
heated.444 
At the close of evidence, Judge Dupuy denied Ward an injunction 
against the museum and further enjoined Ward from interfering with 
construction in the park.445  Judge Dupuy concluded that Ward I and Ward 
 
Hanecy, and the friction between them in the Field Museum fight may have reflected a rivalry of longer 
standing. 
436  Field Museum Plans Ready for Ward’s Lightning Bolt, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1907, at 9. 
437  Id. 
438  Fight on Museum Starts in Court, supra note 430. 
439  Abstract of Record at 67, Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 89 N.E. 731 
(1909) (No. 6657-11). 
440  Ward’s attorneys moved for a change in venue.  See Lake Front Suit Hits Snag in Court Order, 
CHI. REC.-HERALD, Nov. 20, 1908; No Gain to Ward in Museum Ruling, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 1908, at 
2.  Hanecy also tried to withdraw Ward’s petition, presumably to refile it in the hope of securing a 
different judge, but this too was blocked on the ground that the petition could not be withdrawn once a 
cross-bill had been filed.  “Watchdog” Ward Must Face Issue, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1907, at 6. 
441  Lake Front Open to Park Houses, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 1908, at 1. 
442  Ward Explains War on Museum, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 1908, at 4. 
443  Offer Spurned by Park Board, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 1908, at 5. 
444  In one incident, Hanecy kicked a map that Payne had tossed at him.  Judge Dupuy dismissed the 
incident—perhaps he was hesitant to discipline two former judges.  Hanecy Kicks Map in Court, CHI. 
TRIB., Oct. 9, 1908, at 5. 
445  Site for Museum Seems Assured, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 1908, at 6. 
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II were not controlling because neither the SPC nor the museum had been a 
party to the earlier cases.446  He went on to divide the park in two, holding 
that although Ward I prohibited all buildings on the west side of the Illinois 
Central tracks, Ward II left open the possibility that “proper park buildings” 
could be built on the east side of the tracks.447  Judge Dupuy found that the 
Field Museum was a proper park building and hence could be built.448  Both 
Ward and the SPC were unhappy with the decision—the South Park 
Commissioners were still hoping to build the Crerar Library and a new city 
hall on the west side of the Illinois Central tracks—and immediately 
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.449 
The high court reversed, ruling for Ward once again.450  The court held 
that Ward I and Ward II were fully applicable to the SPC, who stood in the 
shoes of the City.451  The City could not circumvent the previous rulings by 
transferring the park to another municipal corporation.452  The court also 
held that there was no basis for dividing the park in two because the court in 
Ward II had already determined that the reclaimed land was of the same 
character as the rest of the park, just as if the additional land had naturally 
accreted.453  The court summarily dispensed with Judge Dupuy’s idea that 
“proper park buildings” could be erected in the park.454  Ward was not 
concerned with the type of buildings that could be allowed in the park; 
rather, he claimed that no buildings could be erected in the park.455 
This was a seemingly decisive blow in favor of the no-buildings 
conception of the dedication.  Nevertheless, the court went on to address the 
SPC’s argument that certain buildings are absolutely necessary in a park, 
such as rain shelters, band shells, and lavatories.456  Those types of facilities, 
the court agreed, “can be provided without the erection of what would 
properly be characterized as a building.”457  This was as close as the Illinois 
Supreme Court would come to offering a definition of “building” in the 
Ward cases.  Its reasoning was opaque, but the idea that the dedication was 
at least in part for “park purposes” seemed to creep into the discussion of 
the meaning of the term.  It was not clear whether the court regarded certain 
kinds of structures as being too important to be excluded from the park and 
 
446  Field Museum Wins; Ward Fight Delayed, CHI. REC.-HERALD, Dec. 10, 1908, at 3. 
447  Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 506–07, 89 N.E. 731, 735 (1909). 
448  Field Museum Wins; Ward Fight Delayed, supra note 446. 
449  Ward, 241 Ill. at 507, 89 N.E. at 735. 
450  Id. at 510, 89 N.E. at 737. 
451  Id. at 509, 89 N.E. at 736. 
452  Id. 
453  Id. at 507, 89 N.E. at 735. 
454  Id. 
455  Id. at 507–08, 89 N.E. at 735–36. 
456  Id. at 510, 89 N.E. at 736. 
457  Id. 
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hence not “buildings,” or, more likely, whether it thought that the listed 
structures were so innocuous that they did not jeopardize the interests of the 
abutting landowners and hence should not be deemed “buildings,” or some 
combination of both. 
A triumphant Ward finally gave the Tribune an interview following the 
decision.458  He said that his fight was “for the poor people of Chicago—not 
for the millionaires.”459  He was not opposed to the museum on the 
lakefront, but came to understand that the SPC had “nineteen” other 
projects lined up, and he feared that the park would become riddled with 
buildings if he did not object.460  He also said that if he had known how 
much the fight was going to cost, in both time and money, he might not 
have started it, adding, with more than a touch of self-pity, that this was 
especially so because he was not even receiving gratitude in return.461 
Perhaps as an implicit quid pro quo for the interview, the Tribune, an 
erstwhile booster of the museum, printed an editorial the next day 
commending Ward for his perseverance in protecting the park.462 
E. The SPC Moves to Condemn Ward’s Interest—Ward IV 
Following the defeat in Ward III, the South Park Commissioners 
announced that they would begin condemnation proceedings against 
Ward’s interest in the park.463  The 1903 Act had given the SPC the power 
to condemn the rights of any nonconsenting abutting property owner.464  
Throughout the Ward III proceedings, the SPC had threatened 
condemnation and indicated that they would keep their ability to condemn 
the abutting owners’ rights as a backup plan.465  Both the president of the 
Crerar Library, on behalf of the directors, and the trustees of the Field 
Museum wrote to the SPC, asking the commissioners to start condemnation 
proceedings.466  The board of the Crerar Library offered to pay the SPC’s 
legal fees, and a contract to that effect was drafted in December 1909.467 
The SPC filed the condemnation action on January 27, 1910.468  In 
addition to Ward and his company, the suit named as condemnees Levy 
Mayer, who owned the Stratford Hotel, and S. Karpen & Bros. and several 
 
458  Moving To Block Victory of Ward, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 1909, at 1. 
459  Id. 
460  Id. 
461  Id. 
462  Editorial, Mr. Ward and the Field Museum, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1909, at 10. 
463  Moving To Block Victory of Ward, supra note 458. 
464  1903 Ill. Laws 263–64; see also supra note 421 and accompanying text. 
465  Fight on Museum Starts in Court, supra note 430. 
466  S. Park Comm’rs, supra note 398, at 160, 163. 
467  Id. at 160–62. 
468  New Move Taken for Museum Site, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 1910, at 13. 
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banks.469  These were not the only nonconsenting property owners, and the 
SPC indicated that if they were successful in the first proceeding more 
condemnation actions would follow.470 
The first hearing came up several weeks later.471  Henry Russell Platt of 
Levy Mayer’s law firm represented the condemnees, including Ward.472  
Platt argued that condemnation of the abutting owners’ rights was not a 
proper public use under the constitution.  The public would be injured, not 
benefited, he contended, by condemning the restriction on buildings in the 
park.  Moreover, the condemnation was for the benefit of private entities, 
the Field Museum and the Crerar Library, not public authorities.473 
Two weeks later, Judge William H. McSurely dismissed the 
condemnation action.474  He said he was satisfied that the previous suits had 
determined the rights of all of the parties, including the right of the SPC to 
condemn any “easement[]” that Ward might have.475  The SPC immediately 
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.476 
Ward won yet again in the Illinois Supreme Court, but for the first time 
the court was closely divided, ruling by a vote of four to three.  With 
respect to whether the SPC could condemn Ward’s interest in the park, the 
court acknowledged that the power of eminent domain extends to every 
kind of property or interest.477  Nevertheless, the legislature could not 
authorize a taking for an illegal use.478  The previous Ward cases had 
established that it was unlawful to erect buildings in the park.479  Therefore, 
 
469  Park Board in Suit for a Museum Site, CHI. REC.-HERALD, Jan. 29, 1910, at 9.  Levy Mayer, 
cofounder of the firm that is now Mayer Brown LLP, was named personally in the complaint.  
Complaint at 3, S. Park Comm’rs v. S. Karpen & Bros., No. 10S277375 (Cook County, Ill., Super. Ct., 
Mar. 24, 1910); Join Ward in Museum Suit, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1910, at 9.  Mayer’s notable career 
included successfully defending the Chicago meatpackers against prosecution under the Sherman Act 
and representing Charles Comiskey and his “Black Sox” after the alleged 1919 World Series scandal.  
About Mayer Brown, MAYER BROWN, http://www.mayerbrown.com/about/index.asp?nid=10113 (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2011).  After his death, Mayer’s wife, Rachel, donated $500,000 to Northwestern 
University for the construction of a law building on the Chicago campus.  Leigh Bienen, The Life and 
Times of Florence Kelley in Chicago 1891–1899: Levy Mayer, NW. U., http://florencekelley.
northwestern.edu/historical/mayer/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2011).  The building, known as “Levy Mayer 
Hall,” is still in use today. 
470  Park Board in Suit for a Museum Site, supra note 469. 
471  Park Site Fight Opened in Court, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 1910, at 14. 
472  Id.  When the case was appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, George Merrick again 
represented Ward, and Mayer represented himself and S. Karpen & Bros.  See S. Park Comm’rs v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 248 Ill. 299, 93 N.E. 910 (1910). 
473  Park Site Fight Opened in Court, supra note 471. 
474  Dismisses Suits of Field Museum, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 15, 1910, at 11. 
475  Id. 
476  See id. 
477  S. Park Comm’rs, 248 Ill. at 304–05, 93 N.E. at 912. 
478  Id. at 305, 93 N.E. at 912. 
479  Id. 
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the court reasoned, the legislature could not authorize a taking of Ward’s 
interest, because the use for which the SPC wanted to take it was 
unlawful.480 
The court then summarized its previous holdings on dedications.  
Under these decisions, once a donor dedicates property to the public with 
restrictions, “the public authorities having their election to accept or reject 
the donation, are bound, if they accept it, to apply the property to the 
declared use.”481  This meant that the City was bound by its previous 
acceptance of the dedication of the parkland with the restriction that it 
would be kept free from buildings.482  The City could not escape the 
consequences of its decision through the device of eminent domain. 
The court reinforced its decision with two other arguments.  First, it 
rejected the SPC’s contention that Ward’s interest was in the nature of an 
easement and therefore could be condemned because easements are 
property rights subject to condemnation.483  The court explained that in the 
previous cases Ward had secured equitable enforcement of a restriction on 
the use of the park that affected his property values.  However, Ward would 
not have been able to obtain an injunction if he had had an easement; under 
Illinois law, the only remedy for interference with an easement was an 
award of money damages.484 
The court also supported its holding on res judicata grounds.485  The 
1903 Act allowing the SPC to condemn Ward’s easement had been passed 
before the litigation in Ward III, the court said, and the SPC had brought it 
up as a defense to Ward’s injunction action.486  Moreover, the reasoning 
went, the equity court would not have given Ward the injunction if the use 
had been lawful under the 1903 Act.487 
Justice Dunn, dissenting in an opinion joined by two other justices, 
pointed out the weaknesses in the majority’s reasoning.  The res judicata 
argument was unavailing, he wrote, because the previous cases were about 
whether buildings could be erected in the park.488  In those cases, the Illinois 
Supreme Court had expressly stated that it was not ruling on whether 
Ward’s rights could be taken by condemnation.489 
 
480  Id. at 306, 93 N.E. at 913. 
481  Id. at 308, 93 N.E. at 914. 
482  See id. 
483  Id. at 310–11, 93 N.E. at 914. 
484  Id. 
485  Id. at 312, 93 N.E. at 915. 
486  Id.  As previously described, the power of eminent domain conferred by the 1903 Act had been 
the SPC’s principal argument in Ward III as to why a court of equity should deny injunctive relief.  See 
supra notes 406–07 and accompanying text. 
487  248 Ill. at 312, 93 N.E. at 915. 
488  Id. at 316, 93 N.E. at 916 (Dunn, J., dissenting). 
489  Id. at 317, 93 N.E. at 917. 
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Dunn then turned to whether the City could use eminent domain to 
develop the park.  He asserted that eminent domain is an inherent attribute 
of sovereignty, and that the State could not divest itself of its condemnation 
powers by accepting a dedication with restrictions.490  The State could not 
deprive itself of the right of eminent domain through contract because 
contract rights themselves are subject to eminent domain.491  The 
government must be able to use the land within its power for the changing 
needs of the public.492 
Dunn argued that the majority’s position, taken to its logical 
conclusion, would mean that if the entire lakefront had been dedicated and 
placed in trust, then the City could allow no streets, docks, or wharves 
along the lakefront.493  Surely the City could not deprive itself of its ability 
to make use of the navigable waterway.494  Without defining the interest 
held by Ward and the other abutting property owners, Dunn concluded that 
although the dedication created a right that required the assent of all 
property owners before buildings could be built in the park, “the acquisition 
of such right to object is equivalent to obtaining their assent.”495 
Justice Carter—who had authored the opinion in Ward I—wrote a 
separate dissent.  He stated that “all private rights are held upon the implied 
condition that they may be re-taken by the sovereign.”496  Again assuming 
that the dedication was contractual in nature, Carter argued that the City and 
the State had no power to accept the dedication if acceptance included a 
waiver of their sovereign powers of eminent domain.497 
By today’s lights, Ward IV seems hard to defend.498  If one assumes 
that the acquisition of land for a museum open to the public is a public 
 
490  Id. at 322, 93 N.E. at 918. 
491  Id. at 324, 93 N.E. at 919. 
492  Id. 
493  Id. at 325, 93 N.E. at 919. 
494  Id. 
495  Id. at 334, 93 N.E. at 923. 
496  Id. at 337, 93 N.E. at 924 (Carter, J., dissenting). 
497  Id. 
498  Ward IV was in fact overruled by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1961 in an opinion written by 
Chief Justice Walter V. Schaefer, but the opinion was later withdrawn on rehearing.  A lawsuit had been 
filed to stop the University of Illinois from locating a Chicago branch in Garfield Park.  When the case 
reached the Illinois Supreme Court, the court not only permitted the transfer of parkland to the 
University, but also overruled Ward IV.  People v. Chi. Park Dist., Nos. 36171–72 (Ill. 1960), 
withdrawn; Thomas Buck, Rule U. of I. May Use Garfield Park Site, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 18, 1961, at 1.  
The court withdrew its opinion before publication on a motion for rehearing filed by, among others, 
Michigan Avenue property owners, ruling that the issue was moot because the University of Illinois had 
selected another site for its Chicago campus.  Thomas Buck, Ruling on Park Use Cancelled by High 
Court, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 1961, at B2; Michigan Av. Suit Attacks Park Decision, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 
1961, at A10; see also Comment, The Status of Dedicated Land in Illinois, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 61, 61–
62 (1961). 
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use,499 then the State should be allowed to condemn all interests in land 
necessary to secure such a public use, whether those interests are 
characterized as property rights, contract rights, or equitable interests.  
Perhaps the closest analogue to Ward IV in modern eminent domain law is 
the understanding that land acquired for one public use cannot be 
condemned for another public use without express legislative 
authorization.500  Ward IV holds that land dedicated to a public use cannot 
be condemned for another public use.  The problem with the analogy is that 
the SPC did have express legislative authority for the condemnation to 
change public uses, which should have been the end of the matter. 
In retrospect, the commissioners and their allies overreached by failing 
to proceed toward condemnation immediately after the decisions in Ward I 
and Ward II.  Instead, they sought to rely on a statutory power to condemn 
without actually going through the condemnation process.  This made it 
look as if they were trying to take a valuable right without paying for it, and 
were willing to pay only after they were called out.  It is not surprising that 
a majority of the Illinois Supreme Court took a dim view of these tactics.  
The directors of the Crerar Library evidently had seen this coming, but the 
SPC and Higinbotham were apparently so exercised by Ward’s opposition 
that it impaired their judgment. 
In any event, Ward IV had a decisive impact on the future of Grant 
Park.  It is virtually certain that if the decision had gone the other way, the 
Illinois legislature would have granted the SPC the power to condemn the 
interests of the abutting owners for a variety of projects.  Since Ward IV 
would likely not be followed today, this suggests an important limitation on 
the efficacy of the public dedication doctrine and the unanimous consent 
mechanism as an instrument for preserving public spaces: namely, that 
these rights can be condemned by eminent domain. 
Following the decision in Ward IV, the Field Museum trustees had to 
scramble to find a site outside the protected area, and they had to find it fast 
if they were to avoid losing the bequest.501  On March 15, 1911, the trustees 
formally asked the SPC to rescind the contract providing a site in Grant 
Park and to approve a location south of the public dedication area between 
12th and 16th Streets.502  A few days later, the SPC and the museum trustees 
 
499  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that eminent domain can be used for memorial grounds and 
parks.  United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (upholding the use of eminent 
domain to acquire part of Gettysburg battlement for memorial cemetery); Shoemaker v. United States, 
147 U.S. 282 (1893) (upholding the use of eminent domain to acquire land for Rock Creek Park). 
500  See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Chi., Burlington & N. R.R., 122 Ill. 473, 482, 13 N.E. 140, 143 
(1887); 2 PHILIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES WHICH 
AFFECT THE TAKING OF PROPERTY FOR THE PUBLIC USE § 361 (2d ed. 1917); 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, 
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.03[3][d] (3d ed. 2010). 
501  Under Field’s will, the bequest would expire and revert to the estate six years after he died, or on 
January 16, 1912.  Will of Marshall Field, supra note 429, § 17, at 39–40. 
502  S. Park Comm’rs, Meeting Minutes 106 (Mar. 13, 1911). 
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entered into a contract for the new site.503  In May of that year, the state 
legislature enacted legislation allowing the SPC to build the museum on the 
new site.504  The new site required some land to be added to the shoreline, 
and the state legislature appropriated funds to assist with that project.505  It 
also required the cooperation of the Illinois Central Railroad in turning over 
some of its land south of the park, which the railroad readily agreed to do.506  
The museum was finally completed in 1921.507 
F. Ward’s Other Actions 
While the high-stakes duel between Ward and the civic elite was 
playing itself out in the Illinois Supreme Court, Ward continued to perform 
his accustomed role of park watchdog.  The results were mixed, partly on 
account of his aggressive efforts to expand the scope of the public 
dedication.  Ward sought and failed to obtain an injunction against the 
construction of a trolley line in the right-of-way of Michigan Avenue.508  He 
also sought and failed to enjoin the construction of a clubhouse for a yacht 
club in the harbor just east of the border of Grant Park.509 
Ward was more successful in blocking the erection of a tent to be used 
for a major speech by William Jennings Bryan, who was touring the 
country in 1900 as the Democratic Party candidate for President.510  When 
Ward saw the tent going up in the park, he called the city corporation 
counsel to protest.511  The Democrats reluctantly agreed to forgo the tent 
and held the event in the open air.512  Ward’s action was viewed as 
politically motivated, and Senator James K. Jones, chairman of the 
Democratic National Committee, urged Democrats to boycott Montgomery 
Ward & Co. in protest.513  Ward engaged in damage control by issuing a 
statement in which he claimed—implausibly—that he had not known the 
purpose of the tent, and said he was merely “guilty of trying to give the 
people of Chicago a free park.”514 
The next year, Ward called on the Superintendent of Streets to demand 
that the federal government desist from building a fence outside the 
 
503  S. Park Comm’rs, Meeting Minutes 142 (Mar. 22, 1911). 
504  1911 Ill. Laws 435. 
505  House Gives Aid to Field Museum, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 9, 1912, at 7. 
506  STOVER, supra note 60, at 298–99. 
507  Timeline, FIELD MUSEUM, http://fieldmuseum.org/about/timeline (last visited Aug. 23, 2011). 
508  Chi. City Ry. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 76 Ill. App. 536 (1898); see infra notes 544–51 and 
accompanying text. 
509  See infra notes 552–59 and accompanying text. 
510  Ward Stops Bryan Tent, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 1, 1900, at 2. 
511  Id. 
512  Id. 
513  Jones Cries “Boycott Ward,” CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2, 1900, at 4. 
514  A. Montgomery Ward, supra note 341. 
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temporary post office.515  The mail wagons cutting through the park had 
been stirring up dust clouds, creating a problem for the Art Institute.  The 
government had offered to build a fence to block the dust.  Ward saw the 
fence being erected and immediately objected.516  The fencing project 
stopped.517 
While the Ward IV case was pending, the vice president of the Illinois 
Central Railroad Company requested permission to build a depot at Monroe 
Street in Grant Park.518  George Merrick promptly wrote letters to the SPC 
and the Illinois Central stating that such a depot would be illegal.519  
Needless to say, the depot was never built. 
These actions suggest strongly that Ward was not motivated by any 
particular animus toward Marshall Field and his museum, as has sometimes 
been suggested.520  Indeed, Ward’s early financial support for Field’s 
initiative, and his offers to settle with the Crerar Library and the museum on 
terms that would permit those structures to be built in the park, indicate that 
he was relatively sympathetic to the construction of monumental buildings 
in the park.  At the same time, Ward’s actions after 1900 suggest a growing 
imperiousness as he came to assume that he had unilateral authority to 
approve or disapprove practically any construction activity between 
Michigan Avenue and the centerline of the lake.  His willingness to pay the 
legal bills necessary to back up his judgments meant that this assumption 
closely corresponded with reality. 
By 1912, Montgomery Ward & Co. had outgrown the facility on 
Michigan Avenue and moved its operations to Chicago Avenue, north of 
the city center.  Ward, who was by then the sole owner of the Michigan 
Avenue property,521 quickly sold it in three different transactions.522  In 
 
515  City Prevents Uncle Sam from Building a Fence, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 25, 1901, at 3. 
516  Id. 
517  Id. 
518  S. Park Comm’rs, Meeting Minutes 30 (Dec. 14, 1910). 
519  See id. at 30–31. 
520  See WILLE, supra note 4, at 78.  Ward and Field sometimes socialized, and they were among the 
founders of the Midlothian Country Club.  See Some Historic Facts About Midlothian Country Club, 
MIDLOTHIAN COUNTRY CLUB WKLY. NEWS BULL. (Midlothian Country Club, Midlothian, Ill.), Sept. 
15, 1983 (on file with Chicago History Museum). 
521  By 1892, Thorne’s five sons had joined the business and had assumed management of the 
company.  HISTORY & PROGRESS, supra note 270, at 18–19.  In 1893, Ward sold his controlling interest 
in the company to Thorne.  LATHAM, supra note 270, at 32. 
522  The first transaction was in August 1912 when Ward sold the lot along Michigan Avenue 
midway between Washington and Madison Streets to attorney Harry C. Levinson for $1,295,000.  Lake 
“Watchdog” Sells Big Tower, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1913, at 1.  The second sale occurred in September 
1912, when Ward sold the property on the corner of Michigan Avenue and Washington Street to 
architect Jarvis Hunt for $1.1 million.  Lake “Watchdog” Sells New Site; Power Passing, CHI. TRIB., 
Sept. 14, 1912, at 1.  The last piece of property, on the corner of Michigan Avenue and Madison Street, 
was sold to a syndicate in January 1913 for $1.3 million.  Lake “Watchdog” Sells Big Tower, supra.  
Figure 15 in Part IV.D of this Article reflects the basic location of the buildings. 
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February 1913, Montgomery Ward & Co. went public.523  Later that year, 
Ward broke his hip while at his winter home in Pasadena, California.  He 
returned to Chicago to convalesce, but died of pneumonia on December 7, 
1913.524  Although it was thought that Ward would make a provision in his 
will for the ongoing fight against buildings in Grant Park,525 he left nearly 
all of his money to his wife and daughter.526 
G. Ward’s Motives 
What are we to make of Ward’s motives for his remarkable crusade to 
keep Grant Park free of offending structures?  The first thing to note is that 
Ward’s record as “watchdog” was largely consistent with his interests as an 
investor in commercial real estate.  Ward’s actions to protect the lakefront 
began when he acquired significant Michigan Avenue property, and ended 
when he sold that property.  His effort to protect the park intensified after 
1893 when he acquired Thorne’s interest in the property and became its sole 
owner.  From that time until he sold it, the Michigan Avenue property was 
Ward’s largest asset.527 
Ward’s enforcement activity was also selective in a way that reflected 
his interests as a property owner.  He did not challenge the Art Institute or 
the Public Library, he consented to the Democratic Party wigwam and the 
temporary post office—and he was prepared to consent to both the Crerar 
Library, if it would be located in the south park, and the Field Museum, if 
the SPC would agree that there would be no more buildings.  He opposed 
loading platforms, storage sheds, garbage, circuses, bicycle tracks, tents for 
political rallies, armories, and railroad depots.  His guiding principle was 
not big versus little—he sometimes opposed small structures (storage sheds, 
bicycle tracks, fences) and sometimes favored large ones (the Art Institute, 
the Public Library, the post office).  Nor was it permanent versus 
temporary—sometimes he opposed temporary structures (circuses, tents for 
political rallies) and sometimes he favored permanent ones (the Public 
Library, the Art Institute). 
Overall, Ward appeared to be guided by a sure sense of how different 
projects would affect the market value of real estate on Michigan Avenue.  
Nuisances, clutter, unsightly temporary platforms, fences, and—
especially—noisy crowds would likely impair real estate values on 
 
523  See $5,000,000 Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1913, at 14 (advertising 
public stock offering). 
524  LATHAM, supra note 270, at 51; Death Takes Ward, Lake “Watchdog,” Following Fall, CHI. 
TRIB., Dec. 8, 1913, at 1. 
525  Death Takes Ward, supra note 524. 
526  Ward’s $5,000,000 Goes to Family, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 24, 1913, at 3.  See also Last Will and 
Testament of A. Montgomery Ward (on file with Chicago History Museum). 
527  Ward sold the property for $3.7 million in 1912–13, see supra note 522, and left an estate of 
$5 million when he died in 1913.  See Ward’s $5,000,000 Goes to Family, supra note 526. 
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Michigan Avenue.  Stately and decorous structures such as the Public 
Library and the Art Institute would not.  Ward’s opposition to the Crerar 
Library and the Field Museum are arguably inconsistent with this 
generalization, since it is plausible that these structures—like the Public 
Library and the Art Institute—would have enhanced real estate values on 
Michigan Avenue.528  But this ignores Ward’s apparent willingness to settle 
with the proponents of these two structures if he could put them where he 
wanted them to go and could preserve his control over everything else. 
Ward’s consent to construction of the temporary post office is 
particularly revealing.  This ungainly building would impair the view of the 
lake and the flow of air and light enjoyed by Ward’s facility immediately 
opposite on the west side of Michigan Avenue.  But by 1895, Montgomery 
Ward & Co. had become the single largest customer of the U.S. Postal 
Service.529  A well-functioning postal system was an imperative for such an 
organization, and it was clearly in Ward’s financial interest to consent to the 
temporary post office.530 
FIGURE 16: TEMPORARY POST OFFICE IN GRANT PARK AT WASHINGTON STREET CIRCA 1900531 
Still, although Ward’s financial interests undoubtedly motivated and 
shaped his behavior, they do not fully account for his remarkable zeal in 
enforcing the public dedication.  For one thing, he spent an estimated 
$50,000 on litigation during his period of ownership532—roughly 
$1.1 million in today’s dollars and far more than any previous or 
 
528  In Daggett, the court heard extensive testimony that the Art Institute would likely increase the 
value of Sarah Daggett’s property immediately across the street.  Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. 
Ct. Rep. 79, 87 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892). 
529  HOGE, supra note 282, at 28. 
530  It is true that Merrick filed suit on behalf of Ward challenging an expansion of the temporary 
post office in 1900.  See Ward v. Cong. Constr. Co., 99 F. 598 (7th Cir. 1900).  But this legal action may 
have been motivated more by Merrick’s concern about defeating the estoppel argument advanced by the 
City in Ward I than by Ward’s hostility to having a post office located opposite his property. 
531  On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-32436. 
532  Dunham, supra note 266, at 19. 
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subsequent owner was willing to spend.533  Ward himself suggested that the 
expenditure was not economically justified.534  His litigation activity also 
took on a fanatical quality, especially as the years went on.  Preventing the 
Bryan campaign from putting up a tent for a one-day rally was hardly in the 
interests of Montgomery Ward & Co., particularly given the call for a 
boycott that it elicited.  And it is hard to see how Ward’s property values 
would be affected by the construction of a yacht club in the lake. 
One hypothesis is that Ward was driven by populist sympathies.535  He 
himself claimed on several occasions that he did it for the “poor people” 
rather than the “millionaires.”536  Ward regarded himself as a man of the 
people.  He started life as a manual laborer, strongly empathized with 
struggling farm families, made many charitable donations to the poor, and 
was affiliated for many years with the Granger movement.  And the public 
statements issued in his name or on his behalf, and seeking to explain his 
actions, consistently emphasized populist themes. 
But the pattern of Ward’s actions does not support the thesis that he 
was seeking to protect the interests of the masses.  A number of the projects 
that he blocked had been expressly approved by the Chicago City Council 
and the Illinois General Assembly, both composed of elected 
representatives of the people.  One, the Field Museum, not only was 
supported by representative bodies but also received an overwhelming 
affirmative vote in a public tax referendum.537  These are better measures of 
popular opinion than Ward’s views about the wants and needs of the 
people.538  Further, Ward showed striking hostility toward popular 
entertainment in the park, bringing multiple actions to block the Adam 
Forepaugh Circus and shutting down a bicycle track, just as an earlier 
generation of owners had opposed toboggan slides and professional 
baseball games.  It is highly doubtful that the “poor people” approved of 
these actions. 
 
533  This inflation estimate is based upon the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Calculator.  CPI 
Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2011).  For a calculator that provides seven measurements of the relative value of U.S. 
dollars, see Seven Ways To Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount—1774 to Present, 
MEASURINGWORTH.COM, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare (last visited Aug. 23, 2011).  
This calculator provides a range of $848,000 to $18.7 million when converting $50,000 at Ward’s death 
in 1913 to present value in 2011.  Id. 
534  Moving To Block Victory of Ward, supra note 458. 
535  See WILLE, supra note 4, at 71. 
536  See, e.g., Moving To Block Victory of Ward, supra note 458; Ward Awaits Other Consents, CHI. 
TRIB., May 7, 1901, at 3. 
537  See supra note 426 and accompanying text. 
538  Ward could afford to defy local public opinion because his wealth did not depend on what 
people in Chicago thought about him.  His market was rural and small-town America.  Thus, in contrast 
to Marshall Field, for example, he could incur the displeasure of Chicagoans without any significant 
personal hardship to his firm or its profits. 
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A somewhat better hypothesis is that Ward was a naturalist or 
environmentalist ahead of his time.  In effect, Ward wanted to preserve the 
park in an unspoiled condition free of artificial encumbrances.  Ward made 
some statements consistent with this hypothesis.  In a short interview with a 
reporter in 1893, Ward stated he had been impressed on a recent trip to 
Europe by the public parks that had been assembled in many cities there.539  
The reporter quoted Ward as urging that the armories and other clutter in 
Lake Park be removed, “and in [their] place give us beautiful fountains, 
pleasant walks and green lawns where tired humanity may disport at will, 
unhampered by any restriction whatever.”540 
The evidence for this hypothesis is somewhat stronger than for the 
claim that Ward was a populist.  Ward often expressed distaste for garbage, 
refuse, and litter in the park.541  And his opposition to gatherings in the park 
for circuses, bicycle races, and political rallies might reflect an austere 
naturalist vision of the proper uses of a park, akin to what many proponents 
of national parks and wilderness areas often express today.  Again, 
however, the data do not fully conform to the thesis.  Ward was clearly 
more sympathetic to the erection of monumental public buildings such as 
the Public Library and the Art Institute than he was to lesser intrusions such 
as circuses, bicycle tracks, and political rallies.  The temporary post office 
building was about the most unnatural addition to the park imaginable, but 
it had Ward’s consent. 
Yet another interpretation is that Ward had a strong antipathy to 
disorder.  His retailing empire was characterized by its precise organization 
and attention to detail.542  Ward was first drawn to intervene in the lakefront 
by his disgust at seeing garbage piled in the park for loading onto trains.  
Once he assumed the role of “watchdog,” he consistently opposed any 
activity that would generate nuisances or involved the gathering of large 
and boisterous crowds, such as circuses.  The old armories demolished in 
1895 were associated in his mind with raucous prizefights and dogfights.  In 
contrast, large, well-ordered institutions such as public libraries and the post 
office were less likely to incur Ward’s displeasure. 
To use the modern vernacular, Ward was something of a control freak.  
He had the financial resources and, thanks to the public dedication doctrine, 
the legal power to attempt to impose his vision of a more orderly world on 
the space known as Grant Park.  He did not fully succeed, of course, for 
large public spaces in major urban centers are inherently disorderly—they 
 
539  To Be a Fine Park, supra note 332. 
540  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (source for this particular portion of article as attributed by 
the American Heritage Center in Laramie, Wyoming). 
541  See supra notes 4, 306–09 and accompanying text. 
542  See Boorstin, supra note 264, at 147–78. 
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are subject to the vagaries and whims of the random clusters of people who 
venture forth into them.543 
Whatever his private motives, Ward’s persistence and willingness to 
spend large sums of money on litigation left a body of law—in particular, 
four Illinois Supreme Court precedents—that would protect Grant Park 
from major intrusions for more than a century.  The City of Chicago would 
look very different today but for Aaron Montgomery Ward. 
V. THE LIMITS OF THE PUBLIC DEDICATION DOCTRINE 
The Ward precedents were strong stuff—no buildings in Grant Park, 
period—and it is not surprising that courts were soon asked to prescribe 
limits to this understanding in terms of the territory covered by the public 
dedication and the type of intrusions prohibited.  The process of identifying 
limits began while Ward was still fully engaged in the role of watchdog.  It 
continues to this day. 
A. Territorial Limits of the Doctrine 
Ward was responsible for defining the territorial boundary of the Grant 
Park public dedication—north, south, east, and west.  Ward I established 
that the doctrine applied to the original fractional section 10, from Madison 
Street on the south to Randolph Street on the north.  Ward II extended the 
doctrine to landfill east of the original area encompassed by Lake Park.  
Ward III established that the doctrine applied in the original fractional 
section 15, from Madison Street on the north to Park Row (later to 12th 
Street) on the south, and to landfill east of this original area.  Ward also 
launched two other battles that further delineated the eastern and western 
boundaries of the dedication. 
In March 1898, the Chicago City Railway Company started 
construction on Michigan Avenue for an electric trolley.544  The company 
planned to put poles along Michigan Avenue from which to hang trolley 
wires.545  Ward secured a temporary injunction against the erection of poles 
 
543  There is evidence that Ward was rather disengaged from the litigation, especially after 1893 
when he turned over control of the company to the Thornes.  During this period, Ward spent significant 
time away from Chicago at his homes in Oconomowoc, Wisconsin, and Pasadena, California.  For 
example, he was absent from the State during the three weeks of evidentiary hearings in Ward I.  See 
Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 341 (statement of Thorne and Ward).  At least one reporter, who 
submitted written questions to Ward only to have the answers quickly clarified by Hanecy, was driven to 
ask “whether Mr. Ward, or his attorney, Elbridge Hanecy, is the author of the opposition to 
improvements in Grant park.”  Ward Wavering on Museum Plan, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 1908, at 1.  
Nevertheless, although Ward’s attorneys—especially Merrick—made something of a career out of the 
Grant Park litigation, there is no evidence that Ward ever disapproved of their efforts or threatened to 
stop paying the legal bills.  Something about being the watchdog of the lakefront was deeply gratifying 
to him, and he persisted in that role until he sold his last interest in the Michigan Avenue property. 
544  Bar for the Wires, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1898, at 10. 
545  Id. 
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and wires within the right-of-way of Michigan Avenue, based on Merrick’s 
argument that Ward I covered the area to the west line of Michigan 
Avenue.546 
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court dissolved the injunction, 
holding that Ward had not pleaded sufficient facts to establish that the 
ninety feet of Michigan Avenue as constructed was subject to a public 
dedication.547  The court pointedly noted that Merrick had failed to include 
the original map of fractional section 10 in the record.  More pertinently, 
the court added that even if the dedication did cover Michigan Avenue, the 
dedication was to establish a “public ground,” and “we see nothing 
inconsistent, so far as appears from any allegations of fact in the bill, with 
such public ground being used for street purposes, and not as a park.”548  
The case was remanded to the trial court, where Judge Brentano continued 
the injunction to allow Ward to file an amended bill of complaint.549  After 
that, the dispute disappeared from the newspapers, presumably because it 
was settled or dropped.  The practical effect of the ruling seems to have 
been to fix the western boundary of the dedication at the eastern—rather 
than the western—edge of Michigan Avenue.550 
The trolley case also marked one of the last attempts to argue that the 
public dedication was an affirmative command to use the lakefront for park 
purposes, rather than a negative restriction on buildings.  Merrick had no 
choice but to make “park purposes” the centerpiece of his argument, since 
poles and wires are obviously not “buildings.”  This probably explains why 
he did not introduce a copy of the original map of section 10—which 
explicitly referred to “buildings”—into the record.  In any event, the court 
saw through the ploy.  The decision, which would soon be reinforced by 
Ward III, effectively marked the end of the park-purposes argument.551 
Another protracted battle launched by Ward would even more clearly 
delineate the eastern boundary of the dedication.  In 1899, the federal 
government granted the Columbia Yacht Club permission to build a 
permanent two-story structure at the foot of Randolph Street, just outside 
the harbor line.552  At the time, several hundred feet of water separated the 
eastern edge of Lake Park and the harbor line.  The South Park 
 
546  Ban on Loop To Stand, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 1898, at 10. 
547  Chi. City Ry. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 76 Ill. App. 536 (1898). 
548  Id. at 544. 
549  Lifts Ban on Trolley, CHI. TRIB., May 27, 1898, at 4. 
550  See, e.g., Mich. Boulevard Bldg. Co. v. Chi. Park Dist., 412 Ill. 350, 357, 106 N.E.2d 359, 364 
(1952) (describing the boundary of Grant Park, and by implication the dedication, as “the east line of 
Michigan Avenue”); Stevens Hotel Co. v. Art Inst. of Chi., 260 Ill. App. 555, 557 (1931) (describing 
boundary of Grant Park as ninety feet east of the west line of Michigan Avenue). 
551  See supra notes 441–61 and accompanying text. 
552  New Yacht Club House, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 1899, at 4.  The Columbia Yacht Club had been 
operating out of a shed atop a barge.  Id. 
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Commissioners intended to fill the park to the harbor line, and the yacht 
club building would eventually be situated just off the shore.553  The club’s 
officials stated that since the club would be located in waters outside the 
harbor line, it would be outside the jurisdiction of the SPC, the City, and the 
State.554 
On August 16, 1899, Ward filed a bill to enjoin construction of the new 
clubhouse, alleging that the structure violated the restriction on buildings in 
the park.555  The yacht club responded that Ward had no standing to bring 
the suit, because the structure was not located in the park.  It argued that 
Ward was asserting a type of riparian right associated with ownership of the 
park.556  That right belonged to the people at large, and could be vindicated 
only by the State’s Attorney, not by a private citizen.557 
In December, Judge Kavanaugh declined to grant an injunction, ruling 
that Ward lacked standing.558  The judge noted that the City and the Illinois 
Central both held property that lay between Ward’s property and the 
clubhouse, eliminating any rights that he might claim based on riparian 
ownership.  A newspaper account of the ruling indicates that Ward intended 
to appeal,559 but it appears that he did not. 
This was only the beginning of the controversy over the yacht clubs.  
In 1901, the SPC granted a second club, the Chicago Yacht Club, 
permission to build a clubhouse at the foot of Monroe Street, also just 
outside the harbor line.560  Clarence W. Marks, who had sold Ward and 
Thorne some of the property that they occupied on Michigan Avenue 
between Washington and Madison Streets,561 filed an action for an 
injunction against both the Chicago and Columbia Yacht Clubs.562  The 
complaint sought to stop the Chicago Yacht Club from building its 
clubhouse and to compel the Columbia Yacht Club, which had nearly 
completed its building, to tear it down.563  Marks was represented by George 
Merrick, Ward’s lawyer throughout the marathon litigation over buildings 
 
553  Permission to fill the harbor came from an 1895 city ordinance.  See Appellate Record at 63–64, 
Chi. Yacht Club v. Marks, 97 Ill. App. 406 (1901). 
554  New Yacht Club House, supra note 552. 
555  Move Against Columbia Yacht Club, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 1899, at 4. 
556  Ownership of riparian land often includes the right to an unobstructed view of the water as a 
matter of law.  1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01(a)(3), at 6-52–6-53 (Robert E. Beck & Amy L. 
Kelley eds., 3d ed. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2010) (1967) (citing authority). 
557  Columbia Yacht Club’s Defense, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 29, 1899, at 4. 
558  Rules Against Ward & Co., CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1899, at 7. 
559  Id. 
560  See Defends Lake Front Too, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 1901, at 9. 
561  Marks had previously consented to the erection of the Chicago Public Library in Dearborn Park.  
See Owners of Lots Abutting on Dearborn Park, supra note 86. 
562  Defends Lake Front Too, supra note 560. 
563  Id. 
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in Grant Park.564  It is conceivable that Marks agreed to undertake the 
litigation at the urging of Ward, who was presumably barred by res judicata 
from challenging the Columbia Yacht Club structure.565 
Marks acknowledged in his complaint that the yacht clubs were being 
constructed on submerged land that was technically outside the boundary of 
Lake Park as defined by the City’s ordinance of 1895.566  But he insisted 
that this location was deliberately chosen to frustrate the rights of Michigan 
Avenue owners and reflected a conspiracy on the part of the clubs to evade 
the law.567 
Marks initially had better luck than Ward, securing an ex parte 
injunction from Judge Hanecy, Merrick’s former (and future) law partner.568  
On appeal, however, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the public 
dedication doctrine stopped at the eastern border of Lake Park, wherever 
that might be located.569  One can detect in the opinion significant 
skepticism about the bona fides of Marks’s contentions.  There was 
considerable distance between the west side of Michigan Avenue and the 
yacht clubhouses, and the structures were not large.  The court observed 
that “the view from appellee’s premises at the corner of Washington street 
and Michigan boulevard can scarcely be said, from the allegation of the 
facts of the bill, to be obstructed by a building in the lake opposite the foot 
of Monroe street.”570 
The first battle over the yacht clubs was concluded, but conflict would 
resume again in 1925 after the harbor line, and the park, were extended 
farther east into Lake Michigan to facilitate the construction of Lake Shore 
Drive.  Expansion of the park required relocation of the yacht clubs, and 
Michigan Avenue property owners, fortified now by four Ward decisions 
rather than just one, promptly sought to enjoin reconstruction of the clubs. 
 
564  Id. 
565  There is no direct evidence of this.  After the Chicago Yacht Club’s motion to dissolve the 
temporary injunction was denied, Merrick stated to the press, “Mr. Ward is in Europe and I have no 
instructions to begin any new suits.”  Have Right to View of Lake, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 1901, at 1 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
After the appellate court overturned the injunction, the case went to the Illinois Supreme Court on 
the question of damages under the bond that Marks had posted to secure the injunction.  See Marks v. 
Columbia Yacht Club, 219 Ill. 417, 76 N.E. 582 (1905).  The court awarded the Chicago Yacht Club 
$1200 and the Columbia Yacht Club $700 in damages.  Id. at 419, 76 N.E. at 582.  Marks was 
represented by Stein, Mayer, Stein & Hume, not Merrick, in this phase of the dispute.  Id. 
566  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
567  Appellate Record, supra note 553, at 12–15. 
568  Defends Lake Front Too, supra note 560. 
569  Chi. Yacht Club v. Marks, 97 Ill. App. 406, 411–12 (1901). 
570  Id. at 413.  Monroe Street is two blocks south of Washington Street. 
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In two separate decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected these 
renewed challenges to the clubs.571  One of the actions was brought by the 
owners of the Stevens Hotel, which would become the Conrad Hilton Hotel 
(and is today the Hilton Chicago).572  Although Marks was not cited, the 
reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court was equally formalistic: the 
proposed yacht club buildings were outside the legal boundary of the park, 
and the public dedication doctrine applied only to the park.573 
One puzzle presented by these cases is why the yacht clubs triggered 
such persistent litigation activity from Michigan Avenue landowners.  One 
can understand why owners of properties on Michigan Avenue would be 
upset by baseball stadiums, armories, depots, and even circus tents blocking 
their view of the lake and bringing congestion, noise, and litter to the park 
across the street.  These structures and their associated activity would 
depress the market value of property on the west side of Michigan Avenue, 
which would be a reason for a property owner to sue.  Yet it is difficult, at 
least at this distance in time, to understand how the existence of the yacht 
clubs posed any threat to Michigan Avenue land values.  The club buildings 
were relatively small and not visible from street level on Michigan Avenue.  
Indeed, from the perspective of modern sensibilities, the clubs’ neat rows of 
sailboats bobbing in the harbor during warm weather would add to, rather 
than detract from, the aesthetics of the vista.  It is also hard to imagine that 
yacht clubs would inject significant traffic or uncouth crowds into the park, 
at least to a degree that might affect property values. 
We can only speculate that the owners feared that the yacht clubs 
would become a precedent that would allow more extensive construction in 
the water just outside the official boundary of the park.  This was not an 
idle threat.  Daniel Burnham’s Plan of Chicago prominently featured a wide 
strip of park in the lake separated from the shore by lagoons, as well as 
multiple artificial islands farther off shore.574  And at one juncture during 
the marathon fight over the Field Museum, state legislators proposed to 
construct the museum on an island just off the edge of the park.575  Of 
 
571  McCormick v. Chi. Yacht Club, 331 Ill. 514, 163 N.E. 418 (1928); Stevens Hotel Co. v. Chi. 
Yacht Club, 339 Ill. 463, 171 N.E. 550 (1930).  The McCormick who sued the yacht clubs was not 
Colonel Robert R. McCormick, the publisher of the Chicago Tribune, but Robert H. McCormick.  The 
latter, ironically, was among other things a member of the New York Yacht Club.  THE BOOK OF 
CHICAGOANS: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF LEADING LIVING MEN OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 438 
(Albert Nelson Marquis ed., 1911). 
572  The Stevens Hotel was managed by the father of John Paul Stevens, future U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice.  Adam Liptak, From Age of Independence to Age of Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at A1.  
The Stevens Hotel struggled throughout the Great Depression, leading to eventual criminal charges of 
embezzlement against Justice Stevens’s father, uncle, and grandfather; their convictions were overturned 
by the Illinois Supreme Court.  See People v. Stevens, 358 Ill. 391, 193 N.E. 154 (1934). 
573  See, e.g., Stevens Hotel, 339 Ill. at 468, 171 N.E. at 552. 
574  BURNHAM & BENNETT, supra note 93, at 50–53. 
575  Plan an Atlantis of Field Museum, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1910, at 1. 
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course, whether or not their apprehensions were warranted, the owners, by 
suing and losing, enhanced the very risk they feared. 
Whatever may have motivated the owners to challenge the yacht clubs, 
there is little doubt why the Illinois courts rejected these challenges.  The 
Illinois Supreme Court, in the McCormick decision, quoted paragraphs from 
the stipulation of facts reciting the many public benefits associated with the 
clubs.  The clubs provided free wharfage for the U.S. Naval Reserve, free 
nautical training for sailors in World War I, and free sailing lessons for Boy 
Scouts; moreover, the wharves of the clubhouse would afford the “only 
present means whereby vessels and other craft may safely land passengers 
along the lake front.”576  On the other hand, the court seemed skeptical of 
the property owners’ claims of injury.  One of the plaintiffs, the Stevens 
Hotel, averred that it had designed its enormous 3000-room hotel “so that as 
large a number of rooms as possible should front on Grant Park and guests 
occupying the rooms would have an unobstructed view over the park to the 
lake.”577  But the court noted that the reconstructed yacht club building 
would be three-quarters of a mile away from the hotel, in a northeasterly 
direction, “and the proposed club house will not be visible to a person 
walking along Michigan avenue from any point thereof or any part of the 
hotel building below the second story.”578  Although the court did not rest its 
decisions on a balancing of the equities, it is not hard to perceive that the 
court regarded the public benefits from the yacht clubs as exceeding any 
detriment to the property owners. 
B. Defining “Building” 
Just as the trolley and yacht club cases defined the territorial limits of 
the Grant Park public dedication, other controversies helped define what 
sorts of structures would be regarded as “buildings” prohibited by the 
public dedication.  In contrast to questions about territorial limits, where 
bright-line boundaries have prevailed, the definition of “building” 
frequently has been influenced by the purposes of the dedication.  To be 
sure, the ordinary meaning of “building”—a structure enclosed by walls and 
a roof, large enough to accommodate some form of human activity579—has 
 
576  McCormick, 331 Ill. at 519–20, 163 N.E. at 419–20. 
577  Stevens Hotel, 339 Ill. at 465–66, 171 N.E. at 551. 
578  Id. at 468, 171 N.E. at 552. 
579  A dictionary in use at the time the dedications were made states that “building” is “[a] fabric or 
edifice constructed for use or convenience, as a house.”  NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 111 (New York, S. Converse 3d ed. 1830).  Shortly after the Ward cases, 
“building” was defined as  
[t]hat which is built; . . . .  As now generally used, a fabric or edifice, framed or constructed, 
designed to stand more or less permanently, and covering a space of land, for use as a dwelling, 
storehouse, factory, shelter for beasts, or some other useful purpose.  Building in this sense does 
not include a mere wall, fence, monument, hoarding, or similar structure, though designed for 
permanent use where it stands; nor a steamboat, ship, or other vessel of navigation. 
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established the core meaning of this concept.  But in marginal cases the 
courts, at least on occasion, have turned to purposive interpretation. 
The many decisions and controversies up to 1910 established the outer 
limits of the meaning of the term “building.”  At one end of the spectrum, 
decisions by the Illinois Supreme Court established that libraries, museums, 
armories, post offices, and depots were buildings, and the court in dictum 
added that power houses and stables would be buildings, too.580  The decree 
in Ward I also established that loading platforms and storage sheds were 
regarded as buildings.  Local precedent had held that a baseball stadium 
was a building.581  At the other end of the spectrum, it appears that no one 
has ever argued that bridges such as those spanning the Illinois Central 
tracks are buildings, or that statues and fountains in the park are buildings.  
And the court has opined in dictum that storm shelters, band stands, 
lavatories, and toilets would not be buildings.582 
As to whether temporary as opposed to permanent structures qualify as 
buildings, the local precedents are mixed.  Ward was clearly of the view 
that tents and wigwams count as buildings, and his aggressive litigation 
achieved some success in vindicating this viewpoint.  But a number of local 
decisions went the other way, both before and after Ward’s reign as 
watchdog.  The practice today is to allow tents to be erected during various 
festivals held in the park.583 
The most extensive consideration of the definitional issue occurred in a 
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in 1952, ruling on a challenge to the 
construction of the first of four parking garages under the park.584  Although 
the project in question entailed significant disruption of the north park and 
caused the destruction of the well-known peristyle at Randolph Street and 
Michigan Avenue, the court held that it did not violate the public 
dedication.585  The court noted that once construction was finished, nearly 
all of the parking garage would be underground, except for entrances and 
exits and several five-foot-high air vents and intakes, which would be 
disguised with shrubbery. 
 
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 288 (2d ed. 1913).  A 
modern dictionary defines “building” as “a relatively permanent enclosed construction over a plot of 
land, having a roof and usually windows and often more than one level, used for any of a wide variety of 
activities, as living, entertaining, or manufacturing” or as “anything built or constructed.”  RANDOM 
HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 274 (2d ed. 2001).  
580  Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 510, 89 N.E. 731, 736 (1909). 
581  See supra notes 237–50 and accompanying text. 
582  Ward, 241 Ill. at 510, 89 N.E. at 736. 
583  See, e.g., Kathy Bergen, Event Adds $12 Million for Olympics Bid, CHI. TRIB., July 15, 2008, 
§ 3 (Business), at 3. 
584  Mich. Boulevard Bldg. Co. v. Chi. Park Dist. (Parking Garage Case), 412 Ill. 350, 352, 106 
N.E.2d 359, 361 (1952). 
585  Id. at 364, 106 N.E.2d at 367. 
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In considering whether the parking garage project violated the 
restriction against buildings, the court emphasized the purposes of the 
dedication.  The intention of the dedication, the court said, “was to keep the 
public tracts free of buildings so that there would be unobstructed view of 
Lake Michigan” and to make “lots abutting on such tracts more 
desirable.”586  Significantly, although the parties had stipulated that the air 
vents and intakes were “structures and not buildings,” the court indicated 
that it did not regard this as determinative: “[I]t is drawing too fine a line of 
distinction to say that the erection of structures generally would not be in 
violation of the spirit of the restrictions in the original dedications.”587  The 
vents and intakes did not violate the dedication because they occupied only 
an “infinitesimal portion” of the whole park, they would be concealed “with 
shrubbery so that they will not disfigure” the park, and they would “not 
obstruct the view of any tenant of the plaintiff or any tenant of other 
abutting property.”588 
The decision strongly implied that in borderline cases, whether a 
particular structure violates the dedication should be determined by asking 
whether it would interfere with the “right to view, light and air” sought to 
be protected by the dedication.589  In other words, at least in close cases, the 
purpose of the dedication should be considered.  The decision eventually 
led to the construction of three more underground garages, making Grant 
Park—below the surface—one of the largest parking facilities in the 
world.590 
Under the purposive test deployed in the Parking Garage Case, many 
of the structures later erected in Millennium Park would have to be regarded 
as buildings.  Indeed, Millennium Park includes several structures that 
would be regarded as buildings under the dictionary definition of the term, 
including the Harris Theater, the Exelon Pavilion, and the McDonald’s 
Cycle Center or bicycle station.591  For this reason, the promoters of 
Millennium Park eventually concluded that they needed the consent of 
abutting landowners to circumvent the Ward precedents.592  But even 
without regard to these structures, the Jay Pritzker Pavilion—though 
perhaps literally a “band stand” and thus under the dictum in Ward III not a 
building—is so massive that it completely obscures the views toward the 
lake from Washington Street (see Figure 17).  Under the purposive 
interpretation of the Parking Garage Case, it should be deemed to be a 
building.  The polished bean-shaped “Cloud Gate” weighs 110 tons, is 
 
586  Id. at 361, 106 N.E.2d at 365. 
587  Id. at 362, 106 N.E.2d at 366. 
588  Id. 
589  Id. at 363, 106 N.E.2d at 366. 
590  See supra note 116 (listing the underground garages, including sizes and dates of construction). 
591  See GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 251–60, 320–23. 
592  Id. at 141–43. 
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sixty-six-feet long, and stands thirty-three-feet high.593  And the Crown 
Fountain consists of two towers twenty-three-feet wide, sixteen-feet thick, 
and fifty-feet tall.594  From a purposive perspective, these monuments could 
also be challenged as obstructing view, light, and air for abutting property 
owners. 
FIGURE 17: VIEW LOOKING EAST FROM WASHINGTON STREET TOWARD LAKE MICHIGAN AND 
THE PRITZKER PAVILION (2010) 
Another controversy that directly implicated the definition of 
“building” was the longstanding saga involving the Grant Park band shell.  
Free summer band concerts first appeared in the park in 1920, using a small 
band stand paid for by local business associations.595  In 1931, a much larger 
“temporary” band shell was constructed in south Grant Park.  It proved to 
be immensely popular: by 1940 an estimated 3.5 million people enjoyed the 
free concerts every year.596  By the end of World War II, the band shell had 
fallen into disrepair; on one occasion, a grand piano reportedly fell through 
the stage.597 
 
593  Id. at 261. 
594  Id. at 277. 
595  Cremin, supra note 26, at 308. 
596  GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 49. 
597  Id. at 59. 
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The Park District embarked on a quest to identify a design and location 
for a more permanent structure.  A long progression of proposals, many by 
famous architects, followed.598  The most ironic from the perspective of our 
story was a 1961 plan, jointly sponsored by the Park District and the A. 
Montgomery Ward Foundation, for a $3 million band shell dedicated to the 
memory of Montgomery Ward (see Figure 18).599  Over about a thirty-year 
period, all proposals foundered when one or more property owners on 
Michigan Avenue either refused to consent or threatened to bring litigation 
invoking the Ward precedents to stop construction.600 
FIGURE 18: RENDERING OF PROPOSED WARD MEMORIAL BAND SHELL601 
 
598  Id. at 50–63. 
599  Id. at 53; see also Thomas Willis, The Grant Park Amphitheater: Ward’s Ghost Lives, CHI. 
TRIB., July 2, 1972, at L3. 
600  See, e.g., Hope for Vote on Band Shell Nov. 3 Waning, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 17, 1953, § 1, at 3; 
Bernard Judge, Park District Asks To Move Band Shell, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 1969, § 1, at 20; Portable 
Band Shell Is Urged, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 1972, § 1, at 19; Stanley Ziemba, Grant Park Concerts To Get 
New Home—Tent or Bandshell?, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1972, § 1, at 4; Paul Gapp, Park District Seeks 
Bids on Disputed Band Shell, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 1977, at B1; Stanley Ziemba, Band-shell Opponents 
To Fight Plan in Court, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1977, at A1. 
601  On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-62406.  Note the yacht clubs in the foreground. 
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The impasse was broken, after a fashion, in 1977–78, when Edmund 
Kelly, superintendent of the Park District, announced that a new 
“demountable” band shell would be erected just east of Columbus Drive 
and the Art Institute.602  No one sued to block its erection.  When the 
summer concert season ended, Kelly said that the Park District would not 
waste its funds on “dismantling” the structure.603  Kelly in effect called the 
bluff of the Michigan Avenue owners.  The Petrillo Music Shell remains a 
fixture of the park to this day, notwithstanding the construction of the 
$60 million Pritzker Music Pavilion which was supposed to replace it.604 
FIGURE 19: CONCERT AT THE PETRILLO BAND SHELL605 
The thirty-year struggle to replace the decrepit Grant Park band shell 
tells us a great deal about the power and the pitfalls of the public dedication 
doctrine.  The summer concerts attracted immense crowds,606 and it is not 
surprising that one or more landowners might object to the building of a 
structure that would encourage masses of humanity entering and leaving the 
park.  What is more surprising is that owner opposition resulted in the 
collapse of repeated proposals for new band shells.607  In Ward III, the 
 
602  Robert Davis & Stanley Ziemba, Compromise Reached on New Band Shell, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 11, 
1977, § 1, at 1. 
603  Bandshell Won’t Be Removed, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 25, 1978, § 2, at 2. 
604  GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 63–76. 
605 Photograph by John McCarthy (Sept. 6, 1987) (on file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-
62404). 
606  GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 49. 
607  Although the Ward cases were frequently alluded to as legal impediments to the new band shell, 
see, e.g., Hope for Vote on Band Shell Nov. 3 Waning, supra note 600, we have discovered only one 
instance in which a lawsuit was seriously threatened.  See Ziemba, Band-shell Opponents To Fight Plan 
in Court, supra note 600.  That dispute was later settled.  Robert Davis & Stanley Ziemba, Compromise 
Reached on New Band Shell, supra note 602.  The Park District and Chicago Plan Commission were 
nevertheless sufficiently concerned about the threat of litigation that at one point they decided “to make 
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Illinois Supreme Court had said that “certain structures are absolutely 
necessary for the comfort of the public and the proper use of the park, but 
most of them, such as shelters in the case of storms, band stands, lavatories, 
toilets, and the like, can be provided without the erection of what would 
properly be characterized as a building.”608  This was dictum, but it would 
likely be taken seriously by later courts, and would provide an obvious 
basis for constructing the argument that a band shell is not a “building” 
within the meaning of the public dedication. 
The puzzle is why the Park District did not move ahead with a new 
band shell project, daring one or more landowners to initiate litigation, 
which they would likely lose.609  The answer is unclear, although increasing 
political conflict between the Park District and various civic and 
environmental advocacy groups over the general direction of park policy 
may provide part of the answer.610  The political infighting made it difficult 
for the Park District to reach a consensus on a proposal, with the result that 
the showdown with Michigan Avenue property owners never occurred. 
FIGURE 20: PRITZKER MUSIC PAVILION (2010) (PHOTO TAKEN LOOKING WEST) 
  
 
a ‘deep’ examination” of the legal issues, including “[w]hether [a] proposal ‘[was] in accord with court 
decrees that Grant Park be forever vacant of buildings.’”  Dolores McCahill, New Band Shell for Park 
Delayed, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 11, 1977, at 92. 
608  Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 510, 89 N.E. 731, 736 (1909) (emphasis 
added). 
609  The Park District suggested this route at one point.  Portable Band Shell Is Urged, supra note 
600.  However, the path was never followed. 
610  The Park District faced obstacles from the Chicago Planning Commission, which had to approve 
all structures in the park, as well as opposition from civic groups such as Friends of the Parks.  See Paul 
Gapp, Grant Park Band Shell Back to Drawing Board, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1977, § 4, at 1.  See also 
Gapp, supra note 600. 
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C. The Consent Mechanism 
The public dedication doctrine is a unanimous consent mechanism.  
Any abutting landowner can block a forbidden use, provided that he or she 
is willing to incur the expense of a lawsuit.  But if all abutting owners 
consent to a use, the project can go forward, even if it would otherwise 
violate the dedication.  The consent mechanism has been successfully 
invoked on four occasions with respect to Grant Park: the Public Library, 
the Art Institute, the temporary post office, and Millennium Park.  Three of 
those invocations—all except the temporary post office—have had a 
profound effect on the visage of the park. 
The Art Institute is by far the largest permanent building in the park, 
and it owes its presence to the consent mechanism.  We have previously 
described the circumstances of its original construction in the park.611  The 
building was designed as a venue for the World’s Congress Auxiliary, as 
part of the Columbian Exposition, and, after the fair, was turned over as a 
new permanent home for the Art Institute.612  The Daggett case, decided by 
a panel of circuit judges in 1892, held that all necessary Michigan Avenue 
owners except Sarah Daggett had consented to the erection of the building, 
and it ruled that Daggett’s objections were barred by laches.613  The idea 
that the Art Institute had obtained unanimous consent from Michigan 
Avenue owners received the imprimatur of the Illinois Supreme Court in 
Ward I, and from that time forward the consent mechanism has been 
understood to be the legal foundation for the Art Institute complex. 
The original legislation authorizing construction of the Art Institute 
limited it to 400 feet of frontage on Michigan Avenue.614  As constructed, 
the building occupied some 320 feet of frontage.615  In ensuing years, the 
Art Institute would continually expand its facilities, though always to the 
east, and always in such a way as neither to increase its frontage along 
Michigan Avenue nor to raise its height above the original structure.  In 
1913, with the consent of the Illinois Central and the South Park 
Commissioners, the Art Institute constructed an addition called Gunsaulus 
Hall over the top of the Illinois Central right-of-way.616  This permitted 
further expansion on the landfill area east of the railroad tracks, and 
 
611  See supra Part IV.B. 
612  See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text. 
613  Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79, 86–92 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892).  The 
decision also held, in the alternative, that the legislation authorizing condemnation of the rights of 
abutting owners had eliminated their right to injunctive relief, id. at 88–92, but this rationale was 
effectively overruled by Ward III and Ward IV, see supra Parts IV.D and IV.E. 
614  Stevens Hotel Co. v. Art Inst. of Chi., 260 Ill. App. 555, 568 (1931); JOURNAL OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO FOR COUNCIL YEAR 1891, at 1825–26 
(1891). 
615  Stevens Hotel, 260 Ill. App. at 568. 
616  Id. at 568–69. 
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multiple additions were placed in this area between 1920 and 1926.617  At no 
time during this relentless expansion did any Michigan Avenue landowner 
raise an objection. 
FIGURE 21: ART INSTITUTE OF CHICAGO AS ORIGINALLY CONSTRUCTED (LOOKING NORTHEAST 
FROM MICHIGAN AVENUE)618 
In 1928, the Art Institute received permission from the SPC to embark 
on yet another addition east of the Illinois Central—the Agnes Allerton 
Wing—and this expansion finally elicited a legal challenge.619  The Stevens 
Hotel, which also sought at the time to enjoin reconstruction of the Chicago 
Yacht Club, retained George Merrick to seek an injunction against the Art 
Institute.  Merrick was more than successful in the circuit court, obtaining a 
broadly worded injunction from Judge Hugo A. Friend barring construction 
of any building, structure, enlargement, or extension “of any kind, size, 
nature or description whatever, or for any purpose whatsoever, anywhere 
within the limits of Grant Park.”620  An alarmed Art Institute, following the 
pattern of the Ward cases, filed a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme 
Court.  Finding that the conditions for a direct appeal were not satisfied, the 
supreme court transferred the case to the Illinois Appellate Court.621 
 
617  Id. at 569. 
618  Photograph by J.W. Taylor (1897) (on file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-59520). 
619  See Stevens Hotel, 260 Ill. App. at 569–70. 
620  Stevens Hotel Co. v. Art Inst. of Chi., 342 Ill. 180, 181, 173 N.E. 761, 762 (1930) (quoting 
Stevens Hotel Co. v. Art Inst. of Chi., No. B-176132, at 4 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1930)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
621  The question of the court’s jurisdiction had not been discussed by the parties but was raised by 
the court sua sponte.  The court held that no question of any freehold was involved nor was there any 
challenge to the validity of any municipal ordinance or statute.  Id. at 182–83, 173 N.E. at 762–63.  The 
court apparently viewed the case as involving nothing more than the validity of the contract between the 
SPC and the Art Institute, authorizing the new extension. 
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The appellate court proceeded to render a remarkable decision which 
has effectively served as the legal charter for the Art Institute to the present 
day.  The court was significantly handicapped in construing the scope of the 
original consents since they were not introduced into the record.622  The 
 
622  Stevens Hotel, 260 Ill. App. at 566.  In the Boaz litigation, see infra notes 635–40 and 
accompanying text, regarding the consents for Millennium Park, the City stated that the original Art 
Institute consents had been lost.  See Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 3 & Response to Motion to 
Dismiss Complaint at 6–7, Boaz v. City of Chicago, No. 99L-3804 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 
2000).  We uncovered the original consent sheet in the court records for the Daggett case.  The City in 
Boaz submitted a document from the archives of the Art Institute, which is a typed version of the 
original consent sheet submitted by Caryl Young in the Daggett litigation; the typed version adds to the 
original a title, an introductory paragraph, and has the signatures typed.  Consent of Abutting Property 
Owners (Apr. 25, 1892) (on file with authors).  The original consent sheet reads as follows: 
 Whereas the undersigned are respectively the owners and occupiers under lease of the property 
situate on the west side of Michigan Avenue and north of Jackson street, set opposite our names 
respectively, and, 
 Whereas, the World’s Columbian Exposition and Art Institute of Chicago propose to erect a 
permanent building on the so-called Lake Front, north of the north line of Jackson street extended, 
and east of the east line of Michigan avenue, said building to be used for purposes connected with 
the World’s Columbian Exposition until the close of said Exposition, at which time said 
Exposition is to release all claims of every kind and character it may have in and to the buildings 
erected upon said premises, and, 
 Whereas, thereafter said Art Institute proposes to control and devote said building to the 
permanent use of said Art Institute, and for the exhibition of works of art, including paintings, 
sculpture, etc., and also as a public memorial in memory of the discovery of America by 
Christopher Columbus, 
 Now therefore, for the purpose of promoting the construction of said public art building, and 
for the purpose of aiding the construction thereof—believing the same to be in the interest of the 
City of Chicago, we, the undersigned as owners and occupiers of said property so situated upon 
the west side and fronting Michigan avenue, hereby consent to the construction, erection and 
maintenance of said building for the purpose aforesaid, and also hereby waive and release all 
claims of any easement that we now have, or may heretofore have had in said Lake Front, north of 
Jackson Street; and hereby waive all claims of damages of every kind and character that may result 
from the erection and permanent maintenance of said building.  PROVIDED, however, that if said 
building shall not be occupied by said Art Institute for the exhibition of arts as contemplated by 
the organization of said Institute, or if it shall be occupied for any other purpose or purposes than 
as above authorized, then this release shall be void and without effect. 
 signed 
 W.C. Ritchie 40 feet 
 per W.E. Ritchie atty  40 " 
 F.B. Rhodes   40 " 
 Caryl Young 145 Mich. Ave.  71 2/3 ft.  
 Spoor MacKey   51 " 
 Warren F. Leland   160 " 
 O. M. Powers    38 " 
 Leroy Payne    105 " 
 B.F. McNeill & Bros. 
 Orrington Lunt     27 1/2 " 
 John S. Hair   26 " 
 Shepherd Brooks 
 by Owen F. Aldis, Atty. in fact 90 cor. of Monroe 
 R. F. Newcomb No. 152 & 153 39 feet 
 [seal] Pullman Palace Car Co. 
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court accordingly proceeded by indirection, looking to language in the 
statutes and ordinances authorizing the original construction of the building 
as well as to the language of the Daggett and Ward I decrees validating the 
consents.  The court concluded from this review that the consents must have 
contemplated that the building would be permanent, that it would 
accommodate the reasonable needs of the Art Institute, and that it would 
include “necessary enlargement of the building” over time as the museum’s 
needs grew with an increasing Chicago population.623 
The court reinforced these conclusions with a discussion of the conduct 
of the Michigan Avenue owners in the almost forty years that had elapsed 
since the building was initially authorized.624  After reciting the many 
additions and enlargements that had been made during this period, the court 
noted that all “were discussed in the public press and were generally known 
to all of the citizens of Chicago and particularly to the abutting property 
owners”; that the construction had taken place “in plain view” and was 
“easily visible” to the owners; that no owner at any time had commenced a 
legal proceeding against the Art Institute contesting these additions and 
enlargements; and that, notwithstanding all this, during the same time 
“abutting property owners ha[d] vigorously and successfully opposed the 
construction of any other buildings in Grant Park.”625  This analysis was 
advanced to support a construction of the consents based on the course of 
conduct by the owners.  But it could equally have been used to establish a 
finding of acquiescence, waiver, or estoppel on their part; conceivably, it 
might even have established that the right of the owners had been 
extinguished by the open, notorious, and continuous adverse possession of 
portions of the park by the Art Institute. 
The court concluded by observing that the Art Institute had offered at 
trial to enter into a number of stipulations if the broad injunction sought by 
the hotel was denied.626  The court observed that “these stipulations might 
well be incorporated in the final decree.”627  The result was in effect a 
regulatory injunction granting the Art Institute the right to construct an 
enormous complex, subject to height and frontage restrictions.  As long as 
 
 by Geo. M. Pullman, Prest 120 ft. 5in. 
 Silas A. Barton 40 ft. 
 Winship & Price 40 feet 
623  Stevens Hotel, 260 Ill. App. at 567, 576–77 (emphasis omitted).  The language of “necessary 
enlargement” was found in the superior court decree in Ward I.  See id. at 567. 
624  Id. at 566–69. 
625  Id. at 570. 
626  These were as follows: the Art Institute would never exceed a boundary marked by Monroe 
Street on the north, Jackson Street on the south, Michigan Avenue on the west, and what is now called 
Columbus Drive on the east; it would never occupy more than 400 feet of frontage on Michigan 
Avenue; and it would never build a structure higher than the original building on Michigan Avenue.  Id. 
at 577–78. 
627  Id. at 578. 
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the Art Institute adhered to the terms of the injunction, it would have no 
further worries based on the public dedication doctrine.628  With its most 
recent additions, the Art Institute has filled virtually the entire area 
described by the stipulations.629 
The Art Institute case resolved some important questions regarding the 
consent mechanism.  A consent given by an owner is binding on successors 
in interest.630  A consent given to one structure does not constitute a waiver 
of rights to object to other structures in the future.631  The scope of any 
consent is to be determined by general principles of contractual 
interpretation.632  If the actual consents have been lost, then the scope must 
be determined inferentially by other evidence.633  Such other evidence 
includes the practical construction of the scope of the consents as reflected 
in the behavior of the parties.634 
Many decades later, when attorneys advising the proponents of 
Millennium Park concluded that the Harris Theater would likely be 
regarded as a building, and hence that owner consents were necessary to 
eliminate the threat of litigation under the Ward precedents, further 
questions about the consent mechanism were presented.  The question the 
attorneys focused on most intensively: who qualifies as an abutting owner 
for purpose of obtaining the needed consents?  Based on the form from the 
archives of the Art Institute and the decision in Ward I, the attorneys 
concluded that consents were required only from those who owned property 
directly opposite or diagonally across from the project.635  Consents were 
solicited and obtained from owners or agents of owners within this group.636  
A test case, Boaz v. City of Chicago, was then filed on behalf of the owners 
of a condominium on Randolph Street located farther east of Millennium 
Park, claiming that their consent was also required.  The City moved to 
dismiss, and after briefing and argument, Circuit Court Judge Green granted 
 
628  The final decree incorporated the stipulations.  Decree at 3, Stevens Hotel Co. v. Art Inst. of 
Chi., No. 31C176132 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. July 9, 1931). 
629  See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
630  See Stevens Hotel, 260 Ill. App. at 575–76. 
631  See id. at 572. 
632  See id. at 576. 
633  See id. 
634  See id. at 572. 
635  This was also the conception of the relevant universe of owners whose consent was required in 
constructing the Public Library and the temporary post office.  For the Public Library, see supra note 86 
and accompanying text.  For the temporary post office, see supra notes 347–52 and accompanying text.  
It does not appear that the litigants in Boaz were aware of either precedent. 
636  In the case of Millennium Park, this was every owner (and in some cases lessees) on the west 
side of Michigan Avenue from Monroe Street to Randolph Street, and every owner on the north side of 
Randolph Street from Michigan Avenue to Columbus Drive, plus the diagonally situated property 
owners on Michigan just south of Monroe, on Michigan just north of Randolph, and on Randolph just 
east of Columbus.  There were fifteen owners in all in this area.  Motion to Dismiss Complaint ¶¶ 4–5 & 
Exhibit E, Boaz v. City of Chicago, No. 99L-3804 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2000). 
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the motion,637 effectively ruling that consent was required only from owners 
directly abutting and those diagonally located from the project. 
This ruling was almost certainly wrong.  None of the parties in Boaz 
cited the decisions in Ward III and Ward IV, which upheld Montgomery 
Ward’s right to enjoin the construction of the Field Museum.638  The 
museum was to be located in the park at Congress Street, a full five blocks 
south of Ward’s property at Madison Street.  Thus, the Illinois Supreme 
Court understood that Ward had standing to object even though his property 
was neither opposite nor diagonal from the proposed project.  If Ward had 
standing to object, then his consent would be required under the consent 
mechanism.  Similarly, when the Stevens Hotel sought to block 
construction of the Chicago Yacht Club and an addition to the Art Institute, 
the courts did not suggest that it lacked standing because the hotel was not 
located directly opposite or diagonally from these structures.  Again, if the 
Stevens Hotel had standing to object, then its consent was required under 
the consent mechanism.639 
Given that the Boaz consent theory is inconsistent with Illinois 
Supreme Court precedent, Millennium Park is vulnerable to a legal 
challenge by nonconsenting owners abutting other parts of the park, such as 
owners located farther south of Monroe Street.640  Now that Millennium 
Park has been built, any such action would likely be met by a defense of 
laches.  Still, more thorough legal research would have been a good idea 
before piling $370 million in improvements in the northwest corner of 
Grant Park. 
VI. ASSESSING THE PUBLIC DEDICATION DOCTRINE 
It remains to consider some more-general lessons that can be drawn 
from the story of Chicago’s premier public park.  What accounts for the 
decline of the public dedication doctrine, to the point where it is today 
largely forgotten?  How does the public dedication doctrine stack up against 
the public trust doctrine?  What does the public dedication doctrine tell us 
about the merits of creating antiproperty rights to protect public spaces? 
 
637  Boaz, No. 99L-3804. 
638  Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 89 N.E. 731 (1909); S. Park Comm’rs v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 248 Ill. 299, 93 N.E. 910 (1910). 
639  It was stipulated in the Art Institute litigation that the “predecessors in title” of the hotel had 
given their consent to the Art Institute.  Stevens Hotel, 260 Ill. App. at 564.  This stipulation is 
inconsistent with the consents actually obtained by Caryl Young for the Art Institute.  See supra note 
622.  The Stevens Hotel was 2563 feet (or almost five blocks) south of the Art Institute. 
640  The consent procedure followed in obtaining approval for the Art Institute and Millennium Park 
is also inconsistent with the Chicago City Charter of 1861 and of 1863, which provided that no 
encroachments were to be permitted in the park “without the assent of all the persons owning lots or 
land on said street or avenue” (emphasis added).  See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Decline of the Public Dedication Doctrine 
Shortly before the first Ward case was decided, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in Illinois Central, launched the modern public trust doctrine.641  The 
Court rejected the Illinois Central’s claim that it had acquired vested rights 
under the Lake Front Act of 1869, which the State had taken by repealing 
the Act in 1873.  The submerged land under Lake Michigan was owned by 
the State of Illinois in trust for the people.642  The conveyance by the 
legislature of this land to the railroad was a breach of this trust.643  The 
railroad’s claim of vested rights was thus without merit, because the State 
had no authority to convey such extensive rights in the submerged land to 
the railroad in the first place. 
Given that the Ward cases and the public trust doctrine both emerged 
in the same place at approximately the same time, the history of the 
Chicago lakefront provides an instructive source of information about the 
relative merits of these two public rights doctrines.  Although the public 
dedication doctrine and the public trust doctrine have not always been 
sharply distinguished, they in fact rest on very different understandings.  
The public dedication doctrine is a creation of the law of equity.  It allows 
persons who have purchased real property in reliance on a dedication of 
nearby land to public use to sue to enjoin departures from the dedication.  
The public trust doctrine is a doctrine about the legal title in which certain 
public assets are held.  It provides that these assets are held in trust for the 
people, and hence cannot be transferred to nongovernmental entities for 
purposes that would violate the trust.644 
A well-informed observer, considering the way the two doctrines had 
been applied on the Chicago lakefront up to, say, 1912, would likely 
conclude that the public dedication doctrine was quite powerful, whereas 
the public trust doctrine was relatively weak.  As we have seen, the public 
dedication doctrine had been used to defeat multiple proposals, enjoying 
widespread political support, to build armories, libraries, and museums in 
the landfill area of Grant Park.645  The public dedication had even been held 
to be immune from condemnation under the power of eminent domain.646 
The public trust doctrine, in contrast, presented little obstacle to 
ambitious projects calling for further landfilling of the lake.  To be sure, the 
Illinois Central’s claim of right to construct and control an outer harbor had 
 
641  Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
642  Id. at 452–56. 
643  Id. at 455. 
644  See Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 203 Ill. 2d 312, 325–27, 786 N.E.2d 161, 169–70 
(2003). 
645  See supra Part IV. 
646  S. Park Comm’rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 248 Ill. 299, 304–06, 93 N.E. 910, 912–13 
(1910). 
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been thwarted in the name of the public trust.647  But in further proceedings 
conducted on remand from Illinois Central, the local federal courts held 
that the railroad’s improvements built on landfill in Lake Michigan up to 
the time of the Court’s decision were all consistent with the public trust 
doctrine since they did not interfere with the public’s access to the lake for 
purposes of navigation or fishing.648  The Supreme Court subsequently 
affirmed these holdings.649  In another decision of far-reaching consequence, 
the Illinois Supreme Court held in 1896 that Chicago authorities could 
construct Lake Shore Drive north of the river on landfill in the lake and 
finance the project by selling the submerged land between the new roadway 
and the shore to private owners.650  The project had the blessing of the state 
legislature, and the court said that it would defer to the legislature’s 
judgment as to whether this was consistent with the public trust in which 
the land was held.651  As the twentieth century advanced, the public trust 
doctrine remained relatively impotent.  The Illinois courts had little trouble 
approving projects to build a large water filtration plant on landfill in the 
lake and a massive convention center on landfill just south of Grant Park 
and the Field Museum, and further held that because of laches the public 
had lost any claim to the air rights above the landfill on which the Illinois 
Central had located its terminal facilities north of Randolph Street.652 
The tipping point in the relative prominence of the two doctrines, at 
least in Illinois, can be marked with precision.  In Paepcke v. Public 
Building Commission of Chicago,653 the Illinois Supreme Court was faced 
with a challenge to a plan to use two city parks as sites for the construction 
of new school buildings.  The plaintiffs challenged the plan under both the 
public dedication and the public trust doctrines.  The court summarily 
rejected the public dedication argument.  A doctrine enforced by the Illinois 
Supreme Court to protect public spaces in dozens of cases over a century 
was effectively interred with the comment that “[t]he mere dedication by 
the sovereign of lands to public park uses does not give property owners 
adjoining or in the vicinity of the park the right to have the use continue 
unchanged.”654  The Ward cases were distinguished on the ground that the 
Chicago city charters of 1861 and 1863 gave abutting property owners of 
Grant Park a statutory cause of action, whereas the plaintiffs in Paepcke had 
 
647  Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 454–55. 
648  Illinois ex rel. Hunt v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 91 F. 955, 957–62 (7th Cir. 1899). 
649  Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 184 U.S. 77, 99 (1902). 
650  People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 148–53, 45 N.E. 830, 834–35 (1896). 
651  Id.  
652  See Bowes v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 120 N.E.2d 15 (1954) (water-filtration plant); 
Fairbank v. Stratton, 14 Ill. 2d 307, 152 N.E.2d 569 (1958) (McCormick Place convention center); 
Hickey v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 35 Ill. 2d 427, 220 N.E.2d 415 (1966) (air rights over the Illinois Central’s 
terminal facilities north of Randolph Street). 
653  46 Ill. 2d 330, 263 N.E.2d 11 (1970). 
654  Id. at 338, 263 N.E.2d at 16. 
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no such special statutory right.655  This ignored the fact that the Illinois 
Supreme Court, in the Ward cases, had rested on the general public 
dedication doctrine, not on any statutory right peculiar to the lakefront.656 
The public trust theory, in contrast, was treated by the Paepcke court 
much more sympathetically.  The court quoted at length from a recent law 
review article by Professor Joseph Sax urging courts to look to the public 
trust doctrine to protect the public interest in common resources, and 
seemingly endorsed this conclusion.657  Overruling prior decisions, it held 
that any taxpayer was entitled to sue to enforce the public trust.658  In terms 
of the substantive content of the trust, the court adopted Wisconsin 
precedents setting forth a five-part test for determining whether a diversion 
in the use of public trust lands is permissible.659  The bottom line, however, 
was disappointing for the plaintiffs: the court simply announced, without 
any analysis, that the public trust was not violated by the decision to build 
schools in public parks.660 
After Paepcke, the public dedication doctrine disappeared in Illinois as 
a tool for preserving public spaces such as parks and was replaced by the 
public trust doctrine.661  The results have been mixed.  Plans to landfill Lake 
Michigan in order to expand U.S. Steel’s South Works plant were scuttled, 
as was a plan to expand Loyola University’s Lakeshore Campus in Rogers 
Park on the far north side of the City.662  But the Illinois Supreme Court had 
no difficulty approving a complete reconstruction of the venerable Soldier 
Field to meet the specifications of the Chicago Bears football team.663 
Although the proximate cause of the demise of the public dedication 
doctrine as a protector of public uses, at least in Illinois, was the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s decision in Paepcke, no doubt there were deeper causes as 
well.  With the merger of law and equity and the general decline in the 
 
655  Id. at 339–40, 263 N.E.2d at 17–18. 
656  See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 409, 48 N.E. 927, 932 (1897). 
657  Paepcke, 46 Ill. 2d at 336–38, 263 N.E.2d at 16 (quoting Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust 
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 482–86 
(1970)).  On the influence of the Sax article in spurring a revival of the public trust doctrine, see Carol 
M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998). 
658  See Paepcke, 46 Ill. 2d at 341, 263 N.E.2d at 18. 
659  Id. at 343–44, 263 N.E.2d at 19. 
660  Id. at 344, 263 N.E.2d at 19. 
661  Illinois courts continue to recognize the public dedication doctrine in the context of dedicated 
roads and alleys.  See, e.g., Vill. of Joppa v. Chi. & E. Ill. R.R., 51 Ill. App. 3d 674, 366 N.E.2d 388 
(1977); see also Harris Bank of St. Charles v. City of Geneva, 278 Ill. App. 3d 738, 663 N.E.2d 483 
(1996); Terwelp v. Sass, 111 Ill. App. 3d 133, 443 N.E.2d 804 (1982).  In effect, public dedication law 
has reverted to the narrow scope that it enjoyed under English law.  See supra note 144 and 
accompanying text. 
662  People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976) (U.S. Steel South 
Works); Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (Loyola 
Lakeshore Campus). 
663  See Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 203 Ill. 2d 312, 786 N.E.2d 161 (2003). 
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study of equity as a separate field of legal inquiry,664 the doctrinal 
underpinnings of the public dedication doctrine in the law of equity have no 
doubt seemed increasingly foreign to lawyers and judges. 
The general understanding of public property has also changed.  In the 
nineteenth century, public property tended to be regarded as something akin 
to “inherently public” property or open-access resources.665  The idea that 
particular individuals might obtain special rights in open-access resources 
did not seem strange, whether it was someone pulling a fish from a public 
stream or discovering minerals on the public domain.666  With the growth of 
government and the number of government employees who serve as 
custodians of public resources, public property has come to be regarded as 
largely equivalent to private property, except that government agents 
manage and control it.  The idea that private owners might have special 
rights in government property in this stronger sense seems harder to sustain. 
Private property and public rights have come to be regarded as 
mutually exclusive in more fundamental ways as well.  Preservationists and 
environmentalists tend to see private property as a threat to public values.667  
Private property, in the typical view, encourages self-regarding and 
exploitative behavior.  Effective protection of common and public resources 
necessitates the extension of governmental control over resources.  This 
attitude is gradually becoming more nuanced, as the environmental 
community increasingly sees value in market mechanisms based on novel 
types of property or property-like rights.668  But the public dedication 
doctrine entered its desuetude at a time when private property was viewed 
as the enemy of public rights. 
Finally, a generalized norm of citizen equality is relevant here.  We 
tend to think of public property as something open to all members of the 
public on equal terms.  The public dedication doctrine does not directly 
contradict this understanding.  But, as evidenced in the Ward cases, it seems 
to say that some members of the public have a greater say about the way in 
which public property will be used and managed than do other members of 
the public.  Just as the Supreme Court has tended to take a dim view of 
 
664  See Lester B. Orfield, The Place of Equity in the Law School Curriculum, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 26 
(1949) (discussing the debate then underway about whether to retain equity as a separate course of study 
in law school).  Orfield notes that only eight schools had abandoned the course in equity in 1949, but 
three were in Illinois: Northwestern, the University of Chicago, and Illinois.  Id. at 36–37.  Since then, 
principles of equity have generally been taught in courses in “remedies,” when they are taught at all. 
665  See Rose, supra note 11, at 762–66. 
666  For example, prospectors operating in the public domain could acquire rights to exclude other 
members of the public under the pedis possessio doctrine.  See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 
337, 353 (1919). 
667  See Thomas W. Merrill, Private Property and the Politics of Environmental Protection, 28 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 69 (2004). 
668  See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The 
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988). 
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voting schemes that give the franchise to property owners and not to 
others,669 so a legal doctrine that gives authority over public resources to 
certain property owners and not others seems to run counter to the 
democratic ethos.670 
B. Public Dedication Versus Public Trust 
Notwithstanding its general demise as a source of protection for public 
uses, it is worth considering how the public dedication doctrine, at least as 
elaborated in the Ward precedents, stacks up against the more-favored 
public trust doctrine as a tool for protecting public spaces.  Five potential 
advantages of the public dedication doctrine can be cited. 
First, the public dedication doctrine covers a much wider array of 
resources.  With the exception of Paepcke,671 which involved urban 
parkland, all Illinois public trust cases have involved land that is or was 
covered by navigable waterways.672  Illinois is not exceptional in this 
regard.  In virtually all states, the public trust doctrine remains tethered to 
navigable waters, and courts have resisted extending the doctrine to public 
lands having no nexus to navigable waters.673  The public dedication 
doctrine, in contrast, applies to any and all lands that have been dedicated to 
public uses, including streets, alleys, squares, landings, and parks.674  The 
only requirement for enforcement in equity is that there be one or more 
 
669  See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (invalidating municipal voting scheme 
granting only property tax payers the right to vote on elections to approve municipal utility bonds); 
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (striking down voter-qualification statute 
for school district elections limiting the vote to owners or lessees of taxable real property); cf. Salyer 
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (upholding voting scheme for 
the directors of public water district limited to landowners). 
670  For an argument supporting a modest return to voting by property owners, see Thomas W. 
Merrill, Direct Voting by Property Owners, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 275 (2010). 
671  Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 46 Ill. 2d 330, 263 N.E.2d 11 (1970). 
672  See Ill. Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 154 U.S. 
225 (1894); People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 45 N.E. 830 (1896); Illinois ex rel. Hunt v. Ill. 
Cent. R.R., 91 F. 955 (7th Cir. 1899); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 176 U.S. 646 (1900); Illinois ex 
rel. Hunt v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 184 U.S. 77 (1902); Bowes v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 120 N.E.2d 15 
(1954); Fairbank v. Stratton, 14 Ill. 2d 307, 152 N.E.2d 569 (1958); Hickey v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 35 Ill. 2d 
427, 220 N.E.2d 415 (1966); People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 
(1976); Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
673  See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: 
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007) 
[hereinafter Craig, Eastern States] (surveying the public trust doctrines of thirty-one states and finding 
nearly universal connection to navigable waterways); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the 
Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an 
Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010) [hereinafter Craig, Western States] (surveying the 
public trust doctrines of the remaining nineteen states and finding same). 
674  MCQUILLIN, supra note 143, § 33:9. 
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private landholdings adjacent to the public space whose value is affected by 
the public dedication.675 
Second, the public dedication doctrine provides a much more objective 
test for identifying the protected resources and the nature of the constraints 
imposed on public authorities.  This is especially true where the doctrine is 
anchored in some kind of published plat or map, as was the case with the 
Chicago lakefront.  The area covered by the doctrine (e.g., Randolph Street 
to Park Row) and the restrictions imposed by the doctrine (e.g., no 
buildings) were set forth on maps in discernible markings and words, 
although of course, as we have seen, disputes have arisen about the exact 
meaning of these markings and words.676  Even absent an express marking 
on a map or plat, longstanding public use serves as a relatively objective 
indicator of what spaces are subject to the doctrine and in what respects 
they have been dedicated.  The public trust doctrine, in contrast, is mired in 
uncertainty about what kind of nexus to navigable waters is required (if 
any), and what kinds of trust obligations are imposed on the state when the 
doctrine applies.677 
Third, the public dedication doctrine incorporates a rule-like 
understanding, which encourages judicial enforcement and facilitates 
bargaining among affected interests.  In the case of a specific dedication, 
such as the “no buildings” restriction on the Chicago lakefront, the public 
dedication doctrine grants abutting owners the power to insist on strict 
compliance with the dedication.  “No buildings” means no buildings.  Even 
in the case of a general dedication, such as an open space on a map, the 
doctrine often enshrines the status quo as reflected in longstanding public 
uses.678  The public trust doctrine, on the other hand, tends to reflect a 
 
675  See supra notes 164–67, 175–76 and accompanying text. 
676  There is also the further complication that the map of section 15 stating that the public space was 
not to be filled with buildings was a commercial map that was not recorded.  See supra notes 27–30 and 
accompanying text.  The court in Ward I nevertheless concluded that section 15 was also subject to the 
same public dedication as section 10 by virtue of public representations by the Canal Commissioners 
concerning section 15, and that section 10 and section 15 should be regarded as part of a single public 
dedication.  City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 402–03, 48 N.E. 927, 930 (1897). 
677  See Craig, Eastern States, supra note 673, at 14–15; Craig, Western States, supra note 673, at 
71–75. 
678  Courts have generally recognized two types of distinctions in discussing public dedications.  
One is the distinction between statutory dedications, where a public entity has followed a statutory 
procedure in accepting a dedication, and common law dedications, where the offer and acceptance of a 
dedication are based on the totality of the circumstances.  See MCQUILLIN, supra note 143, § 33:3; see 
also supra note 139.  The U.S. Supreme Court, in the second Illinois Central case, found that the Fort 
Dearborn Addition (fractional section 10) was a statutory dedication because it conformed to the state 
statute governing dedications.  United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 154 U.S. 225, 236–38 (1894).  The 
Illinois Supreme Court, in the Ward cases, indicated that it did not matter whether the dedication on the 
Chicago lakefront was statutory or common law.  See Ward, 169 Ill. at 403, 48 N.E. at 930.  The other 
distinction is between specific dedications, where particular uses are required or proscribed, and general 
dedications, which simply convey land to the general use of the public.  See United States v. Ill. Cent. 
R.R., 26 F. Cas. 461 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1869); MCQUILLIN, supra note 143, § 33:11.  The Illinois courts 
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poorly defined standard, which confers considerable discretion on courts 
and tends to make bargaining among interest groups more difficult.  In 
Illinois, the courts have searched for an enforceable rule and have found 
only one: title to public trust lands must not be transferred to private 
entities.679  This has done little to further the cause of preservation. 
Fourth, the public dedication doctrine incorporates a standing rule that 
identifies, in addition to public authorities, a finite group of virtual 
representatives of the public who can enforce or waive the dedication: 
abutting landowners.  Abutting landowners will be motivated to monitor for 
violations and to seek to prevent deviations from permitted uses, for they 
have a direct financial interest in doing so.  Part of the value of the public 
dedication is capitalized in the value of their real estate holdings, and this 
gives the members a powerful incentive to seek to preserve the 
dedication.680  Thus, if momentary enthusiasms for development of public 
spaces overcome civic leaders, abutting landowners can step forward to 
resist the idea, and in so doing protect longer-run interests in conserving 
public spaces. 
In contrast, the public trust doctrine swings between one of two 
extremes in terms of standing rules.  In Illinois, before Paepcke, only the 
Attorney General could sue to enforce the public trust; afterwards, any state 
taxpayer had standing to sue.681  The former rule leaves enforcement of the 
public trust subject to the vagaries of the political process; the latter rule 
supplements public enforcement with enforcement activity by nonprofit 
advocacy groups.  Limiting enforcement to public officials may lead to 
underenforcement, particularly if public officials are vulnerable to capture 
by private interests that favor development.  Expanding enforcement by 
recognizing universal taxpayer standing may result in overenforcement, 
insofar as the preferences of advocacy groups may not align with median 
voter preferences.  Moreover, allowing any advocacy group to bring an 
enforcement action may mean in practice that the decision whether to 
enforce particular restrictions on the use of public spaces is delegated to the 
discretion of the courts, which raises difficult questions about whether this 
is a legitimate judicial function.682 
 
eventually agreed that the Chicago lakefront dedication was a specific dedication proscribing buildings 
within the dedicated space.  See Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 508–10, 89 
N.E. 731, 736 (1909). 
679  Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 203 Ill. 2d 312, 325–28, 786 N.E.2d 161, 169–70 (2003); 
People ex. rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 77–78, 360 N.E.2d 773, 779–80 (1976). 
680  For a general explanation of how neighborhood amenities are capitalized in land values, see 
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001). 
681  See Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 46 Ill. 2d 330, 341, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (1970). 
682  See William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-based 
Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental 
Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385 (1997) (suggesting that the public trust doctrine suffers from a democracy 
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Fifth, provided that the number of abutting owners is not too large, the 
public dedication doctrine provides a mechanism for allowing 
modifications to the dedication over time.  Minor deviations that have a 
minimal impact on abutting land values will not likely be challenged, and 
once such projects have been completed, challenges will be barred by 
laches.  Major deviations that nevertheless enhance the value of abutting 
property may also take place pursuant to the unanimous consent 
mechanism.  The public trust doctrine is also subject to the defense of 
laches,683 but contains nothing like the unanimous consent mechanism for 
achieving ex ante authorization to modify public uses. 
No legal doctrine functions perfectly, of course, and our review of the 
history of the public dedication doctrine in the context of the Chicago 
lakefront also reveals some limitations of that doctrine.  One clear 
limitation is that the private interests of abutting landowners will often fail 
to generate a level of enforcement activity commensurate with the total 
value to the community of preserving public spaces.  Almost by definition, 
the value to abutting landowners will be a fraction of the total community 
value.  Thus, although it is quite possible that the public dedication doctrine 
will generate more enforcement activity than the public trust doctrine, it is 
unlikely that it will generate optimal levels of enforcement. 
In the context of Chicago’s lakefront park, Montgomery Ward was by 
no means the only enforcement agent.  A variety of owners, ranging from 
John Stafford to Warren Leland, Sarah Daggett, Clarence Marks, Levy 
Mayer, Robert H. McCormick, and the Stevens family all took up the cause 
of protecting the park.684  The public dedication doctrine generated a fairly 
consistent level of enforcement activity by abutting landowners from 1864 
until the new millennium, with the exception of the period immediately 
after the 1871 fire that destroyed most of the structures along Michigan 
Avenue.685 
Nevertheless, Montgomery Ward unquestionably engaged in 
enforcement activity at a higher and more sustained level than any owner 
before or since.  Other owners sought and obtained temporary injunctions.  
But they usually dropped out of the picture after a few years.  Rarely did 
they persist in litigating to the point of securing a permanent injunction.  
And only Ward was willing to fund litigation through repeated rounds of 
appellate litigation. 
This suggests that perhaps one or more abutting owners must have 
unusually large stakes to obtain effective enforcement.  If every abutting 
 
deficit); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: 
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986) (arguing that public regulation is 
inherently superior to judicial enforcement of a vague trust obligation). 
683  Hickey v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 35 Ill. 2d 427, 220 N.E.2d 415 (1966). 
684  See supra Parts III and IV.B. 
685  See supra notes 57–74 and accompanying text. 
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owner has an equal and relatively small stake, then it will be difficult to 
form a coalition to share the costs of litigation, because of familiar 
problems in forging agreements for collective action.686  Only if one or more 
owners have unusually large stakes—either because they have more land or 
because their land is more sensitive to the preservation of public uses—will 
the public dedication mechanism work.687  The Ward history also suggests 
that effective enforcement may depend on one or more owners being rather 
fanatical, either because they harbor unusually intense preferences for 
preservation or because they are drawn into a grudge match with 
proponents of development, or for some other reason.  Obviously, the 
conditions that call forth a champion who fights to defend a public 
dedication will be somewhat rare. 
Another limitation highlighted by the history is that the preferences of 
abutting owners and of the general public may diverge, sometimes quite 
significantly.  On the largest question—whether to maintain a public space 
or permit it to be privatized—there is likely to be a convergence of interests.  
But on subsidiary issues, abutting landowners may harbor very different 
preferences about how to manage public spaces.  To simplify, abutting 
owners are likely to prefer peace and quiet, whereas the general public may 
want fun and games.  As we have seen, Michigan Avenue owners tended to 
oppose baseball stadiums, toboggan slides, armories used as venues for 
prize fights, circuses, political conventions held in wigwams, and pavilions 
for outdoor concerts.  It is likely that a public referendum would yield 
different views on these activities.  Ward, who became the park’s most 
important enforcement agent, may have harbored even more negative views 
about public gatherings than most abutting owners. 
C. The Feasibility of Antiproperty 
Finally, our history allows us to offer some observations about the 
proposal to confer antiproperty rights on abutting owners of public spaces 
in order to encourage their preservation.688  This proposal closely conforms 
to the public dedication doctrine, but with some significant qualifications. 
One qualification concerns who has the burden of going forward in a 
regime of unanimous consent.  If public authorities must solicit consents, 
then the costs of exercising a veto are very low.  An owner merely has to 
refuse to sign a form.  If abutting owners must go to court and secure an 
 
686  See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS (1965). 
687  The argument is analogous to the claim that asymmetric stakes are necessary for the emergence 
of property rights, see Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S331–33 (2002), or that skewed distribution is necessary for 
effective enforcement of public-safety rules, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: 
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 134–38 (1994). 
688  See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 16. 
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injunction, then the costs of exercising a veto are much higher.  Now 
owners must incur substantial litigation costs in order to wield a veto. 
The assumed burden of going forward implicitly shifted from time to 
time during the history of the Chicago lakefront.  During the heyday of 
Ward’s reign as watchdog, city officials came to behave as if they had to 
obtain Ward’s consent before they could do anything on the lakefront.  This 
also appears to have been the assumption during the thirty-year period in 
which the Park District was frustrated in its efforts to build a new band 
shell.  But after the Chicago Fire, and perhaps more recently during the 
planning for Millennium Park, city officials seem to have assumed that they 
have the right to build, unless and until an owner obtains a court order 
stopping them.  Perhaps the assumption about who has the burden of going 
forward depends on how clearly the dedication applies, and on how salient 
the possibility of judicial enforcement is in the minds of those affected. 
In any event, if one were to legislate an antiproperty rule, a critical 
variable would be to determine the burden of going forward under a 
unanimous consent rule.  One could legislate a rule requiring owner consent 
in all cases, which would make the costs of exercising the veto low.  
Alternatively, one could legislate a right to object that would be effectuated 
only by securing a judicial judgment, which would make the costs of 
exercising the veto relatively high. 
The history of Grant Park suggests that a costly veto is better.  Any 
activity as complex as managing a public park or similar public space will 
entail many issues as to which reasonable minds can differ.  Should public 
lavatories be permitted in the park or not?  Should temporary tents for 
festivals be permitted or not?  If public authorities must secure unanimous 
consent for every decision, nothing will be permitted, and the park may 
degenerate into an unruly or unused commons.  One solution would be to 
try to define the types of major decisions that require authorities to secure 
unanimous consent, leaving minor issues to the discretion of public 
authorities.  But this would generate disputes about what is major and 
minor.  The public dedication doctrine partially solves the problem by in 
effect imposing a tax on the exercise of the veto, equal to the legal fees that 
must be expended to secure an injunction.  Under the American rule that 
precludes fee-shifting, this means that abutting owners will exercise the 
veto only if the disutility of the proposed change is sufficiently severe to 
warrant the investment in legal fees. 
A second qualification concerns the number of parties who must 
consent.  The larger the number of parties, the higher the transaction costs 
of securing unanimous consent.  Bell and Parchomovsky write as if the 
higher the transaction costs the better, because the public space will be 
more effectively protected.689  This perspective, however, leads to the 
 
689  See id. at 5–6. 
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conclusion that consent should be required of everyone in the community, 
since this would generate the highest level of transaction costs and hence 
the most protection. 
The history of Grant Park suggests that overprotection is a problem as 
well as underprotection.  Grant Park would be a less valuable public 
resource without the Art Institute, and the Art Institute was made possible 
only because it was feasible to obtain the consent of directly abutting 
owners.  Likewise, Grant Park would be less valuable without Millennium 
Park, which was also made possible by the consent mechanism.  This in 
turn suggests that the number of abutting owners who wield the veto should 
not be so numerous that unanimous consent can never be obtained for major 
modifications of the public space. 
If this conclusion is sound, then the understanding of the relevant 
universe of parties who must consent that was followed in securing 
approval of the Art Institute, the Public Library, and Millennium Park—
directly abutting plus diagonally situated owners—is a better rule than the 
one implied by the decisions in Ward III and IV—all abutting owners 
surrounding the park.  Today, with commercial real estate located on three 
sides of the park, and many of the structures organized as condominiums, 
securing unanimous consent of all abutting owners would be virtually 
impossible.  Adopting the large universe of affected parties implied by 
Ward III and IV would be tantamount to eliminating any realistic prospect 
of securing a waiver of the dedication.  History suggests that this is too 
inflexible.  The precedent embedded in practice may, at least in this context, 
be superior to the one embodied in judicial decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The public dedication doctrine has largely disappeared, at least as a 
tool for protecting public spaces such as parks, squares, and commons.  The 
history of Grant Park suggests that this is regrettable.  The park would not 
exist today were it not for the understanding that public dedications create 
rights in abutting owners, allowing them to insist on strict adherence to 
public uses.  The public dedication doctrine was called upon by generations 
of property owners on Michigan Avenue, most prominently but not 
exclusively Montgomery Ward, to fight off a seemingly endless series of 
proposals for erecting structures in the park.  The result of their efforts was 
to create a spectacular public space in the center of Chicago, one of the 
most dramatic urban spaces in the world today (see Figure 22).  Various 
fortuities entered into the story of how this happened, including large events 
such as the Chicago Fire and the Columbian Exposition, and quirks of 
personality such as the mysterious Mr. Ward.  But the law was also a major 
contributing force.  If that law is forgotten, the odds of creating similar 
public spaces in the future will be diminished. 
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